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ABSTRACT
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,

Directed by:
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Theories of democracy contain unnoticed (implicit)

assumptions about the nature of the self and of communication which result in their transformation into authoritarian theories.

An examination of these assumptions yields

the possibility of

action. Such

a

a

non-authoritarian theory of political

theory requires

which allows for

a

a

conjunct theory of self

procession of multiple concrete selves.

In the dissertation

I

show certain historical relations

of particular theories of self and of communication to

particular democratic theories based on shared assumptions
(liberalism, hegelian-mar xism) and criticize the

hierarchical nature of ensuing theories of action;

I

discuss possible democratic theories that might result from
the construction of theories grounded in conceptions of self

and of communication that have not been seen as conjunct

with particular political philosophies (namely the

conceptions of Kierkegaard and of Bataille)
construct

a

;

and, finally,

theory of self having the necessary assumptions

to produce a non-authoritarian theory of concrete political

action.
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INTRODUCTION

....the relations that reign between
philosophical
ideas are what are called relations of
forces,
ideological, and therefore political relations
of
orces.
But it is bourgeois philosophical ideas
that are in power.
The question of power is the
number onequestion in philosophy too.
Philosophy
is indeed in the last instance
political.
(Althusser {1982} p. 168)

In this dissertation

I

examine certain relationships

between theories of the self, theories of communication,
and
theories of democracy and political action.
I am motivated
to examine these relations because of a suspicion
that

political theorists often begin with unnoticed assumptions
about the self and about communication which inevitably turn
their theories into authoritarian ones.

My purpose is to

develop conceptions of the self and of communication

consistent with an anti-authoritarian, maybe eventually
non-authoritarian, politics.
My work divides itself into two parts:

constructive.
I

critical and

In the critical portions of the dissertation

examine two schools of democratic theory with an aim to

exposing the assummptions just noted.
the dissertation

I

In the latter half of

attempt to describe selves that might act

politically, without following old hierarchical patterns,
and the communications that facilitate those selves.

turning to the major divisions of the text,

method

I

I

Before

describe the

use in both divisions and indicate my use of some

of the important terms in the dissertation.

.

2

Methodology

in both the critical and
the constructive portions of

this work

deal with generalized views—
par ticular ly in the
critical portion.
There are several reasons for this.
Most
importantly, I wanted to offer a
critique concerning not
merely a given philosopher who held
a specific view about
political action, nor even a philosophical
tradition, e.g,
I

liberalism.

Rather,

wanted to criticize the cultural

I

background that produces the assumptions of
the specific
philosophers and philosophical traditions that
I

Consequently,

I

cite.

use texts more as symbolic of cultural

tendencies than as the considered views of individuals.

It

would be inconsistent for me, given the conclusions
that

I

want to reach, to focus on refuting the specific

formulations of any given thinker.
thinkers on whom

I

Furthermore, many of the

do focus, particularly in the latter

half, do not easily lend themselves to systematic treatment.
It

is especially noticeable in Kierkegaard's "corpus," where

attempts to trace the same themes from text to text must
f ail

Wherever possible

I

have kept "philosophy" within the

conceptual space that includes "self" and "communication."
Political philosophy has been opened into psychological and
social space.

Two techniques have been used through the

3

dissertation to keep political philosophy
naive enough to
illustrate its presuppositions, rather
than its apparent
content.
First, I have tried to use non-political
texts by
important philosophers when discussing
the assumptions of
their political views.
Second, when I use political texts I
have tried to read them psychologically—
as motivators to
action and not as explanations of past
history.
An example
of the first technique is found in
Chapter One where, when

discussing Locke,

I

draw on his work in epistemology,

formally ignoring the work he has done in
political theory.
An example of the second technique is found
in Chapter Two

where

I

exposit some of the psychological requisites to

being

a

Hegelian/Marxist.

That

materialist conception of the self is needed is

a

noticed by many theorists.
p.

21.)

Throughout

materialist

I

(See for instance.

Smith {1988}

have tried to be consistently

trying to succumb neither to essentialism nor

to idealism.

There are two occasions where

I

have had to

fall from materialism in order to explain myself.

these places.

I

mark

One is in the formulation of two principles

of demogenic action.

The other is when

I

assume, as

I

do

throughout the dissertation, that absence of hierarchy is

categorically preferable to its presence.

The technique

I

use to keep myself as materialist as possible is to frame my

research always in terms of how actual selves might respond
to theses

I

examine, criticize or suggest.

I

try to

e

4

privilege that standard above
others— even consistency-but
it is impossible to know if
i have succeeded
in this

respect.

The question that structures my
examinations is:

what would it feel like if an
individual acting in
political context believed the propositions
in question and
what actions could be motivated by
that feeling."

Terms

I

list below some of the terms

the dissertation

Cul tur

:

"low" cultures.

[1]

I

use most frequently in

.

notice no difference between "high" and

I

I

distinguish between "culture" and

"Culture" in that the latter is spoken through and to the

vessel selves by power and the former is an emergent

commonality that is not accessible to vessel selves.

In

short, "Culture" embraces what is normally called "high

culture" and "low culture," that is, the entire ideological

apparatus of an existing power structure.
This distinction in itself is not value-laden as there
is no reason in principle that "Culture" could not produce

and engage in objects and practices that are valuable.
Indeed, cultures will be formed within

a

Culture, although

5

in demogenic opposition to it.

I

make the distinction only

because "culture" can be power-less or
anti-hierarchical.
Because "culture" is largely invisible to "Culture,"
the
following sort of remark can be made:
It is a major anomaly of contemporary
American
politics and culture that socialist thought has
become restricted mainly to highbrow
circles--circles in turn restricted mainly to the
upper social classes, whose self-interest is
ultimately inimical to socialism.

(Lazere {1987}, p. 18)

The claims apparently made in this bit of text have no

basis in fact;

they are advanced on the assumption that

Culture is all there is.

That they are written as if

obvious can be explained by "culture's" relative
invisibility.

Demogenic

:

This is an adjective used mainly to describe

strategies and selves.

A demogenic strategy is one that

helps to produce new selves (or

a

new self);

a

demogenic

self is one capable of transforming itself, when context
allows,

into a different self.

contrasted with

A demogenic self can be

vessel self in that the former makes new

a

selves from the vessel self who is an empty shell for power.
A demogenic self does not have a body but is a body.

Heterodemot ic

describe groups.

:

This is an adjective used mainly to
A heterodemot i c group is one that does not

depend on its duration for any of its purposes and that does

6

not exclude on any grounds
but that of absence of
demogenic
properties. The aims of heterodemo
tic groups are immediate;
they have no long terms plans.
They could never e xhaust the

possibilities for either social or
political life- -to
suppose they might (or anything
could) is Utopian and
idealist in the extreme.
Heterodemot ic groups are to
bureaucracies what the Hegelian slave
is to the ma ster--in
all the possible senses [2].
He terodemo t ic groups
are to

State Power what culture is to Culture.

Ideology

I

:

use this term non— idiosyncr at ical iy.

Ideology is the stuff of vessel selves.

--formation
because

will argue that there are democratic theorists
who

I

assume that
mean, as

"Information" is an important term for me

:

I

a

self is exhausted by its information.

think the theorists

I

examine mean, that

I

a

self

can be regarded as the sum of useable and retrievable data
in a human system.

Thus

a

self's information includes the

impulses of its nervous system, its genes, its

memories

— short-

and long-term, and so on.

A self exhausted

by its information refers to the ideological construct that

often goes by the words "individual" or "person."

It does

not refer to only that of which an "individual" is conscious

right now.

.

7

Power:

Desire for power is the end
result of the
primary internalisation of
repression.
As

such, the desire

for power follows a habituation
of hierarchical patterns.

formally reproduces inequality and
is inherently
exclusive.
Because power is a relation, the desire
for it
must include a tacit or explicit
desire for a domineering
role in a relation.
I use power only as
a relation, and as
a relation that is attendant
on hierarchy.
it requires the
unconscious or conscious assumption of a
third term that is
necessarily an abstraction often a principle.
This third
term allows persons to recoil from the
use of force.
This
is neither good nor bad in theory.
A full discussion occurs
It

—

in Chapter Four.

Self/s ubject

There is

:

a

tension in the dissertation

between "self" and "subject."

"Subject" is such an

appropriate choice for the construct

I

term "self" that an

explanation for its rejection is in order.
a

note on usage.

produce too great

When the thinkers on whom
a

First, though,
I

am commenting

dissonance with the term "self,"

subject" in scare quotes.

I

use

"Subject" without scare quotes

refers to someone else's usage.

"Self" undergoes

a

similar

waver ing
I

use "self" rather than "subject" for two major

reasons.

The first is that "subject" connotes much more

8

than

I

connote with "self."

The history of "subject,"

especially its recent history is
the remarks on method indicate,
(not necessarily ordinary)

study all its own.

a
I

As

have tried to use naive

language wherever possible.

Self" seems more naive to me.

Second, and more importantly, are
three specific
connotations that I want no resonance with.
The first is
the use of the term by Althusser, the
second
its use by

Lacan, and the third its ordinary meanings
that are

associated with political subjection, as in "the
King's
subjects'" or "she 'subjected' herself to
work."

a

long day's

Both Althusser's and Lacan's uses of the terms

overlap to some degree with my usage but differ more
than
they agree.

Althusser's "subject," which contains imaginary

representations has some resonance with what
vessel self--bu t also

a

dissonance.

I

have called

Lacan's "subject," the

divided self who is suspended between the symbolic and the
imaginary describes

stage right before political action.

a

Lacan's "subject" is perhaps closer to "self" than
Althusser's.

But as

I

will explain in Chapter Four, Lacan's

self is born once, in oedipal struggle.

multiple births.

I

wish to allow for

9

vessel self:

The vessel self is the interpellated

subject and nothing more.

The Thesis of the Thesis

Contemporary social and political philosophy
is often a
struggle between those who would announce the
death of the
self, and those who would rescue the self
as

a

guard against

fascism, communism, or some other perceived
enemy.

On this

terrain, the death of the self seems the negation
of the

assertion of the self, but the opposed views work with
simple principle of individuation;

a

every living individual,

every breathing human body, is associated with

a

single

self, or with none.

a

living

A third possibility,

human being may be associated with

a

that

trivial self, the

vessel self, but also with various concrete selves created
in political action with others, has occasionally been

suggested as

a

third possibility that would unsettle the

tired parameters of the existing debates about selves.
know of no sustained effort to establish that this is

concretely realizable and coherent possibility.

I

a

The thesis

of my thesis is that such multiple selves are possible, and
I

try to indicate in practical terms how they are formed,

and how they can act.

Indeed, my thesis is that these

10

selves are not only possible, but that
they are possible
because they have already been actualized.
it is to prove
this that I try to achieve naivete
regarding selves,

communication, and democracy.

The concepts as they are

currently used are too rigid to allow the
conceptual space
in which an awareness of the existence
of concrete demogenic
actors would be possible.

,

Notes to Introduction
1.
Some of the entries cross-refer.
For i nstance
vessel self is in the Culture entry
and in the Demogenic
entry but not defined until its own
entry.
2
Including the sense of "invention."
Rofn
Before
Subnectivation, " Slavoj Si2ek points out "The Subiect
that
readers often overlook the invention
of the Master by the
Slave as a means of externalizing
repression.

m

‘

That's why we could say that it's precisely
in the
moment when we achieve victory over the
enemy in the
antagonistic struggle in the social reality
that we
experience the antagonism in its most radical
dimension, as a self-hindrance.
(2i2ek {1987} p.

This "loss of a loss," made much of by Bataille
(see Chapter
1S a possible route for selves
not a necessary one.
The point is. that there really is more
culture than Culturemore demogenic selves than vessel selves and more
heterodemo tic groups than bureaucracies.

—

CHAPTER

I

THE SELF EXCHANGE:

DEMOCRACY AND

COMMUNICATION AS INFORMATION BROKERING

Three decades ago the current notion of justice
as

fairness was introduced into philosophical
discourse and
then justified by
{1958}

revised contract theory.

a

and {1971}.)

(See Rawls

Theorists were forced to re-evaluate

their notions of justice and its justification.

thought it odd that there be

rendered obsolete by
offspring.

a

return to

a

Some

theory apparently

scientific utilitarianism and its

a

Others thought it odder still that the return

should be so widely acclaimed.

I

think that the return to

contract theory is not very surprising in that contract
theory was never really abandoned in the justification of
liberal

(or

other)

theories of democracy [1],

An image

which represented and then stood as literal justification
for the king's right,

that he was the head of the state, has

remained in the culture long after it could have any

representational value.
image of

a

The culture never became rid of the

just head of state directing the body politic to

carry out its commands.

The image remained widespread even

though such an image was no longer necessary to further any

interest in the culture.
is

unchanged or useless:

This is not to say that the image
it has evolved with us.

The

portion of the image concerning the body became more

13

involved;

but the "body has retained

a

mind or brain

outside of itself, even if the "body
democratically chooses
rts own "head," subject to
recall.
his theorizing

m

against the divine right of kings,
John Locke begins a
dissipation of concentrated power— each
person is said to
have sovereign rights independent of
any head of state.
J.

Mill, whose theories should have made
contract theory
forever meaningless, maintains the image
that makes a
S.

reemergence of contract theory possible when
he writes in On
L-lbert y that:
"Over himself, over his own body
and mind,

the individual is sovereign"

Two deaths

(Mill

{1961} p. 263).

the death of God and that of Monarchs

played havoc with democratic theory and practice.
and Monarchy there was

a

chain of command,

With neither the notion of

a

a

— have

With God

chain of being.

chain is nonsense.

For what

can it mean that the individual is sovereign in Mill's

sense?

I

will argue that it can mean nothing

no good sense.

that it is

a

— that

it makes

That it is an incoherent formulation and

foundational value in much democratic theory

are responsible for tensions and contradictions in

democratic theory.

I

hope to trace these tensions in

democratic theory to the conceptual framework which has
allowed us to talk as if sovereignty over self made sense.
It has remained possible for us to talk as if such phrases

made sense because

lingers on.

I

a

discourse that embodies such locutions

will argue that the theory of self and

14

communication that holds up liberal
democratic theory makes
ostensible sense of Mill-talk and
Rawls-talk by concealing
nonsense in the stock of accepted discourse.
The work of Chapter One is to analyse
the notion of

democracy which is based on

a

theory of communication that

includes tacitly or explicitly held themes.

In all my

discussions and arguments the structure of my
theses will
be:

if a series of beliefs are held about
the self,

and

about what it means for selves to communicate,
then beliefs
about democracy and society follow which pose
serious

problems for any attempt to think through

a

non-authoritarian social structure, and for locating styles
of political action that do not end in the seizure
of power.

Holding certain beliefs seems to preclude an adequate

conceptual framework for living democratically.

I

try to

locate some of those beliefs.
The first theme

ethos as much as

a

— to

be examined as a part of an age's

philosophical thesis--is that the self is

taken to be equal to the information it contains.

This

theme can take many forms and finds expression in

philosophers as diverse as Locke and Lyotard.

Once embraced

this theme yields the result that no meaningful distinctions

can be drawn between communication theory and political
theory.

Lyotard's work can be used an as example of such

a

confusion--as when the logical extension of his work entails
that politics might become

a

battle over communication

15

systems.

A second theme is that

individuals have some

special sovereignty with respect to
themselves.

possible that the image has innocent
origins.

it is

it has become

dangerous over the years as it has become
internalized and
then projected outward.
The third theme is not,

nor could

it have been,

so innocent.

I

am referring to the idea that

there is an analogy to be drawn between
the body politic and
the human body such that the brain is
to the human body what
the parliament

(or

body politic.

This cluster of themes (some of which are

legislature or head of state)

believed only tacitly)

is responsible,

is to the

in large part,

for

the problems that accompany traditional democratic
theory.

The third theme is only possible in our age because of
the

persistence of the first two themes.

It is no longer

the

king or queen who is the head of state but those whom the

body politic elect to represent their interests.
I

will discuss two problems that result from the three

themes.

Each problem has its basis in

a

manner of viewing

communication which is consistent with the three themes
mentioned above. The first problem arises because of

widespread belief in the following additional cultural
themes.

First, many people take selves and ideas to be

fixed, separate and equal.

Ideas are so seen and

a

vague

analogy has come to be made between the ideas and the selves
who "have" them.

Democratic theory has often made use of

this analogy between self and its ideas to buttress concepts

.

16

pertaining to "free citizens"

of the state which has them.

Separate' and "equal" are adjectives often
applied to
citizenry. That the citizenry might also
be "fixed" is not
always seen as contradictory. with respect
to democracy,
these separate equalities will be used to
describe citizens
of the state.

As a consequence, novelty in persons
and in

ideas is taken as miraculous

— i.e.,

explanation for novelty

or change must be seen as incoherent
and impossible.

Novelty and change within the democracy cannot be
seen as

necessary or even possible in

a

citizens as fixed individuals.

society which defines its
For example,

have essential characteristics only

struggle is possible.

a

if classes

certain kind of class

Finally, communication is seen as the

exchange of already fixed ideas.

Justice or fairness in the

democracy is viewed as the appropriate exchange of desires
or interests culminating in whatever distribution of goods

and services such an exchange implies. This becomes

a

problem given that there can be no appropriate analysis of
desiring or desires when the self is restricted to

information available to it.

Accordingly, and predictably,

fairness becomes the exchange of correct or legitimate

desires

[2]

One can see that this problem is serious

because when desire becomes coupled with correctness,

totalitarianism and domination have been invited into the
system along with the "objective" measure of correctness.
(To say nothing of the fact that it obliterates desire as

17

such.)

Not every claim to correctness ends
in

totalitarianism;

there is

a

pattern, however, that leads

from the assumption of correctness,
to intolerance to

totalitarianism.

This pattern will be discussed in more

detail below in "Justice:

Contracting Correct Desires."

My

ultimate aim in this chapter is to show that
the road to the
dispersal of power is blocked and twisted by the
marketplace
of interests in which selves are valued,
understood and

talked with as potential sovereigns.

The notion of

sovereignty requires legitimation.
The theory of communication according to which selves

exchange already available information cannot offer any

significant strategies in the political arena.

Because

knowledge is power, and everyone is the monarch of his or
her own information, democracy is the free market exchange
of bits of "self."

available strategy;

Exchanging parts of oneself is the only
but, as

I

will argue, it can have no

significant effect on the structure of political affairs.
There are two reasons why this is so.

First,

a

strategy can

only rearrange bits of information according to preset
rules.

For example a convention can change to a caucus, but

in both cases preexistent preferences are tabulated.

Second, and more importantly, such strategy is

self-centered.

If one had internalized the image, one would

always be busy figuring out who one was, and what one was
allowed

,

too busy to act or try to figure out who anyone

18

else was from their point of view
[3].

That is, in

a

democracy whose participants view themselves
as mini-states,
the only consistent strategy is
anarchist
individualism.

(The state could not be any but a state
of war of all

against all with the difference that the state's
state of
war had something like a world gover nmen
t--which
is

incoherent.)

it is impossible to believe in one's
efficacy

against and in concert with social institutions given
that

particular conceptual picture.

Or to put it another way,

within this view of affairs, social institutions can
appear
only as groups of individuals who band together solely
for

purposes of self-interest.
The second problem mentioned above is the following.
First, given the theory's presuppositions, new ideas are

always no more than new combinations of the old "fixed"
ideas.

Restricted to this basis, communication is the

combination and exchanging of ideas.

As such it can only be

as successful as the adequacy of the technology which

transmits it.

The translation of this aspect of information

theory into democratic theory is again that the institutions
of democracy are already given.

One's job as

a

good citizen

is to analyze the structures available in order to find the

best manipulation of them.

What is most emphatically not

one's job, is the production of new institutions.

Thus

conceptual work place exists wherein it is possible for
rational persons to condone or despise political groups

a
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according to whether they are sanctioned
by the "head."
For
example, it is possible to consistently
maintain within this
framework that the Casey - North Poindexter secret groups
are "wrong" for exactly the same
reason that secret cells
within the FMLN are "wrong."
"These people take things
into their own hands... they have no
respect for
the tried

institutions."

This kind of judgment might turn out to
be

a

correct one in some cases; it is not worthy
of being

generalized into political theory as the example
shows.

if

it has no place as a general principle
of political theory,

it has no place as a major assumption of
the same.

Democratic theory has

a

difficult time preserving

a

meaningful private/public distinction if the selves under
analysis are uncertain of their own boundaries, and, if
those selves find images from formal images.

were said to be made in God's image;

Once humans

now our image is

sometimes said to be derived from society.

Portions of

society, however, can be formally equivalent in spite of

differences with respect to end and ideology.

As Weber

reminds us "the principle of hierarchical office authority
is found in all bureaucratic s true tur es

.

.

.

I t

does not matter

for the character of the bureaucracy whether its authority
is called

'private' or

'public'"

(Weber {1946} p.

197).

Our

images derive from our power source so selves become

uncertain of where they might be.

Theoretically, they must

be uncertain of their own boundaries in that everyone's

20

information is potentially available
to every other self.
Mass communication networks are
discussed as a panacea to
many social ills and as the beginning
of universal

understanding [4].

"Separate but equal" fairness is

a

short-cut consequence, and the private
sphere seems in
principle to melt away under the assault from
theory.

Voting becomes

a

symbol for an ultimately powerful political

act because it is modeled on the universal
exchange of
ideas.

The end result is unspoken:

is talking to one another.

no one says that voting

But that is the model and the

model is satisfied by interacting computers exchanging

memory banks.

That this model is absurd as explanatory or

heuristic is not be discovered by asking if we would accept
this exchange of steely information as our decision

procedure;

instead, we can see the inadequacy by asking

whether such

a

communication is what we, any of us,

at root, prefer.

would,

These two problems indicate that neither

social institutions nor political action can be explained in
terms of
I

a

contract theory of democracy.

will proceed as follows in this chapter.

First

I

will

discuss the manner and extent in which thinking about
liberal democratic theories and societies involves the

illegitimate image of head of state and body politic
alluded to above.

Second,

I

will further discuss the first

problem using the work of John Rawls as symptomatic of the

assumption of structural stability.

Third,

I

will discuss

.
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the second problem to indicate that
traditional theories of

democracy cannot legitimate coherent
political action [5]
There is no necessity to the order in which
I discuss
the two problems of democratic theory that

I

have chosen.

It is not the case that any given democracy
or

have to encounter these problems in this order.

its theories
I

do

believe that modern democratic apologetics inevitably

encounter both problems.

If it can be determined that there

are conditions under which democratic institutions
cannot be

changed and if it can be further determined that those

conditions exist, then one will know that the theory will
not provide solutions to certain flagrant social illnesses.
If it can be determined that there are conditions under

which political action in

democracy is inherently

a

quiescent, then again theory or democracy must change if
social improvement is to be conceivable.

One must survey

the most basic levels of conceptual analysis before being

capable of defining

a

more flexible form of democracy.

Image-Making

Theme One:
In the Essay

:

Every Man A King

The Unified Self of Information

,

Locke mentions as "evident" several

counterintuitive properties of "self:

s

'
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Self is that conscious thinking
thing, (whatever
e
UP ° f whether ^ritual, or
Mater iai 'simn?
° r Cora P ounded
it matters not)
which i senqfh ^
Pain,
'

/

extends.
Ihus'evlryone** inds.^ha^whUsf^ieusness
comprehended under that consciousness, the
little
Finger is as much a part of it self,
as what is
most so.
upon separation of this little
Finger
should this consciousness go along
with the little
d leaVe th
g
eSt ° f the Body, 'tis evident
the
he Ii;
t ?: F
little
Finger would be the Person,
the same
Person;
and self then would have nothing to
do with
Bod y--- In this personal Identity is
founded all the Right and Justice of
Reward and
Punishment;
Happiness and Misery, being that, for
which every one is concerned for himself,
not
mattering what becomes of any Substance, not
joined to, or affected with that consciousness.
For
as it is evident in the instance I gave
but now, if
the consciousness went along with the
little Finger,
which it was cut off, that would be the same
self
which was concerned for the whole Body Yesterday,
as
making a part of it self, whose Actions then it
cannot but admit as its own now.
(Locke (19751

V

pp.

341 - 42

;

)

Under what conditions can it be assumed as obvious that

one's little finger
of oneself as
a

finger with

that mind?

(albeit with memory)

What is most so?"
a

is as much a part

How can it be evident that

mind" would be the person who once held

In the end one can agree with Locke.

If a

surgeon were about to throw out an amputated finger in order
better to concentrate on the brain which had been the focus
of an operating session, and then, suddenly, the finger were
to cry out in something resembling language, however

remotely, someone would at the very least put the finger,
the person

,

on ice.

So while Locke may be right,

there is

something strange about his use of "self-evident"
and
everyone would agree" in connection with his
bizarre
fantasies.
And not only because "everyone would agree
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after cons ider able thought on the matter, but
also because

when one assents to the finger's being the
same self it is
through a sense of moral duty— -"that finger could
be me or

someone else

I

love."

That is, the assent here would be

a

slower and more complicated one than that to "the cat
is on
the mat" when the cat is, in fact, on the mat.
I

believe that the reason Locke holds these notions of

personal identity to be obvious is that they are based on
what is obvious, namely, that one values in the political

realm those "things" with which one is capable of

communication.

What is more questionable, but what Locke

has to hold, is that one values most highly those whose

communications most closely mimic one's own, in this case,
the case of Locke, the free individual.

Locke begins by

recognizing the importance of communication, but his

explicit valuation makes the bourgeois "free" individual the

paradigm of the locus of communication.

Locke conflates the

two concepts of communication and the communicating

individual.

For Locke,

in my terms,

one is one, and there

are as many political agents as there are named individuals
in the ordinary sense of legitimate,

persons.

named, rational

One's personal identity expands to include that

with which one is able to identify in thought.

Locke says

.

that one cannot care about "what becomes
of any Substance^
not joined to, or affected with that
consciousness" of

oneself.

The key concepts to retain are, first, that
for

Locke one is what one is able to identify with
in thought
and, second, that one can only care about what
one is in

this sense.

Colin Cherry,

a

mathematician and information theorist,

makes similar points centuries later.

Cherry values the

individual and the individual's capacity for communication
to the extent that,

like Locke, he merges conceiver and

concept in one "personal" identity.

Locke's "self"--the

finger who remembers being itself, i.e., who remembers the
other body's information-- is supplanted, metaphorically, by
the printed word:

Inasmuch as the words we use disclose the true
nature of things, as truth is to each one of us, the
various words relating to personal communication are
most revealing. The very word "communicate" means
"share", and inasmuch as you and I are communicating
at this moment, we are one.
(Cherry {1957} p. 4)

Cherry thinks that if one understands others, one is in some
sense, the sense of unity, part of one personal identity,
("We understand one another.

(Cherry {1957} p.
I

This one another is the unity"

4)

juxtapose Locke and Cherry here to point out the ease

with which each of two very different thinkers might be said
to be able to communicate.

For both. personal identity is

defined in terms of the selves with, or about whom, one can
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think.

Communication for these thinkers is the
conscious
transmission of information between
selves; it seems an

alarmingly wide conceptual leap that
Cherry does not write
merely of the reader having become one
with him, but also of
having become his book [6]. The alarm
subsides when one
notices that the personification here occurs
only because,
as with Locke, Cherry's views depend
on consciousness being

specifically "human."

A detached piece of body is me if and

only if it remembers being me [7].

consciousness into

a

if one could throw one's

lamp the lamp would be oneself only if

it could communicate as one had done.

consciousness into

a

When Cherry wrote his

book, the book was made him because the

book mimics his communication process.

Nonetheless the

personification of the book and the finger creates

a

limiting tension for the strict criteria Locke and Cherry

utilize in common for what counts as understanding,
discourse, or shared consciousness.

If personal identity is

tied up with shared consciousness and memory of self,

however vaguely, then one could literally, in forgetting

oneself, cease to be oneself.

What had appeared

very

a

loose notion of personal identity appears to include more
than Locke had bargained for.
am myself when and only when

Could Locke have thought:
I

am remembering who

I

"I

am?"

There is an answer to this sort of problem in the Essay

;

it
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turns out Locke has

a

way to keep the individual
person

within the boundaries necessary to
his theory.
Locke describes failure with respect
to communication,
as when he describes a case where
minds have not merged:
I
know not, how Men, who have the same
Idea, under
different Names, or different Ideas, under
the same
ame, can in that case, talk with
one another, any
more. than a Man, who not being blind, or
deaf, has
distinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet, and
sound of a Trumpet could discourse concerning the
Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man, I mention in
another Place, who fancied, that the Idea of
Scarlet
was like the sound of a Trumpet.
(Locke {1975} p.

12 6

)

This passage strikes me as odd.

Locke seems to be

saying that unless one has perfect communication one
has no

communication;

not only does one need shared experiences to

communicate, one must have had identical experiences.

The

passage is even more odd if one considers the sound of

a

trumpet an appropriate description for the color scarlet.
Locke makes the opposite point

I

would have made:

reaction is "How like me this blind man is."
reaction is "This man, compared to me, is

a

my

Locke's
lunatic."

notices that sometimes people will not communicate;
then what does this mean for personal identity?

forget how blue looks to me at

d usk

am

I

Locke
but

And if

I

no longer myself?

A free reading of Locke would allow these momentary

lapses outside of self.

Conside r this argument:

Personal identity is the unity

Everything assimilable by

a

of

(1)

one's information,

consciousness is

a

(2)

part of that

27

consciousness' personal identity,

(3)

Persons who do not

share names for ideas nor ideas for names
cannot communicate
with one another, therefore, (4) one cannot
be oneself if
one confuses one's ideas and the names
one has given to
one's ideas, though one can be oneself in
(l)-(3)

(

1

different body.

seem Lockean, and yet Locke would surely reject

Locke's response,
from

a

)

-

(

3

possible.

)

think, would be that

(4)

does not follow

because such confusion, in oneself, is not

(4)

conclusion.

I

(4)

is therefore not coherent,

and cannot be

a

Locke accepts that one can be oneself despite

modification of body.

But one can communicate with only

those selves who see things as one does.

according to Locke, in two ways:

One uses words,

first, to record one's own

thoughts and, second, to communicate one's thoughts to
others.

Communication can fail--that which fails does not

become part of us.

We cannot fail to communicate with

ourselves, however, and hence we are always ourselves, in
the sense that we are always selves that contain unified

information.

That we can never be confused in ourselves is

suggested by such passages as the following:
...we talk to our selves, any Words will serve the
turn.
For since Sounds are voluntary and
indifferent signs of any Ideas, a Man may use what
Words he pleases to signify his own Ideas to
himself: and there will be no imperfection in them,
if he constantly use the same sign for the same
Idea:
for then he cannot fail of having his meaning
understood, wherein consists the right use and
perfection of Language.
(Locke {1975} p. 476)
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believe these claims is to begin

impossible ways.
forget itself;

to image oneself in

a self becomes something that
cannot
it has very strict boundaries.

sum total of its information.

As such,

It is the

it is represented to

itself as capable of acquiring immense
power.

But the

inner, homogenous self is allowed to
talk to itself with any
sounds it pleases.
it is given licence to create freely.
The power of creation is limited only
when one is forced to

deal with others, specifically those others
who are not like
one's self.
Difference is seen as irrational, ludicrous,

expendable.

"irrational"

Locke has barred from "self" everything

— all

those things for which no universally

understood names exist.

The power of

self is its ability

a

to expand its "rational" repository of information.

Again, Cherry makes, or refers to,
like one of Locke's.

one-eyed man is not
{1957} p.

19).

a

point remarkably

"in the Country of the Blind the

king

a

— he

is a gibbering idiot"

(Cherry

Notice how domineering are the theories

which result from this notion of self.

Unless two selves

are completely similar, they will not be able to make any

sense at all to each other.
can become me through

a

A finger can be Locke, Cherry

book, and yet these imaginative

suggestions collapse to the truism that there is no room for
a

one-eyed person in

a

country of blind people.

Implicit in

this notion of self is the notion that difference is

impossible to grasp.

Information acquired must be of

a
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certain kind— namely rational
and universal
to be
assimilated by others.
Ruptures of what Cherry describes
as
mob-1
behavior are incomprehensible. Any
communications
that are irrational cannot be
assimilated, only difference
in the amount of information
one has acquired and then only
to the point where some sort
of qualitative change

—

occurs— as

in the case of sighted and
sightless persons.

if

qualitative difference is suspected, it
can can only be
feared or ridiculed.
One never fails to be oneself because
one always shares information perfectly
with
oneself.

is never

One

different from oneself. Insofar as one is

consciousness, one knows who one is.

if one is only careful

with the way one uses words and names, one
can communicate
with anyone else taking equal care.

One's hindrance to

perfect information lies in the other.
stranger to the desire for

communication.

a

Cherry is no

universal or perfect

He says:

Awareness of the universal nature of "communication"
has existed for a very long time, in a somewhat
vague and empirical way, but recently the
mathematical developments which come under the
heading of the "Theory of Communication" have
brought matters to a head and many there are who
regard this work as a panacea.
(Cherry {1957} p. 2)
While Cherry does not think that the mathematical models
solve every communication need, he sees looming

communication problems only as

a

lack of information coupled

with insufficient processing space and/or storage capacity.

.
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Winch is to say Cherry believes
that the models of
information theory are helpful with
respect to the problems
one faces in understanding others.
Thus, Locke and Cherry
appear to have similar views, while
perfect communication
is possible in theory, it can
happen between two or more
people only in special cases. Even
limited communication is
impossible between people who take in
information in
radically different ways or who have
radically unequal
access to information. Cherry says that
perfect

communication is not practically possible but he
believes
that it is theoretically possible— as we saw
in the citation

where he claims that he and his readers are one
in

communication.

Such communication is possible but only with

peopl e-1 i ke-me "

That this is

[8]

view not so much

a

explained but taken for granted by two such diverse
theorists suggests that the Culture that produced them both
assumes some version of the theme as well.

Theory sets the

possibilities from which we choose, by narrowing the
possibilities we can see; thus, theory sets the goal towards
which we can move.

To assume what Locke and Cherry have

assumed in this respect is to be incapable of affirming

a

politics of difference.
While Cherry finds communication
(Cherry {1957} p.

impoverished.

3),

a

"social affair"

the nature of the social is

The process of coming to communicate is said

to be evolutionary.

Cherry maintains that this process is

.
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what makes society itself possible:

"we evolved a host of

different systems of communication which
render social life
pos s i bl e
Commun i c a t i on renders true social life
.

.

.

practicable, for communication means organization"
{1957} p.

5).

(Cherry

Communication is best understood as an

evolving set of signs.

in addition to transferring

information from one person to another, the task
of

communication is, for Cherry, twofold:

first to further the

evolution of those signs by new models and "languages"
which
make communication quicker and better organized
and,
second,

to increase the stored knowledge of society.

Since none of

us know everything, rational group decisions must
depend on

the quickest possible flow of information along the
possible

channels.

Individual memory can give way to public

repositories of information.

Cherry believes that new

selves exist now due to increasing amounts of information,
and new ways of dealing with these increased amounts.

Cherry's view of society as

a

clearing of information

embodies the lack of recognition of social institutions that
I

referred to earlier.

Everything is in place except the

possibility of faster channels of information transfer.
This is

a

superficial but unsettling view of social

existence
I

will discuss one last thinker whose views rely on the

theme that

a

self is exhausted by its available information.

Lyotard is especially appropriate here since he. like

.

,
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Cherry, thinks that humans
now "know" in different
ways, and
he shares Cherry's interest
in information theory and
the

possibilities that computers bring.
(This is the strand of
his discourse I seize.
I believe that
many of his

views-reconstructing new notions of truth
and justice, and
allowing free play of language
games, for examples-are open
to criticisms parallel to
those I will make with respect
to
opening computer banks "to all."
The important point is
that whether one refers to narrative
or
me ta-nar r a t ive

science or pre-science, the subject
is constituted by what
it "knows.")
For Lyotard, "...young or old, man
or woman,
rich or poor, a person is always
located at 'nodal points'
of specific communication circuits
however tiny these may

be"

(Lyotard {1984} p. 15).

Selves are places in

communication networks, completing the exhaustion
of the
individual self whose beginnings were noticed in
Cherry.

One cannot be the "man who knows everything;"

species, we can pool our information as

confronting challenges.

but as

means of

a

The social disappears;

collectivity of information sharers.

a

we are a

As one commentator has

put it "Lyotard does not trust the integrity of
'communities' any more than of 'totality''
xiii)

Restricting the size and scope

(Arac

{1986}, p.

of a language game

does not lead to better communication or groups with more
integrity.

places in

Instead, as Lyotard puts it, people find their
a

network of words that is radically

s

33

individual isti c.

So, although the impetus
behind Lyotard's

work is vastly different from
that of the two thinkers just
discussed, the familiar ontology
of individuals surfaces
once again:

t! ei:e ls no need to
resort to some fiction of
social? origins to establish that
language
games. are the minimum relation
required for society
S
e
n bef ° re hS iS b ° rn
if only b
virtue
t^ name
n
of the
he is given, the human child is y
already
positroncd as the referent in the story
those around him, in relation to which recounted by
he will
inevitably chart his course.
(Lyotard {1984} p. 15
.

r

'

-

)

If one believes that such is the
condition of the human

child, one must also believe that humans
can always only
make sense to each other in terms of information
that

predates them.

(Whether or not the latter proposition is

true is not significant here.

it may well be true but it is

inconsistent with radical individualism

—

a

view shared by

many who have also assimilated the possibly true
proposition
under discussion.)

When that view of society and selves is

taken, there is no reason to argue for the view that

language

g ame

conceptually precede society;

nor can an

argument be made for the view that systems of communication
make society possible.

There is no dialectic between

structure and person, society and speaker.
are exchange and organization:

All that can be

these constitute society.

The values of a society arise from the exchange of

information in which one finds oneself already enmeshed.
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Values may be fluid but they
fivpH in the sense
are tlxed
that
they have nothing to do with
us.

The conclusion both writers
reach from their accounts of
communication regardless of their
emotional reaction to this
conclusion, is that they are nothing
without society and its
language games. This conclusion
follows from their theories
of communication.
The dominant political theory,
however,
which they both implicitly accept,
tells them that they are
in dividuals who interact
politically with other separate
individuals. The self of communication
and the political
individual are hard to reconcile;
this difficulty results
in a tension.
In a

tension.

moment

I

will turn

a

theoretical instance of such

An instance in the world of such

encountered by those with

a

(and to some of politics)

the artist.

a

tension is that

great burden of communication
What an artist must

reject in order to create is precisely what cannot
be
re

jected--namely the political individual with all its

baggage.

The apolitical individual must be created anew

continuously and this can only be done politically

— in

groups, symbolically, for reasons of survival.
But perhaps the theoretical instance will serve better

explanatory purpose.

Lyotard, like Cherry, is insistent

that communication theory is not

argues,

in fact,

a

social panacea;

he

that for society to rearrange itself as it

ought, all need to pay attention not only to language and
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communication

heories but also to the power
struggles in
the real world often called
games by theorists and others,
Ordinary commun ication theories
are weak on Lyotard's view
because they fa il to take account
of what he calls the
agonistic aspec t of society. Game
theory can account for
this aspect of society because
it contains an element of
novelty:
t

Each language partner, when a 'move' pertaininq
to
him is made, undergoes a 'displacement,' an
alteration of some kind that not only affects
him in
his capacity as addressee and referent,
but also as
sender.
These 'moves' necessarily provoke
countermoves --and everyone knows that a
countermove that is merely reactional is not
a 'good' move.
Reactional countermoves are no more
than programmed effects in the opponent's strategy;
they play into his hands and thus have no effect
on
the balance of power.
That is why it is important
to increase displacement in the games, and
even to
disorient it, in such a way as to make an unexpected
move' (a new statement).
(Lyotard {1984} p. 16)
'

'

.

How does one do the unexpected if o ne is the sum total
of one's information and only this and if one's "essence"

is

the place one holds in relations which tell one who one is?

Perhaps this is why "new statement" is in

parentheses- -because there is no adequa te answer to this
question.

Or perhaps novelty comes about through

increasingly complex combinations of codes, signals or
ideas.

One finds

a

hint in Lyotard that he believes that

quantitative changes can become qualitative.

humanity will have the perfect communication
at which the computer is big enough.

One day

— at

the point

Thus he says:

.
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We are finally in a position to
understand how the
computerrzat^n of society affects
this problematic
It could become the 'dream'
instrument for
lng and re 9ulating the market
extended^ to include knowledge itself system,
and governed
exclusively by the per format ivi
principle.
in
that case, it would inevitably ty
involve the use of
terror.
But it could also aid groups discussinq
metaprescr lptives by supplying them with
the
information they usually lack for making
knowledgeable decisions. The line to follow
for
computerization to take the second of these two
paths is, in principle, quite simple: give
the
public free access to the memory and data banks.
Language games would then be games of perfect
information at any given moment ... Th i s sketches
the
outline of a politics that would respect both
the
desire for justice and the desire for the unknown.
(Lyotard {1984} p. 67)

But to get to the point where this could be

a

move or

strategy one would have already to have admitted that
the
grand narrative is the narrative.

That is to avoid the

terror of our world by giving information to "the people" is
to suppose that the terror already allowed is allowed

because most people do not know about it.

Someone might say

that many already know where terror begins and grows.

It

would seem that Lyotard's informational resources are too

impoverished to ground the political intuitions that

threaten constantly to interrupt the progress of information

exchange
Locke, Cherry and Lyotard may have seemed an unlikely

trio for joint scrutiny.

However, it is of considerable

interest that they share the notion that the self is

exhausted by its information [9].

Locke presents the most
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restrictive limitations on this
notion.
afraid of Locke
information.

s

Lyotard seems not

irrational or incomprehensible

He does not, however, allow
free and equal

access to information when we read
closely.
for everyone "however small."

node size is
(or

a

Nodes are there

Implicit in this language of

mirror of reality showing the largest nodes

to use more precise information theory
language than

does Lyotard, the most centrally located and
most frequently
used nodes) existing for the young, rich and
male.
That
memory banks will be free is a theoretical claim
that

provides no relief in practice for those not party to
the

information network in its more celebrated points.

(Making

computer banks free in this context is like paying workers
little bit more for their being exploited.)

a

Despite the

differences between our social thinkers, their theories of
self and communication allow information to shift while the

structure of society is unchanged.

Theme Two:

I

Sovereignty of Self Over Body

have begun by showing some potentially dangerous

political beliefs which can result in those that believe
that the self is equivalent to its available information.
turn now to the second theme.

If the self is its

information, particularly the information that is

transparent to itself, then the self rules itself with

I
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respect to that of which it is
constituted.

The self is

sovereign over itself in both its
physical and mental
manifestations, insofar as they are
not determined by
external laws of causation.
Each self in our democratic
theory should rule only over itself
provided,
of course,

that it is

a

rational self.

No self should rule over any of

the other selves with which it is
linked in the society of

equals.

When selves are so regarded, democracy
can be but
one of two things:
a truce between selves brought
about by
social contract, e.g., a republic; or an
impartial clearing
mechanism fueled by the moral electoral activities
of

thoughtful agents, e.g.,

a

democracy.

in both cases, selves

must be viewed as equal, sovereign, moral agents
who

exchange information.
"Whence morality?"

equality as important.

The analysis thus far has pointed to

Negating differences other than

those expressed in terms of the quantity of available

information
content

— which

turns to qualitatively different

or those expressed as different preferences leaves

only equal political selves.

Consider J.S. Mill's

discussion of moral obligation in Utilitarianism:
The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard
of duty may be, is one and the same
a feeling in
our mind;
a pain, more or less intense, attendant
on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated
moral natures rises in the more serious cases, into
shrinking from it as an impossibility. This
feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself
with the pure idea of duty, and not with some
particular form of it, or with any of the

—
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merely accessory ci rcumstances,
is the sense of
Conscience;
though in that complex phenomenon
as it
actually exists the simple fact is
in general all
encrusted over with collateral
from sympathy from love, and associations, derived
still more from
fear;.. The ultimate sanction,
therefore, of all
morality (external motives apart)
being a subjective
feeling in our
,

own minds.

(Mill

{1961} pp. 214-15)

Duty and, when properly developed,
conscience, are
feelings in the mind.
Mill's formulation is so constructed
that it becomes impossible for a person
to do anything

morally wrong, provided, of course, that he
been properly indoctrinated.

[or

she!]

has

There is only one pure idea of

duty connected to our feelings.

The ultimate sanction of

all morality is this subjective feeling, which is
derived

from indoctrination.

external

The internal sanction must be first

in that outside place where we learn what is our

duty, what ought to cause pain, what is to be feared or
loved.

The "external motives apart," must be that which

makes the internal duty.

Mill underpins the feeling with

the principle of utility;

that nothing could count as

however, his argument is such
a

rationally defensible

counterexample to the principle.

("I recoil

in horror from

British colonization of India," might be the statement of
someone whose subjective feelings are "wrong," or
"incorrect," or "shortsighted," or whose indoctrination had
failed.)

And this problem is not Mill's problem.

It is a

problem where the terms of our morality (our ethos) and the
terms of our political systems are not just incompatible but

.
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make each other appear completely
incoherent,

Consider what
"vote your conscience" might mean
in agonistic language
games
Mill understood very well that many
people value power
over liberty.
My point is that power is so
over-valued that
it is entrenched in all analysis
and his "liberty" requires

power relations to exist.
that result in

a

The internalization of values

moral conscience,

I

coextensive with the urge for power.
tied up with morality at

The urge for power is

very basic level and is

a

consequently tied up with

will argue, is

a

pattern toward totalitarianism.

When one scrutinizes the idea that each self is allowed
within the system to react to Conscience, problems
arise
regarding the adjudication of ideas.

The tension here is

that each self is "empowered" as determiner of moral

rectitude;

nonetheless

a

limit must be imposed by various

institutions and selves cannot be allowed to determine what
their political duties shall be.

formulate

a

In part our

inability to

decision procedure in this regard is based on

what appears to be

a

contradiction in that theory.

Thus,

when Mill writes in On Liberty that "the only part of the

conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society,
that which concern others.

is

In the part which merely

concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute"
(Mill

{1961} p.

263), we want to respond by saying that it

follows from his views of moral and political obligation

41

that there can be no such thing
as that which "merely

concerns himself."
Wherever there is

a

right, the case is one of justice.

Here, however, is an absolute right
to be free from justice
a11 one s "individual" undertakings.
Individuals, their

m

'

vision blurred by the sovereignty they have
been told they
possess, but who also have legitimate needs to
engage in

political activity, ask themselves "What part is
that, that

concerns only me?" and readily see that this

a

question that

cannot be adequately answered given the liberal images
and
language.

Because the question cannot be answered and

because individuals know that political activity is to be
kept separate from "other" activities, they do not know how
to proceed politically or socially.

When individuals can no longer believe in the

reproduction of freedoms within democracy, when individuals
cannot find coherent places in the political network, and
when, moreover, the society is constantly throwing up images
of voting as a panacea, as the ultimately democratic

institution, then such individuals have no genuinely

political strategies.
The tension that arises is not, of course, due

specifically to the work of J.S. Mill and such is not my
claim.

Instead his work exemplifies such tension already.

In the

world of politics selves must consider the following

contradictory propositions, all of which are integral parts

.

42

of their cultural heritage.

A self is entitled,

to judge moral action according to conscience.

by right,
A self is

not entitled to act on these judgments unless the results
of
the actions harm no other self

.

A self is sovereign.

A

self has no political power and no means of group

identification that has not been predetermined.

A self may

exercise political power and foster existing groups and
cr ea te
"

new ones.

Selves seem hopelessly caught in

subjectivist and objectivist systems.
order by invoking Conscience

,

Mill would restore

an abstraction that collapses

morality into the objectivist system as

a

means of judging

an equality that his utilitarian pronouncements cannot

justify
That the self as information is necessarily in tension
with the political individual manifests itself in

a

controversy surrounded by the possibility that if one dares
to bring up the notion of an objective value, one is

automatically seen to be totalitarian [10].

Because the

individual is sovereign over the mini-state which is the

person's own body, justice can ultimately only be

a

compromise between sovereigns, unless something is said
about the self that is beyond the resources of liberal

grounding.

Anything less than this is

a

violation of the

sovereign's absolute right to rule its domain.

But if

values are not objective an appeal to morality can only

apparently solve

a

crisis in the theory of already existing

43

power in

a

democratic setting.

That morality is brought

into play indicates that the
theory of equal selves

presupposes an unequal conception of
power relationships as
a background for actually
doing social
business.

Theme Three:

I

now turn to

a

Body Politics

discussion of the image that the head of

state is to the citizenry, or the body
politic, as the
brain/mind is to the human body which houses
it.

quite correct to say, as
is imaged,

I

It was not

did earlier, that when the state

the body politic must place the leader
at the

head--in the brain or mind.
Roman leadership as

a

Menenius Agrippa represents the

great all-consuming stomach.

This

sort of corporeal variation does not detract
from my point,
as it may only indicate whether the persons
participating in
the imagining are for or against the state in
question.
is this practice undertaken at all?

Why

That one can so refer

to the state is possible because of the assumption that the

state is organic.
society)

a

Aristotle makes the state (and not just

"creation of nature"

(Aristotle {1941} p. 1129).

The identity of the state is in its essence, its remembrance
of itself:
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... the s ta te is by nature
clearly prior to the
1
ld al
SinCe the whole is of necessity
prior
P
th^ part;
n
^
the
for example, if the whole body
be

%

to

destroyed, there will be no foot or
hand, except in
an equivocal sense, as we might
speak of a stone
d/
r wt en destroyed the
hand will be no better
;
than \v/?
that.
(Aristotle {1941} p. 1129)
.

Until the body politic finds its "head"
or "brain" in
state, it is not really made up of
individuals, any more
than a finger, without a memory of
itself as person, is a

person.

Without

a

a

head of state, according to the image,

the body politic cannot exist.

maintain that it is the deceptive coupling of the

I

image of the state as

a

head having

a

body with the theory

of the self as the sum total of its information
that can

lead

a

theorist to say:

"in the part which merely concerns

himself, his independence is, of right, absolute"
{1961} p.

263).

(Mill

There is no adequate theory of the body

which can be consonant with such imaging.

In the image

which is used to describe social arrangements, the people
are the body politic.
us possible.

The head of the state is what makes

Within the possibilities of the image, the

notion of equal selves is incoherent.
always comes in.

This is why authority

Equality cannot make sense by itself;

it

is an apparent starting point whose political implications

seem anarchic or disorderly.

It is assumed that authority

must appear in order to head off chaos.

psychological point.
need

a

"leader."

I

This is

a

am not suggesting that the "people"

My point is that we are often shown a
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strange political anatomy wherein
no group of persons seems
possible qua group without a leader
as its head.
in a group
of people the often presumed
correct posture is either to
look to the

natural" leader or to assume that
role [11].
In addition to the fact that
no coherent theory of the

body allows the image to picture us
in any believable
manner, there is now the fact that the
power of the monarch
can no longer be seen as sovereign
because we are each
sovereign over our separate and individual
selves.
it
appears, therefore, as if there is no place
for the way in
which most are told to perceive themselves in
the social

picture.

Having no room in the political space for

a

unique

sovereign. Culture validates the picture of each
individual
as a mini-sovereign with absolute rights with
regard to

itself.

The result is

a

vision of political power which is

the brokering of the mini-sovereigns'

interests.

Heads of

state are hired, through contract and vote, by the body
politic.

Contract theory need not view itself this way;

it

continues to do so because the image persists alongside
subsequent developments of it.
a

The image persists alongside

theory of the self which seems to deny that we could

possibly so image ourselves and our state.

If a theory of

the self can accommodate the image, such

a

already contain authoritarian elements.

Selves that do not

theory must

allow hierarchical relationships with respect to one another
cannot be power brokered by elected sovereigns in the extant
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theories of democracy.

But, power must appear from

somewhere.

The theories we have been discussing
cannot
explain where power comes from.
It is just always already
there as something that individuals
have with respect to
their own bodies.
Equal selves are said to give up their
already present power to elected officials
(in only relevant
respects).
That power is prior to rights or political

process is, if not impossible, at least
confused and in need
of elucidation in extant theories.
The newer philosophies of the body seem to
encode the

notion of each one's sovereignty over one's self.
becomes the "mind" ruling over one's

Each

own body, reducing the

image to its simplest expression [12].

That little really

novel is involved here can be seen by applying the method
of

Individuation;
subjects.

there are as many bodies as there are

The philosophical problem is usually described

not just in terms of human or animal bodies.

Instead all

bodies, what are called individuals, are treated as

conceptually equivalent.
of bodies

(individuals,

(language, sentences)

The connection between the problem

identities)

and communication

is inextricable.

So,

for instance,

"individuals" have been described as "not properties or
relations;

r

properties"

(Hiz

given.

athe r

.

.

.

they enter into relations and have

{1971} p.

253).

Bodies, as such, are not

The only things that are given are "certain

sentences"

(Hiz

{1971} p.

261).

An individual is an event

:
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abstracted "fro.

a

mass of facts.-

flnd

an individual is a

body.

Later, we will see how
this one-to-one correlation
has to be broken if the
authoritarian presuppositions of
power are to be avoided
13
[

]

If my argument so far is
reasonable,

then it can be said

that the reason why some
focus increasingly on the body
is
that the sovereign control
given in myth and culture is
looking for expression through
the exercising of that
"absolute" right over what is
owned:
the body,
it seems
impossible to free ourselves for
multiple selves as long as
we are encumbered not with body
but with a body theorized as
something against us which we must
control through

ownership.

Perhaps

a

good way to show how difficult it is

for us to find a body for the
self

(or

to find a

relationship between selves and bodies that
is at root
non-dominating) is to compare Descartes to
Deleuze and
Guattari on the body.

First Descartes, from the

Meditations
I must begin by observing
the great difference
between mind and body. Body is of its nature always
divisible; mind is wholly indivisible. When I
consider the mind that is, myself, in so far as I
am merely a conscious being
I can distinguish no
parts within myself... on the other hand, I cannot
think of any corporeal or extended object without
being readily able to divide it in thought and
therefore conceiving of it as divisible. This would
be enough to show me the total difference between
mind and body, even if I did not sufficiently know
this already.
(Descartes {1954} p. 121) [14]

—

—
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The image of the Citizenry
is complicated further
in that as
a Part of the body
politic the citizenry is somehow
one with
the state but, as Descartes
already knows sufficiently
well,
we know that we are not
the state.
The state is indivisible
("one country under God
indivisible"), the citizenry is
by
its very nature divisible.
Descartes uses a method of
individuation that breaks with the
requirements of

democratic theory.

Thus, Cherry opines concerning
the

question of the divisible body and
the unified head:
Business, industries, and armies
are not mobs, or crowds.
They have defined purpose, they
have formal structure," they
have rules "which determine on the
whole how messages
(orders,

instructions, etc.)

unite the parts into
'organism'"

a

shall flow and communication

whole, purposeful, goal seeking

(Cherry {1957} p. 23).

citizenry's thinking, the result is
striving toward

a

nothing more than

goal.
a

When leaders do the
a

unified organism

Left to itself, the citizenry is

mob or

a

crowd.

Unfortunately, for information theorists, mobs and
crowds exist.
Cherry asks "why does society continually
split into two, like the two opposing teams in

capital and labor, the two parties of
the two sides in a war...?

way we think?"

game:

stable democracies,

is such dualism inherent in the

(Cherry {1957} p. 26).

question unanswered.

a

a

He leaves the

The unified democratic organism seems

to require division if it is to function as it ought to
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function.

The tension which here
occurs in Cherry's writing
underlines the impossibly
inconsistent images given to
selves to think about
themselves.
if one thinks correctly
(i.e., rationally) one's
body will feel right and
one's life
will be well-ordered.
if the government follows
the rules,
ity will follow.
But unity cannot be even the
ostensible
goal of a democracy that
requires an elected leadership.
Descartes undertakes a thought
experiment to convince
himself that he has no body:
"Nutrition and Locomotion?
Since I have no body, these are
mere delusions" (Descartes
{1954} p. 69).
in addition he convinces himself
that the
body is no great thing. Western
culture has devalued the
body ever since.
Descartes, even as he places himself
at
the center of the universe, tells
us that bodies are so
negligible that he sees no reason for
supposing that he did
not create their images entirely:
"As for my ideas of

corporeal objects, they contain nothing so
great that it
seems it could not originate from myself"
(Descartes {1954}
p.

83)

.

Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, have done

a

great

deal to reclaim the body for us--although my
relationship to
them must remain that of friendly expositor given their
too

fragmented view of self.

it is very interesting that in so

doing they have also produced

centering the "I" anywhere

a

— let

political work.
alone in

center of the universe--they describe

a

a

Instead of

mind at the

substance that is

.
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everything/nothing, everywhere/nowhere.
this dispersal one that
that

I

call

a

The reason

I

find

reclaiming of the body is

believe the focus on sovereignty with respect to

I

mind/body concerns has partitioned individuals into bodies
unduly.

There is no reason, save convention, for viewing

individuals as distinct

[15]

The body without organs is the matter that always
fills space to given degrees of intensi ty and the
partial objects are these degrees, these intensive
parts that produce the real in space starting from
matter as intensity=0. The body without organs is
the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense
of the word;
and the partial objects are like its
ultimate attributes, which belong to it precisely
insofar as they are really distinct and cannot on
this account exclude or oppose one another.
(Deleuze and Guattari {1983} pp. 326-27)
,

Desiring and not thinking is overlaid on this substance;
The body without organs, the unproductive, the
unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording
of the entire process of production of desire, so
that desir ing-machines seem to emanate from it in
the apparent objective movement that establishes a
relationship between the machines and the body
without organs.
(Deleuze and Guattari {1983} p. 11)

Imaging the body requires dealing with desire in some
way.

image"

"It

[the body without organs]

is the body without an

(Deleuze and Guattari {1983} p. 8).

Thus when Plato

was faced with the decision of making desi ring primarily

either

a

production or an acquisition, he chose to make it

an act of acquisition.

The result, metaphorically put, is

)

51

that the society has valued financiers
over manufacturers.
(See Deleuze and Guattari
{1983} p.
25.)

That rational thought in the ideal
world has been valued
more than production through desire
in the material world,
is a factor contributing to
the neglect concerning the role
of the body.
When important issues are neglected,
however,
they do not go away;
they reassert themselves in other
ways.

That analyses of the human body have
failed to

develop which approach in depth or seriousness
those of the
mind has led to an overemphasis of some aspects

of the body.

This shows in the way politics proceeds.

So,

for instance,

democracies are very concerned about free speech.

But in

many democracies, this one included, body language and
non— spoken expression are among the more restricted

communications.

So for example, dress codes for men and

women (and for adults and children) vary wildly and in

patently unfair ways.

(Imagine, if by current law men were

permitted to say things women were not allowed to say.
yet it is illegal for women to dress

(or

undress)

And

as men

do.

This fact is symptomatic of the covering up of the body
and its desiring at the level of theory.

But by the same

token, the authoritarian presuppositions of democratic

theory cannot be broken by opposing the individual body to
social

s

true tur e--although it works better than words--or by

breaking the body into

a

collection of desiring machines.

Because the state is modeled on the rational organization of

s

the human in democratic theory,
its function includes that
of controlling the desires
and interests of the body politic
under its control.
Lyotard's picture of a well-managed

information network, or state, shows
that on his view
desiring never transcends acquisition
for production.
Despite his wonderfully innovative
discussion of "subject,"
he remains solidly in the school
which reduces the self to

information, and the state (or the corporation)
and seller of information.

to the buyer

Because selves are their

information, on this model, the state turns out
to deal in
bits and pieces of self.
in spite of the unfortunate images
which flow from it, this theory is heady with
possibility.

When what is exchanged is bits of mind, acquisition is
endless, concrete resources and emotions which are in short

supply get forgotten.

Who is not seduced (momentarily) by

the following optimism and who can believe it is written in
a

time of increasing scarcity of necessary goods?:

The stakes would be knowledge (or information, if
you will), and the reserve of knowledge--language
reserve of possible utterances is inexhaustible.
(Lyotard {1984} p. 67)

—

'

Lyotard's political remarks are the natural extension of
this image.

Kant says that "under the Law of nations,

state is regarded as

a

moral person living with and in

opposition to another state in
freedom, which itself is
{1985} p.

115).

a

a

a

condition of natural

condition of continual war"

Lyotard's agonistics just bring to

(Kant
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consciousness what strings of
images had "shown" us:
that
selves are mini-states in "a
condition of continual war."
My

argument in this chapter reveals
that the view of
sovereign mini-states at war within
themselves and against
each other exists because of
two anterior
views:

that the self is its information;

second, that the society

has so valued the internal
that to have

body must be seen as owned by
the self
have any political control,

power have attempted

first,

a

[

body image the

16 ].

in order to

those in power or those seeking

(and often accomplished)

control of

bodies. These attempts became codified
in political theories
such as Mill's.
Problems in theory which arise for

democracy arise much earlier in the conceptual
framework
than most theorists allow.
I see the problems as centering
around what a self is, what selves want, and
how selves are
able to talk to one another despite the fact
that society
has been separating selves for centuries.
two problems.

I

now turn to the

The first concerns what these themes entail

for contract theory. The second concerns the
democratic

theory of diverse electoral activities and agents.
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Contempor ary Problems

Justice:

The first problem

Contracting Correct Desires

I

discuss falls under the heading of

justice, in that the problem in
question concerns the
legitimate exchange of interests (and
the manifestations of
those interests) between individuals.
This problem concerns
the theoretical structure of a
democratic society when it is
viewed as justified by some version of
a social contract.
By contrast, the second problem
concerns actual electoral
change in a functioning democracy. However,
I wish to make
it clear that the distinction
between the first and second

problems is not that between abstract and
concrete problems.
As has been the case throughout this
chapter, my points are
conceptual ones.

Locke shows himself to be an idealist when

he maintains that a person persists as the
same person

through time and space so long as that person remains

conscious of itself.
Deleuze and Guattari do not accept the notion of

unified self existing through time and space.

a

They make

material Locke's notion that one can be oneself in

a

different body, thereby exploding the notion of personal
identity through time.

Furthermore, and more importantly.

their view about the material necessity of that process
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Which is the body without
organs makes the picture of
selves
as mini-sovereigns forever
at war henceforth impossible.
That is, once the possibility
of the "self" expressed in
An ti-Oedipus is envisioned,
the intuition that one is a
separate individual loses its force.
Conceptual imaginings
along the lines of what one finds
in Anti-Oedipus can
suggest how to break the authoritarian
presuppositions of
extant democratic theory, among other
reasons, because one
could on occasion believe oneself to
be non-antagonistic
with respect to others and not to
be engaged in attempting
to assimilate their information.
Deleuze and Guattari only
suggest a possibility. Many of their
conclusions are

questionable for instance their overly enthusiastic
valorization of schizophrenia.

They do constitute such

a

radical departure from the theories of self which
proceed
them that their work is interesting just for
that fact.

Chapter Four,

based on

a

I

By

will propose an account of political action

different theory of the self [17].

The problems which surround the notion of democracy as
an exchange of correct desires begins with the notion that

when two or more persons communicate, what they are doing is

exchanging fixed ideas between fixed selves, where those
selves are located at the "nodal points of specific

communication circuits" (Lyotard {1984}

p.

15).

This notion

is related to the political notion that one has a separate

but equal self at war with others.

One slips into the
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notion of

correct

desire (or preference or
interest) even
though the system depends
on subjectivism, since
the "war"

can only be seen as incredibly
unfair to some of its
participants. Some members of the
society can never enter
the so called Great
Conversation," because their points
of
intersection in the circuit are too
small.
I believe that
Lyotard's blunted awareness of this
inherent unfairness is
related to Rawls' abstraction from
our actual nodal points
of communication in his
description of the original

position.

Instead of turning to the necessity
of political
action to correct inequality, Rawls and
Lyotard abstract
away until the possibility of political
action is erased.
We have at most the preferences of
individuals, waiting to
be reconciled.

When ideas and selves are viewed at fixed
nodal points,
the notion that novelty in communication
is some sort of

miracle becomes inevitable.
capacity.

Many people just wonder at this

This conception concerning the ability to do new

things when talking leads to the political conception
that

things are too complicated (crooked, large, hopeless)
to worry about them

[18]

solution will appear.

.

One has to hope that

a

for us

novel

When novelty in communication is

viewed as miraculous and when politics is

a

mirror of

interpersonal relations as expressed through communication,
then change in politics is viewed as outside the control of

any one self.

Instead of leading to joint action this
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cluster of thoughts leads to
frustrations because these same
selves have been led to believe
that they are sovereign,
complete and fixed. The relevant
theorists have no
responses that cannot be reduced
to the exchange of
information between individuals.
Some theorists reject the view
that novelty is
inexplicable.
There are two possibilities for
what occurs
when communication of the new
takes place:
either a

combination of old signs has occurred
which captures an
element of novelty or, paradoxically,
novelty is found when
selves penetrate through language to
"real" ideas.

these explanations presupposes

Each of

fixed and true idea either

a

at the base of the human thought
process or as existing

validly "out there" somewhere.
require

a

To make sense, both

correspondence theory of truth.

views

The first view

implies that as things change in the world,
selves make up
new combinations of root ideas in order
to maintain a

correct description of the world.

Ultimately the selves

will arrive at the "right" combination of ideas
and the

right way of seeing the world.

somewhere there is

a

The second view implies that

code to all correct (true)

ideas.

When

selves have discovered all the "rules," the code will be
apparent.

The "democracy" which follows from the conception

of body politic complete with ruler at the head, seals

selves off in

a

paradigm of subjectivism;

communication and

personality, however, follow external paradigms.

Justice,
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the exchange of interests,
must be seen as subjectively

determined if democracy is necessary
to the correct form of
social arrangement.
However, justice cannot be seen
as
subjective because the philosophy of
the self that

I

have

shown underlies it, implies
external absolutes. Thus, what
might have been a theory of brokered
desires must eventually
become a theory of correctly brokered
desires.
One way to
put this is that there can be a
defensible philosophical
distinction between justice and Justice.
I am not merely
making the point that no court can
impartially administer
justice.
I am claiming that if
one accepts the philosophy
of self and communication outlined thus
far then one must

also accept,

if one wishes to be consistent,

that there are

correct desires which are theoretically identifiable
and
that these correct desires are fixed.
It is appropriate to return to communication
theory once

again to see how ideas and selves are held to be fixed, but
also to see that the tension which exists for political
theory begins at this more basic level.

Schank and Birnbaum

state in an article "Memory, Meaning, and Syntax" that:

.
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As communicators, we have
two roles: to understand
the utterances of others and
to generate Sur o£n
f ° rming thlS latter
P
task '
must formulate
thp ?H
the
ideas we want to express, and
then, while still
engaged in this formulation process,
^e must begii
C °d
0Se d aS lnt ° lan 9 ua 9e. . .
[1] inguistic

rules...
rules
mu^ include
} ?
must
even social context, since
S a
= lear y ^deration rules
that depend on
^hat
wh
We i Ve ]USt Said foi: generation
is even
A
?
truer off language understanding.
The goal of
understanding language is in reality to
understand
ideas. Language is
a means of communicating
those
ideas and, as such, is merely so much
baggage to be
stripped away to reveal the contents. The
rules we
use in this stripping process are, of
course, of
great interest.
(Schank and Birnbaum {1984}
'

pp.

;

246-7)

The sort of rules in which Schank and
Birnbaum are

interested concern how to use stock phrases, how
memory aids

m

the generation of new sentences, and which,

rules parallel those used to program computers.

if any, human

They

believe that understanding these rules will help dispense
with Language so that the content, the Ideas, might be

understood
This view is far from simplistic.
see language as

a

Schank and Birnbaum

complicated series of processes:

Language cannot be separated from the reason for its
existence and use in human society. Communication
is at the heart of language, after all... how
language effects communication must be the ultimate
goal.
No study of language can achieve this goal if
it fails to view communication as a process.
(Schank and Birnbaum {1985} p. 246)
At root, however, the processes are held up by what must be

seen as "perfect" ideas.
the process.

The ideas are not seen as part of

Even though Schank and Birnbaum separate the

.
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processes of language acquisition,
following a rule, and
conception (having ideas, from
the process of communication,
they do so equally:
"No one type of knowledge
is more
crucial than any other in the
process of understanding."

it

seems unclear that these processes
must remain separate.
But from what has been written
so far, there is no great
puzzle

Every element, every thing, is
separate but equal. And
somewhere, at the bottom of all the
rules and processes, the
ideas, and the people who think

(about)

Selves and ideas are fixed; if one is
self until one is nothing.

a

them, are fixed.

self, one is that

The self does not undergo

processes according to adherents of this
view;
owns processes.

the self

Processes are properties of the self.

It is no wonder

that Cherry is puzzled not that

businesses and states are organized, but that mobs
are
unruly.

He cannot figure out how mobs can act at
all.

Selves are equal and separate;

the mob is hardly a

collection of such primitive elements.

Thus it strikes the

thoughtful communication theorist as incoherent that one of
us might be mob-like rather than organized, or that mobs

could take concrete action.
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S-'sF”
0
°? ly then doeS he slowl y come to
realize that
thaJ the machinery’ may
be very
af£ ir jei:ked along by the
clash of
personalitiea
a
tum by ambitions.
(Cherry U957} pf l?-™

^

“

Cherry's moments of existential worry
pop in and out of
his text.
The person at the top has no theory
of how events
move. When Cherry is not worried,
it is because
of a

retreat made possible by the tidy
conception of truth:
"speech is like painting, a representation
made out of given
materials" (Cherry {1957} p. 74).

Novelty in speech consists in Cherry's
world from the
creation of metaphors— old "stuff" that is
merely recycled.
Metaphors arise because we continually need
to stretch the
range of words as we accumulate new
concepts and abstract
relationships" (Cherry {1957} p. 74). So the
disturbing
picture of the self, being battered about the
corporate
halls by personalities and ambitions which cannot
be

understood by Cherry's "young man," is not hopeless.

The

sovereign in the self will be able to adapt to new
tests by
stretching its range of words, by learning new ways of
talking and hence of understanding its world.

What is

nebulous may come to make sense.
Neither class distinctions nor concerted political

action can make sense in this picture.

That both do make

sense points up something wrong with the theory and not with

the brute fact of the former
and the historical reality
of
the latter.
in the U.S., and perhaps
in other democracies,

the notion that selves are
equal and separate has played
large role in the ideology that
permits an account of

a

society as jointly concerned
democratic actors working
collectively [19]. But for some, Mike
Davis for example,
this is only the backdrop for an
analysis
of the

depoliticization of the U.S. working
class:
The American working class, on
the other hand
Y br ° ad arraY ° f C °1 lective institution
or
anv
ny to?an
totalizing agent of class consciousness
(that
a class party)
has been increasingly intearated
into American capitalism through
the negativities of
its internal stratification, its
privatization In
consumption, and its disorganization
vis-a-vis
Cal
nd tr ade-union bureaucracies.
(Davis
??ao^!"
?
'

1

15*

,

oof

p.

8)

Part of the unique problem with discussing
modern

democracies is that all political groups may
be
"depoliticized" and "disorganized" in the ways Davis
suggests are true in connection with the working
class.

The

reason is that the notion of collectivism does not
fit the

picture one has of oneself regardless of class.

Insofar as

people suffer the symptoms released by widespread acceptance
of themes one through three, the working class will not be

able to find its enemy class because that class will have

done no more political bonding than the working class.

Democratic classes are piles of brick without mortar insofar
as democratic theory cannot recognize the existence of
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mortar

Democratic theory is thus far
from an innocent or
neutral account of social structure.
.

Individuals interested in the power
felt through
consumer practices which become
increasingly political may
feel more in common with other
related individuals

than with

individuals in the same party or
class as given by political
theory.
An easily observed example is
found in

environmental practices.

One feels

a

kinship with those who

share one's eating and domestic
maintenance habits
regardless of traditionally conceived
political

similarities.

Likewise, one has trouble getting on

politically with those who fail to share this
grouping even
if all other political "properties"
are compatible.
it is

unclear that any significant political activity
can come
from such consumer oriented grouping [20].

exchanged in

a

market counts.

But

I

What is

am not working towards

the exercise of power over production in the classical

sense, an exercise that can be based on similar

authoritarian principles to those which underlie traditional
political theory.

The notion that at root there are fixed

selves deciding the distribution of fixed ideas (of justice)
reaches its most articulate and intelligent political

expression in the work of John Rawls:
Men are to decide ui advance how they are to
regulate their claims against one another and what
is to be the foundation charter of their
society... In justice as fairness the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of
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nature in the traditional
theory of the serial
contract. .Among the essential
features of thL
.

*&sa&£*3&g£&

including principles

U971}

pp.

o!

a

h

11-17,

system
?
virtues.
(Rawls

Just as Schank and Birnbaum
wish to strip all
communication processes down to bare
Ideas, so Rawls wants
to rid us of the process
which is the body and with it any

desires that could differentiate
selves; in fact, Rawls
wants to do away with any reality.
This process of peeling
away anything "divisible" is
done in order that selves might
meet as equal and timeless sovereigns.
in this form, he

believes, selves will be able to decide
not only on the
principles of justice but on an entire
ethical system. The
ideas found at the root of things will
be the right ones.

Interests, when selves are nothing, will
be the correct
ones.
in this context it is very difficult
for selves to

understand themselves as "political animals."

The logical

translation of contract theory into our age makes us
warriors to each other, or brokers of our interests,
and not
jointly concerned political animals.
to Rawls'

original position.

Paranoia is integral

There, people can only meet

politically when stripped of their personalities;
can they trust each other enough to talk.

only then

Change cannot

enter the system once the original position has been left,

.
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except for changes permitted
hw the economic
y
y emitted by
structure
therein agreed upon.
Political anfinn
runticai
a
action does
not appear- we
make a contract decision
and abide by it.
Political
stagnation is implicit in any
modern contract theory which
shares a basis in Locke's
theories of self and

communication
Political action opens up the
possibility of real
novelty, of unanticipated
consequences. But our information
theorists cannot get the point.
Cherry has said
that

novelty arises in language as the
rearra ngement of concepts
into me taphors.
What novelty means and how it is
measured
is very different in communication
theor y.
In assessing
novelty Cherry says:
,

...it is not their probabilities as
'appearing' to
some one person that are considered, but
their
frequencies of use by a certain population,
such as
are observed in 'newspaper English,'
'prose,'
telephone speech,' et cetera the average or
statistical properties of a source
And for this
reason in particular, this mathematical work should
be interpreted with the greatest care, in
situations
involving r eal people
(Cherry {1957} p. 14, my
emphases)

—

.

.

Thus in situations involving real people, which can
only

mean here in small situations, novelty comes about by

a

sovereign, free act of rearranging metaphors. In large

communication fields, novelty is measured by the frequency
of a sign.

The less frequent, the newer it is.

have thought that this was
novelty.

a

One would

definition of scarcity and not

The political parallel shows why this bizarre
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usage is not theoretically
bizarre.
of the individual self.

Freedom is in the realm

Each self may have

perfect
nderstanding of itself through
its clear understanding of
its language.
it is free to create names
and ideas at will,
as we saw in Locke.
Once, however, the selves find
themselves in the political realm,
they are restricted by
the rules of the institutions
that exist. Within the
restrictions imposed by those rules
the selves may arrange
and rearrange institutions.
No actual novelty is allowed.
Selves contract away the right to
create new defining
principles and institutions.
if a principle is used rarely,
it appears to be new.

a

Change in the big picture is

contracted away when all the weapons which
could bind us
into groups have been checked at the door.
The notion of rules
(in democratic theory)

(in communication)

and principles

share interesting features.

Schank

and Birnbaum, who benefit both from more
sophisticated

technology and

a

more developed cognitive science than was

available to Cherry in the Fifties, have worked out

a

computer program to help understand those rules of

processing which, they say, assist human beings in adapting
to novelty.

The human capacity is described by this

s
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impl

after
to a
si tua

can s
tua ion
the s

son has understood this
that is, he understands Burger
Kinq i n
able t ° ° PeCate “--when he
says
"I se
King is just like McDonald's.
^
(Schank
l^cnank
and B lrnbaum {1984} p. 214)
si

•

'

,

To understand better the
process of coping with new

situations, Schank and Birnbaum
analyze rules given
computers to perform similar feats.
The manner in which
this sort of human capability
is transferred to the computer
is through the computer's
memory of similar, though not
identical, things which are connected
in complex patterns
thought to mimic in crude fashion patterns
that human minds
might have.
"Understanding an experience or situation

crucially involves recalling from memory the
previously
experienced situation that is most like the new
input, and
being able to use that memory as a source of
expectations
relevant to current processing" (Schank and Birnbaum
{1984}
p.

214)

.

Schank and Birnbaum have set up

a

complex network

of rules which account for how both computers
and humans are

able to adapt to novelty;
Cherry, turns out to be only

however, "novelty" here, as in
a

reinterpretation of the past.

Despite the advance of two separate sciences, this view
is not

significantly different from the view that "novelty"

is a new arrangement of old words.

rearrangement of the fixed ideas.

Novelty in humans is

Novelty in machines, or

in networks of machines, mimics humans.

But it is an

)
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p cfect mimicry.

Humans touch on new metaphors.

Machines

and networks of machines
"mimic" novelty by only

occasionally throwing up

a

sign.

One must be careful not to

confuse this process with the
human one.

If one does,

then
the human cannot be said to
be doing very much if anything

when talking or thinking.

might be noted, as an aside, that
the circularity of
the methodology is responsible for
some of the confusion
surrounding the idea of novelty. The
computer is modeled on
the human.
The human behavior is analyzed.
Then
(It

the

computer functions are studied to tell us
about real
people
.

The Rawls ian political animal cannot be
said to be doing

very much in the political arena.

Insofar as Rawlsians

could approach political action, they would be
focussed on
rules, prohibitions, procedures, and principles.

His

idealized political process is tightly structured.

Each

step is outlined, defined and then re-outlined and
redefined.

The result of the rules is hardly

a

novelty or political change in the social arena.
placed

a

recipe for
Rawls has

condition of finality on the principles chosen in

the original position

—a

condition so strong that the

principles may not even be overriden by considerations of
prudence or self-interest (Rawls {1971}
novelty enter such

a

system?

p.

135).

How could

In the theorizing of language

by

acquisition such an entrance
is no less problematic
than in
its democratic counterpart.
The right thing to do when
the need to effect a change
presents itself is to have a
meeting of the minds wherein
the "best" group of persons
"win."
The dictates of that
group must then be followed.
This takes place as a vote, a
discussion at a town meeting, in
a class room or in a
family
meeting.
The group making the decision
is effecting a

democratic event.

However, under the contract theory,
there

can be no reason to participate
in such an event.
The first
decision is binding until a war
breaks out. Whatever is
decided in the original contract is
the only "right"
ecision.
There can be no reason for changing
society which
is consistent with the recurring
images of our political
discourse.
I believe that rational
men and women who agree
with Rawls' theory of justice have
to remain apolitical if
they wish to remain "rational."
They would know that any
attempt at playing democracy after getting
back into the
dress of their original personalities would
be the

conceptual equivalent of war.
living is
ir rat

a

Peace or smooth democratic

real or pretended selflessness which is at root

ional--to consent to it one must forget who one is.

Any change in structure must make somebody worse off
by the

. .

.

rules of the game so it
is not
ot f=>irfair play to attempt any
change
So long as

information

"self
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is seen as the sum total
of its

and so long as "self is
seen as fixed or
essentially fixed due to the
fixed ideas from which its
thoughts are created, the only
form of government which can
viewed as fair is one based
on tolerance.
Nothing in
the theory allows us to find
"truth" but truth must be
,

presupposed because each "self" is
based in it.
One's
thoughts are oneself, and as such
are merely more or less
successful combinations of fixed ideas.
Tolerance for ideas
or principles, then, must always
take precedence over
respect for the body or interests.
Selves are ideas or

partakers

m

truth.

Bodies are mere concepts or images

which are poorly defined and get in
the way of

a

unified

political structure or communication network.

Tolerance for ideas is itself limited.

The transition

from "desire" to "correct desire" with
respect to the

exchange which makes up justice guarantees this
limitation.
Even though the writers we have discussed all
stress the

importance of communication, self, and novelty, they are
unable to account for any but the most mundane

communication:

the dull dispersal of already known

information, and of new items in the received conceptual

notation

New" becomes faster. New remains

a

miracle.
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War, mob action and
political
xiLicai srt-inn
=
f
action all
remain
i

i

a

mystery.

Cherry's analysis is applicable:
Since man has evolved language
and systems of
organized thoughts, the evolution
of socTal
rganiza t ions can no longer
be said to proceed bv
Y
T ° day WS SSe planned
experiments, the
social oorganization we call
businesses, industries
government economics, and all
the great
nt SyStems which form our
modern
iorld have
world
havP hbecome so complex and
costly,
and their
U
Uld CepreSent faster on
such
a
sca^e
that planning,
olann
control, and social design are
becoming ever more prominent.
(Cherry {1957} p. 21)
*

increasingly it seems that the
control of information is
the control of politics.
Some might argue that this is an
empirical truth. To control information,
however, one is
controlling, literally on this view,
bits of self.
And yet
the realm of information is the
realm of the sovereign self.
Only someone who can communicate can
be properly considered
a member of the social order;
only someone
who can

communicate can be properly considered

a

person [21].

Dissent is allowed in the social order only
among those who
already fundamentally agree with one another.
Only correct

dissent is allowed into the political dialogue.

Even Mill,

champion of individual freedoms, sometimes, although rarely,
talks of dissent as if it were

a

necessary evil which would

go away if one could dig down to bare Ideas.
he says

:

In On Liberty,
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It still remains to
speak of nnp
P rincipal
causes which make diversity
t opinion
^ of
advantageous
and will continue
^
entered a s?aae ef l °,f until ma "Kind shall have
a

Cement Which at
present seems at an incalculable
incalcSlable dist
distance.
(Mill
{1961}
p.

295)

Political consensus is far away,
to be sure (and to be
celebrated), but on this model it
has always to be the
understood goal of political life.
Fairness must be the
exchange of information and desires
among the selves of
society.
The market, the polls and the
media
are the

exchange locations.

That is, if the self is an individual

who is capable of merging with
similar selves on occasion,
and if the individual is the locus
of accountability, then

bartering towards consensus is the only
conceivable form of
fair government.
Electoral Reform:

Statement Making

As mentioned earlier, there is another notion
of

democracy which is consistent with the head of state
image
even though it does not appear at first glance to
be so.

When the theory of contract becomes too confining, it

becomes imperative for people to talk not only about how to

maintain certain freedoms but also about how to fight for
and act towards new ones.

In the last section

I

analyzed

what it would feel like to view oneself as an individual in
a

democracy, if one believed, as the conclusion of an

argument, that one's proper place is that of being

represented and that one is being fair in abdicating

7

political action to others in order to maintain
stability.

Now

I

a

3

certain

will discuss how it might feel if one

believed that one had

a

duty not merely to be

a

passive part

of democracy, thereby miraculously maintaining
the present

levels of freedom, but also to act in

constructing new freedoms.

a

way consistent with

The conceptual framework with

respect to this second conception of democracy
differs from
the first mainly in that electoral reform
is seen
as an

active and obligatory part of one's life.

But the second

also reduces to the first in that each
election (or other
legislative terminus) can be viewed as the
certification of
a new contract within the
limits of theoretical contract
theory.
The difference is that here acquiring
new contracts
is perceived as an obligation.
The problems that one holding
this belief pattern would
encounter are (1) one could
not really believe that
the

democracy could reproduce
itself from inside itself
and (2)
one could not make sense of
the private/public distinction
necessary to one's making sense
of one's political actions.
An individual who has gone
beyond acquiescing
in the social

contract to make reforms is aware
of political unease in a
way that the simple contractee
of last section cannot be.
Contracts need an adjudicator or a
group of adjudicators to
function as they ought.
Thus each new contract needs to be
interpreted for the parties making the
contact.
(For
example, it was thought necessary to
filter the result of
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the citizens' vote with that of
the electoral college in the
United States of America.)
Outside of any contract, then,
is someone or something sanctioning
that contract.

This

continuously hierarchical structure of
democracy, coupled
with the notion of individual sovereignty,
effectively bars
political action, within the system, that
can change the
system.

We can change things but not to the point
of

changing structure.

I

am not alone in making this

assessment with respect to the inherent conservatism
of

democracies in this particular extent [22].
An extreme, and insightful, interpretation of
what to

make of this peculiar "moving" stagnation is that of

Alessandro Pizzorno.

He has recently suggested that the

sooner political actors realize that politics is not what it
seems, the sooner they will be able to identify (or cause

others to identify) new ways of doing politics which call

attention to the impotence of the old way.

His suggestions,

however novel they might seem, ultimately must be seen as

stemming from

a

deep seated conviction that the more

political events change the more they remain the same.

An

analysis of Pizzorno as representative of democratic
electoral reformists follows.

Pizzorno suggests that politicians receive training in
acting (that form of acting normally associated with the
theater) and that citizens learn how to best exploit their

identification in groups.
and pragmatically

These suggestions are interesting

sound— even

if ironic.

Because he
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addresses but one strand of
what may have been
double-edged response to democracy's

a

ills, he does not

transcend the grips of hierarchy.

The nature of his

critique serves as an example
that when electoral reformers
imagine their terrain to be that
pictured by a state with a
"capital," their action is reducible
to simple acquiescence
in a contract.
Pizzorno argues that the value of
democracy lies not in
the freedom of political
choice but in the freedom of
political identification. He defines
the freedom of
political identification as the "right
that these

identifications have to exist, their right
not to be
nullified or even determined solely
by the authority of the
national state” (Pizzorno (1985)
p. 69).
He admits that
democracy is only a set of
mechanisms for social control"
(Pizzorno (1985) p. 69), but
indicates that on his view this
freedom for political
identification is sufficiently
valuable to force an acceptance
of democracy which does
not
depend solely on expedience.
The problem which Pizzorno
sees for political theory
is that of explaining
political
identification. That is, Pizzorno
sees

a

need for

a model
that can explain how and why
people identify as they do.
He argues that neo-utilitarians
fail in the construction
of such a model because they
place too much weight on the
interests of individuals. Symbolic
theorists offer more

promising theories because they include
categories such as
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solidarity and ritual;

nevertheless these theories
fall
short of providing an
explanatory model for
reasons similar
to those pertaining
to neo-utilitarian
theories,
short,
according to Pizzorno,
just as the neo-utilitarians
cannot
know what any interest
is, due to well-known
political
paradoxes, e.g., the voting
paradox, so too symbolic
theorists face this
epistemological

m

impasse.

What will ever hp
P eS nt 3 s ymbolic good
for the individual
if itq
p
?
9
by others? what good
reco 9 nized
is a meda?
f
°
r exam le
one else knows whit it- qJL
if no
P

™

%

^

'

(Pizzorno {1985} p. 54

r
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For any object, either
symbolic or material, to have
value its utility must entail
"the idea of intersub jective

recognition"

(Pizzorno {1985} p. 56).

Thus,

to have a real

nterest in the political
process, interested parties
must
"maintain membership in the
collective unity that will
acknowledge them" (Pizzorno
(1985) p. 56).
Pizzorno argues
that the only means of having
an identity
(political or

otherwise)

is for a person to be
identified by other

individuals.

Meaning for political action is
found in the
criteria formulated by the identifying
collectivity in which
an agent exists.
Thus the meaning we give to our
activities
is meaningful only in
intersubjective terms.
Pizzorno sees
a need for a theory that
can explain and account for "the
activity that establishes identifying
collective" (Pizzorno

8

.
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19

5

p.

A theory which
is capable of doing
this will
be able to explain
those t hi ngs which
theories of utility
}

57)

.

cannot

One teaS0 n why this
theory provides superior
explanatory
Power to Rawlsian
theories is that it
recognizes political
analysis from two sides:
the side of identification

activity and the side of
instrumental activity.
These kinds
of activity are
separate yet act dialectically
within the
identifying collective.
Identification activity is
that
which reinforces group
solidarity through
ritual, rhetoric,

information gathering and
dispersal, etc.
Instrumental
activity involves putting
into practice the programs
constructed by the groups.
Once these distinction are
made
the model's advantages
become apparent.
For instance
according to this theory voting
can never be seen as
irrational.
Voting can be viewed, when
hopeless, as an
identification activity. One of
many strengths in
Pizzorno's view is that he
points out that when individuals
act politically, they do so
for good reasons and
are not,

unbeknownst to themselves, engaged
in meaningless,
irrational activity.
Because the individual's interests
are necessarily group
interests, voting for a losing
candidate is not irrational.
Instead it can be seen as an act of
solidarity with the
individual's group.
Herein lies the advance both of
electoral reform (as compared to contract
theories) and
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Pizzorno's theory (as
compared to Rawls' theory).

"

the

know

POUtiCal

Persons

they are doing but
they

u

ways that are opaque
to theory.
People act, among
other reasons, out of
friendship, respect for
moral
p r inciples, and loyalty
to groups.
There are reasons for
voting, lobbying, and
most other traditional
forms of

effecting electoral reform.

analysis ends by recognizing
political to

Nevertheless, this excellent
a

framework that limits the

game outside of the actors'
control.
Pizzorno's model, thus,
requires supplementation.
First a
more detailed account of
the self is necessary to
its
transcending the problems
just sketched.
Second it requires
a normative component
that is as well developed
a

as the

explanatory component.

These suggestions for

supplementation do not constitute
what Pizzorno has developed.
not present

a

systematic criticism of

a

His underdefined

serious obstacle for

a

"self does

model which confines

itself to explanation.
The main point here is that
the extent to which people
believe themselves incapable of
changing democratic
institutions from within the institutions
themselves is so

great that serious theorists have
concluded that the purpose
of politics (and not of social
grouping) is to identify with
and offer solidarity to groups.
This is a purpose but
cannot be the only or even the major
purpose. The notion in
itself is ruthlessly hierarchical in
that it presupposes

ruggle out there with
which one may or may
not offer solidarity,
such a stance is inherently
hierarchical.
it implies that some must
struggle while
others may choose to identify with
the struggle which is not
really their struggle. Pizzorno is
a theorist who does not
fall prey to the assumptions that
lead to this conclusion.
It

is important that a normative twin
to his explanatory

portion be found.

Part of that should include

a

manner of

reassigning images that pervasively reproduce the belief
in
the assumptions

I

have been discussing.

Two conclusions can now be stated.

First,

if the self

is seen as exhausted by its information, and communication
is seen as the mere dispersal of that information,

result will be

aggressive.

a

the

political theory that is individualist and

That is, one can hardly help but view oneself

as a self-contained entity with absolute rights to one's

thoughts about which one is the absolute judge in every
case.

That thought becomes the coin of the realm, rather

than the bodies over which selves are said to be sovereign,
is due to the fact that no adequate theory on which to base
a

reasonable body image is available.

Consequently, the

body is devalued and in the process the entire "self" is

devalued, at least indirectly.

The special form of

alienation that follows from these confusions is not
compatible with being an effective democratic actor.
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A second conclusion is that there is a
problem

surrounding democracy understood as

a

form of government

which is just because everyone is seen as equal by
blind
justice.

To avoid war of all against all, some antecedent

and objective standard which explains what counts
as

correct interest or desire must be posited.
requires an adjudicator or

a

a

This positing

group of adjudicators with whom

citizens make explicit or tacit contracts.

It is difficult

to view history as moving toward consensus because the

standard which stands outside is not under anyone's control
nor can it be brought under anyone's control.
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13.
It is important to note that the sovereignty
persons over their own bodies is initially liberating. of a
it
is better than that the monarch or God have
such power.
It
remains to rid ourselves of the baggage that makes it
necessary (and at present it is necessary to claim such
sovereignty) to have a primary internal relationship be
one
of hierarchy.
14.
Perhaps this image, a recurring one in our culture,
is responsible for why we say "the people united will
never
be defeated," but not "the cabinet united will never be

defeated

"

.

'

)

:

84

T

me,

t
~
is the firs° materialist ln Anti 0edlpus

Self and

a

is occurs to

•

self-„here

bodv

state
tbout a

ing that

d.ll
n

AnT ^hInos

-

people don't make sense

th lan9Uage “ h »"

not'going
tnVthe^p^pj"
may be visibly abnormal fro s
m across the
16.

it won'

e
5

TooJ‘

(pp

?

d

^.t

are

476-7?"

do to say "I don't believe
the
"
E«g., that I have sovereign
n
0l
d
t
lO £(
doe s: Tbe cLtufr d ois °S; d belieVe
any
images surrounding
t

propositions in question

the\Yp^posSs /

^

theoSfifErP

dl station differ from
democratic
theories that
rneories
ILt precede
f
it.
iC a
9
mea
the Creatin 9 *" d recreating of
sel veT° Tt i s ^i°^
tly used to modify the term
LiteralllY
lv 1
means cheating peoples but I will "strategy."
use itas
^.
ho^h generative
^
both
and regenerative
er dem0t C alternative is one
which the political
h
K
actor ™^
may choose
because it does not exclude any type of
ha Wh Ch 1S monodemoti c.
There is no chance
that Thlin
^ c alternative
a heterodemotl
will turn monodemotic over
Mmo
me because once the alternative is
chosen and sufficient
time for its implementation allowed,
the next set of
alternatives is encountered.
The structure of the theory of action I
will present
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groups.
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Italian group
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No. 9 for numerous examples) as
heterodemotlc.

^

18.
The solution to the puzzle when so stated is to
become capable of being in charge. Once in charge,
however,
one s best efforts will harm someone.
(One must ask oneself
of the persons in charge doing harm what
percentage perceive
themselves as doing just that?)
Rawls sees this and asks
that institutions be set up that they harm the least
advantaged as little as possible. But, is there not
something inherently wrong about the interest to rule.
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21
£herr y a<3 a n makes the point with graphic, though
f
^
perhaps chilling, simplicity.
He recounts the story of
•

,

Helen Keller and her nurse learning Keller's
first word
water."
His comments are instructive.
"Immediately in a
flash of revelation, Helen saw the idea of words.
Everything has a name!' she cried.
She made a remarkable
inference, developing the new concept, or universal,
of
'words,' a thing no animal can do.
From that moment on,
Helen became human and her mental life became orqanized"
(Cherry {1957} p. 78, my emphases):
!

22.
Umberto Eco makes much stronger claims about the
effects of the illnesses this image has wrought.
In his
"Striking at the Heart of the State," (Eco {1986} pp.
113-118) written in 1978, he claims that the sickening
strength of modern capitalism lies in its being "heartless
and headless" (Eco {1986}, p. 117).
Revolutionar i es can no
longer strike against the state by killing the king— its
head, but violent revolutionaries in Italy "still spoke of
'striking at the heart of the state'" (Eco {1986} p. 116)
When power becomes concentrated to such an extent that it is
impenetrable both in terms of knowledge of it and attacks
against it, Eco argues that even extra-electoral-reform is
easily absorbable by the system:
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CHAPTER II
SELVES IN CONFLICT

this chapter the conception
of democracy on which I
focus is that which belongs
to the Hegelian/Marxian
tradition 1
Marx, in his Critique of
Hegel's Doctrine of
the State, indicates that
what differentiates democracy
fr™
other social arrangements
is that "in democracy, man
does
not exist for the sake of
the law, but the law exists
for
the sake of man, it is human
existence, whereas in other
political systems man is a legal
existence." Democracy is
"the solution to the riddle of
every constitution;" it
"relates to all other forms of state
as its Old Testament;"
and, states "are untrue to
the extent that they are not
In

[

democracy"

]

.

(Marx

{1975} pp.

87-89).

Like Marx,

that insofar as states invested
with power exist,

state will be the more democratic
one.

I

think
the better

The best state of

affairs is that where there is no longer
the need for a
state.
Until that time, for every state there
will be a
civil society trying to make it democratic;

democratic state

a

for every

civil society trying to make it more so.

The riddles of democracy viewed from

a

Hegelian/Marxian

perspective are "Who are the humans of democracy?" and
"How
do they communicate across the socio-economic
classes whose

struggle is necessary to the formation of that state of
affairs?

But Marxian democracy, even though it allows for
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"men" making themselves
and their state, remains
too

abstract.

That it remains too
abstract

is due to the

Marxian importation of
Hegelian self.
Fo r the purposes of
this chapter I refer to a
way of being Marxist and
of
reading Marx which I call
Hegelian/Marxian [2],
The question

"How can the Hegelian self,
the self

constituted by its struggle with
itself pass beyond such a
struggle while retaining an
identity?" is an idealist
question about an ideal journey.
Understanding this
question will help us to answer
a concrete political
question about Marxian history,
namely, the question of how
the political can dissolve
into the social as the critique
of capitalism works itself out
in history,
our

m

question becomes more precise:

how can

a

terms the

heterodemotic

social life ultimately supplant
political democracy? I
believe that such a supplanting is made
possible by eroding

political democracy with demogenic strategies.
I

mean that practice which creates new selves.

By demogenic

Demogenic

strategies will always be heterodemotic, that
is, they will
not close off the possibilities for different
kinds of self

except in one case

— that

where the self, to be itself, must

restrict all selves but the kind it is.

The work of this

chapter is to show that Hegelian/Marxian selves have been

barred from demogenic activity by the authoritarian

presuppositions of their construction.
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I

am neither making the
conceptual claim that

authoritarian presuppositions of

a

theory of the self held

by Hegel and Marx make
that theory incompatible with
the
principles of political democracy;
nor am I making the

pragmatic claim that actual people
whose selves are very
much as Hegel and Marx say they
are find themselves unable
to engage in democratic
political action. My claims are
that the principles of political
democracy are based
on such authoritarian presuppositions
as
in Hegelian Marxism, and,

I

have pointed to

that if people actually believed

theories consistent with Hegelian Marxism,
they would be
psychologically barred from demogenic activity.
In an essay that goes from seeming to
being back to

seeming again

with dizzying rapidity. The German Ideology

,

Marx says:
The separate individuals form a class only insofar
as they have to carry on a common battle against
another class;
otherwise they are on hostile terms
with each other as competitors. On the other hand,
the class in its turn achieves an independent
existence over against the individuals, so that the
latter find their conditions of existence
predestined, and hence have their position in life
and their personal development assigned to them by
their class... We have already indicated several
times how this subsuming of individuals under the
class bring with it their subjection to all kinds of
ideas, etc.
(Marx {1978a} p. 179)
The State is conceived as a set of collectives locked in
the political conflict (as well as other forms of conflict).

The Social would allow the true assertion of individuals as

v
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themselves

"m

order, therefore, to assert
themselves as
individuals, they must overthrow
the State" (Marx (1978a)
p.
200).
The political and the social
are in direct contrast
another,
to live in the social one
must do away with
that which make possible the
political as this passage from
The Coming Upheaval" indicates:
:

Does this mean that after the fall
of the old
Y there wil1 be a new class domination
culminating in a new political power?
No
The

^f

.

—

^s deve^pment.
Will
wili'subs
substitute
ti tut
for the old civil society an
association which will exclude classes
and ?heir
antagonism, and there will be no
more political
P
Y
since P^ica! poSer is
pr ec isel
thp
P
3
e official expression of
y fc
antagonism in
C
c vj 1 society
.Do not say that social movement
excludes political movement. There
is
political movement which is not at the never a
same time
social.
it is only in an order of things
in which
n
6
lasses and c lass antagonisms that
S
? T"
— ocial evolutions
will cease to be "political
revolutions ."
(Marx {1978b} pp. 218-19)
th *

^

'

.

.

.

How "political revolution" becomes

need no longer be used for analysis

explanation.

— is

concept

a

— one

which

what needs

The trappings of Hegelian dialectic may have

introduced assumptions that no Auf hebung of the
political
can dissolve.

To discuss that possibility,

I

will consider

the theory of communication which underlies the

Marxian/Hegelian conception of democracy.
a

I

will argue that

form of Hegelian theory stands at the foundation of

Marxian/Hegelian democratic theory.

Marx's critique of

Hegel's dialectic cannot transcend the limitations of
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Hegel's implicit view
of the possibility
of communication
A1 though Marx'S criti
que of the idealist
theory of the stlte
is in general
successful, he fails to
avoid some of the
basic tenets of Hegel's
philosophy.
f suggest that
this
leads to a conception of
self that cannot itself
lead to an
adequate theory of communication,
and a conception of self
that is ultimately responsible
for an uncertain distinction
between the social and the
political in Marxian/Hegelian
theorizing.
Conflict becomes conceptually
irresolvable at
the level of selves in such
theorizing, a fact that may
explain why Marxian/Hegelian democratic
theorists often
revert to bourgeois conceptions of
self when discussing
social and political action.
Individuals may not be bound
by the rational calculations of
shopkeepers;
classes,
however, are.
The discussion of Hegel's theories of
self and

communication makes up section one.

There

Marx's critique of Hegel stops short of
the dialectic.

I

a

I

argue that

full inversion of

specifically argue that Marx takes up

Hegelian concepts of self and communication without

scrutinizing all of the presuppositions.
Marx's strategy are

Some questions of

"What can the 'social' mean to

a

P ® — ^ ® vo 1 u t i ona r y Marxist? and "How can one enter the
1-

social?"

in section two

I

analyse the relationship between

Marx and Hegel with respect to the category of the human.

show that from this context it can be seen that the fact

I
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that Hegel is anti-democratic
and Marx pro-democratic is

linguistically determined but that
neither seems to have
been implicitly aware of their
linguistic determination.
The manner in which they viewed
science, rationality, and
the human are linked in turn to
their views on

communication.

in section three

I

discuss problems that

arise from the tension that exists
between the kinds of
selves found in Hegelian and in Marxian
theory.
I argue
that no theoretical compatibility can
exist between the

members of some social community and those same
individuals
regarded as political actors. This incompatibility
creates
severe problems for our conceptions of political
actors.

Previous attempts to deal with this problem at the level
of

communication will be discussed in terms of their
inadequacies.

I

also discuss some concerns involved in

seeing violence as

a

political strategy.

The questions here

are "Who can one count as political interlocutor?" and "Must

one be violent?"

To some extent, the theoretical

incompatibility to which

I

refer may give rise to a

suggestion that action be "irrational," i.e., violent, thus
avoiding the demands of coherent theory by the relief of
just doing something.

I

believe it is possible to

articulate theory more coherently in approaching the

question of practice.
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Hegej^ i an/Mar xi ari Selves
Doing Battle with Capital

Hegel expresses

problem of communication which
is very
different from the Lockean
problem we discussed in Chapter
One.
Early in the Phenomenology
Hegel says:
a

.

eak ° f the exis tence of external
obiects
be more Precisely defined as
actual,
tely
ular
wholly person al individual
aCh °
them abs °lutely unlike- any thing
\l
axistence they say has absolute
nllV
^
rt lnby
and truth.
They mean 'this' bit of paper
P P
nn
^
on which
I am writing— or rather
have
W 1 t
'this';
but what they mean is not
u 5 fu
what
they say.
if they actually wanted to say
h
C WhiGh they mean
if the y wanted
^L it, thenPa pu
to say
this is impossible, because the
sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached
by
language, which belongs to consciousness,
i.e. to
that which is inherently universal.
In the
attempt to say it, it would therefore crumbleactual
away*
those who started to describe it would not
be able'
to complete the description, but would
be compelled
o leave it to others, who would
themselves finally
have to admit to speaking about something
which is
not.
They certainly mean, then, this bit of paper"
here which is quite different from the bit
mentioned
above;
but they say 'actual things', 'external or
sensuous objects' , absolutely singular entities'
[We sen
and so on;
i.e. they say of them only what
is universal
Consequently, what is called the
unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the
irrational, what is merely meant [but is not
actually expressed].
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 110)
eY

.

!?

S

u

?

?^

.

^9
.

'

'

'

'

]

.

The "they" of this paragraph represents "those who

assert the truth and reality of sense-objects."

For Hegel

sense-certainty is incompatible with meaningful expression
because at this stage one cannot mean what one says.

The

self one finds for oneself at this stage is about to

perceive truth but cannot yet express this meaningfully

.
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because it is not yet sufficiently
self-conscious.
Language
at this level "directly
reverses the meaning of what is
said.
There is no way for intentions
to be translated into
shared discourse.

Why is Hegel already concerned
with language at this
point in the Phenomenology ? After
all, it is not until
"Lordship and Bondage" that an Other is
introduced, and the
obvious problems of communication addressed.
As Judith
Butler points out, only at the later point
"do we become
convinced of its [an Other's] existence" (Butler
{1987} p.

42). Butler describes the subject at this
lower stage of

development as one who "mistakenly restricts
his dependence
to the world of natural objects," who
"shows no

understanding of human embodiment," and who because of
the
peculiar arrogance attached to ignorance is "swiftly"
on the
way "toward defeat"

(Butler {1987} p. 42).

Butler's puzzle

concerns why Hegel had not introduced the Other earlier in
the journey to selfhood:

"Why did the journeying subject of

the Phenomenology begin its journey alone?"
p.

(Butler {1987}

Her answer helps to solve the puzzle about the

46)

genesis of language in

subject with no language.

a

Butler notices that "desire" and "Other" would be

impossible in the dialectic if they had not always already
been there in some form before their actual appearance.
Hegel,

nihilo

i

"coming into existence.
,

but is, rather,

a

..

For

is never... a creation ex

moment in the development of

a
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Concept

(Butler {1987} p. 47).

For Hegel, there can be no

reality, nothing at all, without
the Other.

"There can be

no experience outside the context
of intersub jectivi ty"

(Butler

{1987} p. 47).

As we shall see language for Hegel

is consciousness for others.

others that presupposes

a

it is a consciousness for

perception of self which is

pure

a

perception (see especially Phenomenology paragraph
652).
The puzzle about language's seemingly
premature appearance
can be solved in

desire.

a

strictly analogous manner to that of

That language is ontologically prior, cannot be

demonstrated until the proper form of consciousness has
been
achieved;

nevertheless there is no consciousness

that embodied in

"

sense— cer tainty"

— without

— not

even

language.

Language is the construct that makes Hegel's teleological
system, with its succession of stages of consciousness,

coherent as

a

totality.

The context of intersub ject ivity

necessitates some explicit awareness of something that makes
such

a

context possible:

language.

The discussion of language at the stage of

self-certainty becomes coherent
a

i^i

retrospect

.

Language is

necessary precondition for the consciousness of the stage

of sense-certainty even though its existence is not known to

the subject at this specific point of development.

problems remain.

Three

Hegel's early discussion of

sense-certainty leaves the reader wondering how it is
possible

(1)

that language "directly reverse the meaning of
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what is said,

(2)

that

"what they [those who assert the

truth and reality of sense-objects]
mean" and

(3)

perception.

say is not what they

that anyone could go beyond
sense-certainty to
The last worry is the most important
because it

can be generalized:

how is it that anyone could ever

successfully go from one stage to the
next on the journey to
selfhood.
Although the question of consciousness
is
explicitly raised later, it is also true
that the nature of

communication is already problematic
beforehand--these
clusters of implicitly nesting concepts do
not provide a
motor for movement along the path of increasingly
articulate
self-consciousness.
How is it possible, then, that language turns
everything
into its opposite?

How can it be that the language of

self-certainty does not let "what is meant get into
words at
all"

(Hegel

{1977} paragraph 110)?

It is claimed that this

ability results from language's "divine
nature."

I

will

examine two interpretations of the claim
that language
facilitates these strange abilities.

First

I

will analyse

the discussion of languages here as
provisional:

Hegel

means only that "they" are prohibited from
saying what they
mean in language at this level of development.
The

self-conscious "1=1" of absolute knowledge will not be
so
prohibited.

A second way of reading the claim is to

attribute to Hegel an equation between language and the

mediation between consciousness and things.

Even

a
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self-conscious

”

1

=1

”

cannot fully express

self-consciousness in language.

Both interpretations

require that something in
the equation of communication
be
constant, and that is language.
The inconstancy of things
across stages and even shifts
in consciousness are
balanced
by the fixed point of language.
Language, the mediator,
stands outside of the process.
Language, the bearer of
ideas, must pre-exist in order
to lay out the path to
absolute knowledge.
As many commentators have
noted, Hegel requires a

necessary metaphysical place for
each self (see for instance
Butler {1987} p. 5 who uses the
term "subject," which I do
not use for reasons explained in my
introduction).
Language, as abstract mediation,
establishes this necessity
through change.
it is thus at once the prime mover
of the

system and that in which subjects find their
necessary

metaphysical stage.

As such it is possible that language

does what had seemed impossible, viz., reverse
the

intentions (meanings) of speakers. This ability on
language's part is properly called "divine."

This point

will stay with us through section three where we begin
an

analysis of discourse theory as

a

possible solution to the

fixed and totalitarian nature of the "divine" and mysterious

system of words and language.

We will not be rid of the

implications of the point until the end of Chapter Three
where we find that Kierkegaard's anti-system and

98

anti-politics places something else
in the structural
position Hegel had reserved for
language.
It is instructive in comparison
to note Marx's use of

the metaphor of the journey to
(true)
the dialectic again on

a

selfhood.

Marx turns

new terrain as the following

passage and subsequent analysis of
it suggest

[3]

:

The result of the capitalist process
is
mere product use-value) nor a commodity neither a
that is,
use-value whic h has a certain exchange-value.
Its
result, its pr oduct, is the creation of
surplus-value for capital, and consequently
actual transfo rmation of money or commodity the
into
capital-- which before the production process
they
were only in i ntention, in their essence, in
what
they were dest ined to be.
(Marx {1963} pp.
399-400)
(

,

Marx

s

account of the transformation of money into

capital only makes sense if there is

a

necessary

metaphysical place in the system for them.

The entities

referred to by the terms "money" or "commodity" cannot be
what they mean except at the moment of transformation.

The

money, the commodity, and capital mimic life processes but

capital is especially interesting.

Capital turns people

into their opposites so that they literally are not what
they can be at some more authentic level.

It is not only

that "in general ... the characters who appear on the economic
stage are but the personifications of the economic relations
that exist between them"

(Marx

{1967a} p. 85), but also that

these characters have just one script

capitalist:

— that

of the

"In a social order dominated by capitalist

.
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production even the non-capitalist
is gripped by capitalist
conceptions" (Marx 1967b} p. 39).
Capital is the "power to
mmand " and the wea ke r the capitalist

—

becomes, through

sloth, the more social power he
acquires.
E conomic

Marx says in the

and Philosophical Manuscripts that
this power is

not possessed "on account of his
personal or human

properties but in so far as he is an owner
of capital" (Marx
{1975} p.

295).

Capital turns the weak into the strong and

the strong into the weak:

...the more the worker produces, the less he has
to
consume;
the more values he creates, the more
worthless he becomes;
the more his product is
shaped, the more misshapen the worker;
the more
civilized his object, the more barbarous the
worker;
the more intelligent the work, the duller
the worker and the more he becomes a slave of
nature.
(Marx {1975} p.
325)
,

Only when capital is gone as

a

part of material production

will people be able to exist with their selves right side
up

Marx seems at some level to have implicitly accepted the

Hegelian notion of necessity for self —development and
language.

The capitalists' desire for profit turns the

economy from the originating standpoint, even if desire is
ultimately theoretically linked to material processes.

The

workers' desire to survive allows them to maintain the

contradictions of capitalism of which they are increasingly
aware.

The solution to solve the problems these desires

present is the supersession of private property but the
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selves theorized cannot
supersede in any manner
unsanctioned
by the capitalist script.
So, for Marx, Capital
stands to
material processes as language
stands to the ideal journey
for Hegel.
in either case, abstract
universals are
the

things which produce
change, thereby moving history
[4].
Economic transactions can be
seen here as analogous to a
mysterious transfer of information,
what seems at first to
constitute in reality the entities
under investigation must
give way to the final explanatory
terrain;
Marx can be seen
to be a metaphysician who
has not completely escaped the
Hegelian terrain. Conflict and
transformation occur for
both according to design in
pre-established "space." And,
it is no wonder, that theories
of money and of the state
that are met now repeat this
entrenched situation. We have
no discourse in which to discuss
money or state in which we
are free from either endless conflict
or mysterious

transformations.
The possibility that speakers cannot say
what they mean
is related to Hegel's thesis we have
just discussed that

language necessarily reverses the meaning of what
is spoken.
Hegel says that what the selves at the stage of

sense-certainty mean is not what they say.

One means to

discuss sensuous particularity but "divine" and "universal"
language cancels the project.
one pointed to

a

"this,"

universal or particular?

One may wish to ask Hegel if

whether one's gesture would be
Hegel would have to commit
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himself to the proposition
that gestures are universal
to be
consistent. One's question
then becomes
"How can we fail
to mean what we say
when what we mean is as
trivial as it is

hands?'."

where is the cancelling
universal of language?
It is different to ask
whether we can mean what we
say
than to ask whether meaning
is necessarily reversed
by
speaking in that the former
is the more general.
That
meaning is reversed directly
by metaphysical necessity
is
sufficiently concrete that it
translates easily into Marx's
material necessity. That is,
there is a parallelism between
Hegel's assertion that "language
reverses meaning" and
Marx's "capital reverses being."
The question concerning
generalizations is not answerable or
capable of

formalization in any straightforward
way. It seems as if
Hegel also cannot mean what he says
here.
Language is
mediation but so too is the subject.

Perhaps, we are on the

way to knowing of what we speak but
it is impossible that we
can mean what we say until it is the
"l = i" who speaks.

Strictly

,

if Hegel and Marx are still using
the old language

to communicate to others,

they will end up meaning something

^iffsrent from what they say.
Butler says that "the permanent irony of the Hegelian

subject consists of this:

it requires mediation to know

itself, and knows itself only as the very structure of

mediation"

(Butler

{1987} p. 7-8).

One means what one says
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just when one is no longer
oneself.

Again

a

parallel with

is tempting.

Vulgar economists cannot mean
what they
say because their language
reverses itself like the language
of the "they” in Hegel's
section on sense-certainty
[

5 ],

The teleological nature of
the system, the goal of the
transparent "1=1," expresses the
position of the "they" that
cannot say what they mean.
If "they” could already say
what
they meant, there could be no
point in movement.
Marx
repeats the structural position:
"All science would be

superfluous if the outward appearance
and the essence of
things directly coincided" (Marx
{1967b}, p. 817). Marx
treats the Hegelian self so that when
a self achieves

the

satisfaction of desire, it must cease to exist.

But quite

the contrary, he says that one becomes
a self exactly when

desire is consummated.

The contradiction inherent in the

metaphysics will not go away.
One might point out that one will never really
get what
one wants.

One might allege that it is the critique, and

not the theories under attack, that is idealist.

My

response is that when Hegel and Marx are doing theory, the
result that "at the end" all movement ceases is not just

syntactic tautology.

Instead, both systems have as their

end some absolute negation and void.

end

a

One cannot reach this

and not only because the end is unreal, but because one

cannot move.
of action:

Two structural features thus stand in the way
the incredibility of the endpoint and the
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inability of moving toward
that endpoint.
it is not a
feature of the world that keeps
us from ending history
in
this sense but an aporia
cast up in theory.
One wants to know from Hegel
how it is possible that the
distorted nature of self at an
early stage of development
can attain the next stage or
even possibly undertake
,

to do

How can sense-certainty become
perception?

Hegel's

description of the transition begs
the question:
out as a here
which is a Here

of other Here's;

,

it is a universal.

!

point
i.e..

take it up then as it is in truth,
and

instead of knowing something immediate
it, or perceive it"

"I

(Hegel

{1977}

I

take the truth of

paragraph 110).

That

this begs the question is sharply
indicated in Kierkegaard's
general criticisms of the Hegelian
system. We will examine
that critique in the next chapter but
we can already see
that Hegel does not solve the mystery of
why we move from
the sensuous "this" to the perceived and
universal "this,"
or indeed why any movement along the path
indicated in the

Phenomenology should ever take place.

It is necessary that

each self make this transition but there is no reason
to

accept the transition as necessary.
can be read precisely as

a

The talk of necessity

tacit admission that no

explanatory mechanism of movement is in view.

One repeats

meaningless propositions in sense-certainty until, uttering
higher level nonsense in place of the old, one perceives.

Language's divine nature indicates the path of the journey

.
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Without explaining or even
motivating its undertaking.
Language, although not possible
without the Other, makes it
possible for us to be outside of
ourselves so that we can
confront the Other. As the mediator
of consciousness and
things, language is primary.
But the necessity of its place
leaves the connection of language
to linguistic ascent
opaque [6]
Hegel noticed early that language
"kills" reality in a
peculiar manner. That is, the
contradictions it expresses
may be resolved in language even while
the conflict that
gave rise to them rages in the world.
Everything imaginable
exists;
one of language's uses is to mark off
that which we
cannot bear. Notice the twisting ontology in
this passage
from Hegel's Preface

:

Nor is there such a thing as the false, any more
than there is something evil.
The evil and the
false, to be sure, are not as bad as the devil, for
in the devil they are even made into a particular
subjective agent
as the false and the evil, they
are mere univer sals , though each as its own essence
as against the other.
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 39)
;

Here language forces meanings beyond what is said.
Hegel is describing why spirit could never attain scientific

knowledge without facing negativity not as false

propositions but as that which gives substance its form.
Hegel's conclusions are that it is impossible to ever face
truth or falsity because they do not ever exist;
never

a

negation of the negation.

there is

To frame this problem of
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ontology in Marxian and
political manner, the issue becomes
one of the possibility that
the social and political might
ever transform each other into
something else. The problem
with language at least suggests
that the social will not
"win out."
if a transformation to some
new form seems

incoherent how can the negation which
manifests itself as
revolution be worth the sacrifices of
the revolutionary?
The theory can only be explanatory
to a revolutionary class
that is already class-conscious.
in late capitalism, where
classes are difficult or impossible to
find, theory
stagnates and action appears irrational.
Not finding

a

class, one needs to look to oneself.

in

Hegel 1 an/Mar xi sm, the nature of selves is
predetermined, and
so is the path by which one can become one's
final self.

There is

a

journey to be undertaken, but the parameters of

the journey are rigidly bound by language.
the place of selves.
a

Language marks

Communication between selves is always

struggle over something.

The script of the master and the

script of the bondsman are already there for them;

struggle in which they hold

a

the

place is out of their control.

The over-determination of the situation is compounded when

one realizes that in the Hegelian system one's progress is

determined by how one uses language.
Earlier we saw that

a

marker of sense-certainty is that

"they cannot say what they mean."

Other examples of one's

language abound or at least markers of appearance of one's

°
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outer being and one's position.

The bondsman becomes

himself (for himself in the
technical Hegelian sense) when
the inner fear becomes an outer
fear that can be

shared.
The explanation of the transformation
in this respect is
interesting:
"Without the formative activity, fear
remains
inward and mute, and consciousness
does not become

explicitly for itself" (Hegel (1977}

paragraph 196).

As

Reason, expression is not only the
marker, but the essence
of self-consciousness:

Having discovered this [that thinghood
is Spirit's
e lng f0r ‘ 1 :Self] self ~ consc
iousness
thus knows
T^Lr
.
K
l
1
be reallt
in
the
form
y
of
an
individuality
5
i
that drrectiy
expresses itself, an individuality
which no longer encounters resistance from
an
world opposed to it, and whose aim and object actual
are
only this expressing of itself.
(Hegel {1977}
paragraph 359)
-

By the time that consciousness has become
absolute

spirit for and in itself, the expression of fear is
pure

negativity or death;
freedom!)

in this sphere

(that of absolute

what is called government is merely the

victorious faction, and in the very fact of its being
faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow;
being government makes it conversely, into
[so]

guilty"

(Hegel {1977}

paragraph 591).

a

a

and its

faction, and
The marker of

this stage is to be found in linguistic expressions in the

outer sphere.

We can tell this stage because its movement

"cannot achieve anything positive, either universal works of

language or of reality, either of laws and general

.
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institutions of

c onsciou s

freedom, or of deeds and works
of

freedom that wills them" (Hegel
{1977} paragraph 588).
In every stage of the
journey, then, the significance
is
measured and realized externally.
it remains to examine the
connection between the inner and
the outer
a

if we are to

adequately understand the mysterious
role communication
plays in the Hegelian system.

Hegel says of the connection:

f
place ln regard to the relation of
the
inn!? r
thl
outer
il: seems clear that
the
relation mustf lbe grasped as a causal
connection
1011 ° f ° ne beln 9-in-itlelf
beinaJnM^fr
being m-itself, qua a necessary relation, to another
is a
causal connection... NowTfor spiritual
individuality
b ?* e an effe t
the b °dy it must, qua cause, be
?
itself corporeal.
The corporeal element, however,
in which it acts as cause is the
organ, but
organ not of action against external reality,the
of the internal action of the self-conscious but
being
operating outwards only against its own body.
(Hegel {1977}
paragraphs 324-5)
'

'

He then goes on to point out the "absurdity"
of

observational views, specifically that which assigns
functions of the spirit to various parts of the body
(then
we could know mysteries of the spirit by examining
dead

bodies)
body.

and that which holds that the spirit lives in the
"For this is at once incompetence and deceit, to

fancy and to pretend that one merely has not the right word"
(Hegel

{1977}

paragraph 328)

to be able to express:

For Hegel,

to understand is

"If one had the Notion, then one

would also have the right word."

The causal connection

between internal and external is the necessary relation

.

.
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found in words, that refines
language through all the
stages
until at the end, when one
reverts, transformed, to the
unity of inwardness (Hegel
{1977} paragraph 804).
The
ultimate transformation is that
the external ization of the
self is its inwardizing.
"Their (Spirits-) goal is the
revelation of the depth of Spirit,
and this is the absolute
Notion" (Hegel (1977) paragraph
808).
The absolute place of
language is abruptly cancelled
just when it is fully
developed

Hegelian philosophy is strange at
exactly the place Marx
identifies. We are either nothing in
being everything or
everything in being nothing and it is
impossible to relate
these stages.
I have argued that Marx
pinpoints the problem
in Hegel's philosophy but that
he does so at too abstract a
level.
Marx ends up with a problematic democratic
theory
because his partially borrowed theory of
self and
of

communication does not lend itself to any possibility
of
political action that is not from the beginning
endlessly
confrontational.
political

The Hegelian/Marxian self can only be

there is no concrete social imaginable for humans

as we know them

[7]

To realize Marx's vision, the mote

that made it possible has to be removed by recognition of

more coherent theory of the self and of communication.

a
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Hum^n All Too Humana
The Structure of

Erasure of the Merely Animal
a

Hegelian/Marxian Dialectic

Two passages must be addressed in
order to handle the
discourse which concerns the relationship
of Marx to Hegel
These passages are important to
Marxian theorists and
activists alike. The first is the famous
passage from the
E conomic and Philosophical
Manuscripts the second is from
the afterword to volume one of Capital.
;

Because Hegel equates man with self-consciousness,
the estranged object, the estranged
essential
reality of man is nothing but consciousness,
nothing
but the thought of estrangement, its abstract
and
hence hollow and unreal expression, negation. The
supersession of alienation is therefore likewise
nothing but an abstract, hollow supersession of that
hollow abstraction, the negation of the negation.
The inexhaustible, vital, sensuous, concrete
activity of self-objectification is therefore
reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute
negativity, an abstraction which is then given
permanent form as such and conceived as independent
activity, as activity itself.
(Marx {1975} p. 396)
My dialectic method is not only different from the
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the
life-process of the human brain, i.e.
the process
of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he
even transforms into an independent subject, is the
demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is
only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea."
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else
than the material world reflected by the human mind,
and translated into forms of thought.
(Marx {1967a}
,

P.

19)

There are three important points in the preceding

passages that

I

must immediately address before

I

can
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reassess the relationship of
Hegel to Marx with respect to
democracy
when I make the reassessment,
I win do so in
terms of a concrete category
distinction which both
philosophers find important, namely
that between humans and
non-human animals.
.

The first of the points

I

feel compelled to dispel is

that Hegel's "consciousness"
which is said by Marx to be, in
the end, everything that is
cannot be everything in the

Hegelian system.

Language is the "object" which must
play
this role; language plays this role
for Marx although
possibly in a more sophisticated manner.
Consciousness
cannot be the only activity for Hegel—
not even in the final
stage of the progression.

In that final stage perception is

still crucial in an important, but often
overlooked, sense.
Marx states in the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts
that true science will be the science of
sense perception
(Marx

(1975) p.

355).

This sense perception must be social

sense perception and recognized as such.

For Marx, the

species must be species-conscious in order to do science
and
this is why doing science is making revolution.

The second point is that Marx believes that for Hegel

there can be no overcoming of human alienation.

This is

because the overcoming of the alienation must itself be
new alienation, since only
at stake.

a

a

change in consciousness seems

The negation of the negation must be a permanent

form of the Hegelian system.

A Hegelian/Marxism must

Ill

Perhaps terminate in the
belief that there is a
permanent
form of alienation
(political life,.
what is clear is that
for the majority of
Marxist actors the revolution
must be
permanent. The slogans •'Finish
the revolution" or "Complete
the revolution seem to
presuppose an end somewhere but
it

is theoretically unclear
what that end might be.

success of

The

revolution remains a revolutionary
break in
Hegelian/Marxism, and perhaps in
Marx's thought itself.
What cannot be foreseen is the
determinant negation that
would produce socialism. To
describe a classless society is
merely the abstract negation of
capitalism, as indicated by
the difficulties that socialists
have found in describing
utopia.
The realization of utopia requires
a materialist
practice that would give the classless
society its concrete
a

form.

Finally Marx accuses Hegel of failing to
see that there
is no substantial difference
between the ideal and material
worlds."
Hegel is said to personify the movement of

history into

a

subject and to overly abstract the Idea.

And

yet how can we understand Marx's class analysis
without the
aid of the heuristic device that allows us
to personify the

proletariat and the bourgeoisie?
contradictions between actors,

a

What moves history if not

situation which impels an

analysis involving selves and (other) selves?
These three points do not imply, nor do

I

think that any

points that could be made about this relationship could
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imply

that Marx and Hegel are
structural mirror images o£
each other with respect to
world history and conflict.
They
indicate however that Marx's
rejection of Hegel cannot
itself provide a structural
difference.
A Marxian critique
of each Marxist rejection of
a Hegelian position is
still
possible. What I hope to have
shown is that their
relationship here is very complex
and that Marx's belief
that he had turned Hegelian
dialectic on its head can now be
seen to be in some deep way
incomprehensible. The inversion
still consists of abstract negations.
it cannot be what he
claims for it, viz., that he makes
history the history of
doing, not of merely thinking.
The reason is that the
movers of history must be posited as
always external to the
,

"humans" who are about to move.

I

also suggest that persons

who have a Hegelian understanding of
self, language and
history will be (rationally) open to theories
of permanent
revolution.

Throughout the rest of this section, then,

I

will assume Marx can be read as if he were
Hegelian, and
that Marx's inverted Hegel will still carry

a

core of

linguistic communication that is shot thcough with with

a

potentially authoritarian but unachievable telos.

An Application of Hegelian/Marxian Dialectic

Going back to the start of this chapter, such

a

Marxism

must conceive democracy as the primacy of human control of
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political process, and as
revealing the secondary nature
of laws, government and
state.
As Marx
says in "On the

Jewish Question:"

"all emancipation is reduction
of the

human world and of relationships
to man himself” (Marx
{1975} p.

234)

.

Marxian/Hegelian

democracy is the

political freedom to be human—
the freedom of humans from
politics, but this is prima
facie only a slogan in current
language.
We need to learn what it would
mean if it could
be brought to say what it
means.
One way of bringing about
this understanding can be explored
by focussing on
a

distinction, namely that between human
and non-human
animals.
This distinction depends
on "self" and

"communication" which can now be seen as
building blocks in
revolution.
People had been seen as "real" people
by
entering language. The second transformation
makes them
even more "real" by entering revolutionary
discourse as

member of

class-conscious class.

a

If the conflict of reality finds itself
bound and begat

by language,

conflict.

then every "thing" that can talk is forced into

People become people by entering language.

We

can see now that Hegel's person, while accorded rights
in
the Philosophy of Right

(strictly speaking)
achieved.

,

until

is restricted from being human
a

mastery of abstraction is

The self in Hegel who counts is

a

uniquely human

self which is constructed independently of its body.
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As we found a dividing
line in the information
theorists

dividing line in the Phenomenology
as to what
counts as truly human:
"The individual who
a

has not risked

his life may well be recognized
as a person but he has not
attained to the truth of this
recognition as an independent
,

self-consciousness" (Hegel {1977}

paragraph 187)

.

The

philosophers whom we have examined
have criteria that define
a humanity one may or
may not have. Hegelian theory
does
not exclude and as such is an
advance. Nevertheless, the
reason it does not exclude is that
it is not really
conceivable that anyone could not follow
the path to
selfhood at least to this point, namely
that it exist "in
and for itself when, and by the
fact that, it so exists for
another;
that is, it exists only in being acknowledged"
(Hegel

{1977}

paragraph 178).

our lives in the relevant sense

If we get that far we risk
[8].

One risk, however,

could stop us in the progression to absolute
spirit and that

progress-stopping risk is that of taking the animal or
unscientific attitude.
Cherry!)

Fortunately for Hegel (and for

his theory does not allow for unruly mobs to really

exist or for feelings actually to win out.
One, section one.)

i

(See Chapter

^
115
3" °f C
°?“ ' sense makes his appeal to
feelina^hn
reeling,
to an oracle within his
breast he is
l

-I-/-.

,

e

^ a 1 n that ne has nothinq more to

does no,: find and £eel ?he
same in
himself
?n nth°
,
roots of humanity*! ToT'i
human
nl
y
lty of minds.
The anti-human, the merely
in " tayin 9 " Uhin that
sphereof
f eelinq 'ZnlT*
t0 commu " icate only at that
level.
(Hegel
(Heqel^igy?!
11977}
paragraph 69)

"““
dh?

v^

15

’

Where does Hegel get this notion
of consensus?
How can
"we" agree if we always already
agree and why is there no
value in the risk of losing one's
"mind," which might
reasonably be said to be one's "life"
in the Hegelian
world? And how in that world could
the roots of humanity be
explained as the desire or need to press
onward to agreement
with others? To communicate only at
the level of feeling is
to be

'animal."

One feels pressured to conclude that

discord is synonymous with animal which in
turn is

synonymous with feeling.
I-I

when we arrive, if we do, at the

of spirit is one side of that equation other
people?

Is this what the passage suggests?

No.

The passage,

I

think, suggests instead that the impulse to truth
and

justification is human "agreement with others"
latter denotes the agreement about

reality with others.

proposition about

To be animal instead of human means to

be unable to do science.
to "let oneself go."

a

where the

To be unable to do science means

In Hegelian/Marxian thought "doing

science" is very important, since ultimately doing science

.

:
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IS making revolution,
and science provides a
platform for

consensus.

One would suppose that for
this tradition, then,
the materialization of
dialectic through Marx would make
of

revolution something that humans
did with nature for all
material bodies; Marx's
classification in this regard,
however, is not overtly different
from Hegel's.
Marx draws the following
distinction between the human
and the non-human in the Economic
and Philosophical
Manuscripts
The animal is immediately one with
its life
activity.
it is not distinct from that activity
it is that activity.
Man makes his life activity
itself an object of his will and
consciousness. He
has conscious life activity.
it is not a
determination with which he directly merges.
fe activity directly distinguishes
man
c
from animal! \life
activity.
Only because of that is
he a species-being.
Or rather, he is a
being, i.e. his own life is an object forconscious
him
because he is a species-being. Only because only
of that
is his activity free activity.
(Marx {1975} p. 329)
f

Humans have life activity that is conscious
and they
will act in the world, they will labor, even
when they do
not need to do so to survive.

himself in
329)

a

"Man"

is able "to contemplate

world he himself has created"

(Marx {1975} p.

Under capitalism such activity is not possible except

within the limits of the existing class structure.
individuals living under
world

— what

a

(The

state cannot create their

would that mean in that discourse?)

The

species-being which ought to bind us together, alienates us
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and turns what is our
common end into a means for
individual
vival.
in short, capitalism
dehumanizes by producing the

individuals it needs quite
literally.

participants to be individuals
in
is no interest,

for capital,

their commonality;

a

"it" needs its

specific sense.

There

in having persons understand

there is no necessity for the

revolutionary theorist to allow
free activity to be
perceived as possible in pre-revolutionary
time.

Indeed,

life under capitalism must
structurally preclude

self-understanding

.

Capitalism dehumanizes, but so does the
divorce of
rational" animals from "the rest of

nature" in "artificial"

ways.

As we just saw, doing so makes it
possible for

classes and their theorists to postpone
the feeling of
freedom until the "right" time in a way
consistent with

Hegelian/Marxian thought.

But this is morally repugnant.

What Capitalism, or any "ism," cannot do is
take away the

possibility of carrying out demogenic strategies;

these

strategies will depend on the actors being able to

communicate with each other in

a

world that they recognize.

In advanced capitalism this is possible

(as it happens)

because individuals can form groups to refuse capitalism in
or out of strictly speaking revolutionary time.

requires continuous creation and recreation.

The refusal

This ability

crosses class-lines and conceptual imaginings of what counts
as world or body.
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Demogenic strategies are
conceptually impossible under
Hegelian/Marxism except in an
abstract and useless form.
The discourse excludes
performance, struggle between
selves
and selves is always
essentially political struggle,
and the

abstract transcendence of struggle
is social for Marx,
spiritual for Hegel. Neither
social nor political movement
has a coherent explanation.
The beginning of struggle in
Hegel is an irresolvable
fight between two men
and for Marx

between two groups of men.

When Marx tries to make this

Eight concrete he succeeds in
pointing us towards a solution
the form of democracy by turning
individuals into
groups--but these are groups in which
all social (and

m

political) differences have been already
erased.

Motivation

tends to enter the inherent pessimism
of this reading of
history for individuals only by pasting
on a theory of human

differences, borrowed from some "unscientific"
theory:

mystical-religious, aesthetic, psychoanalytic

— whatever.

Some believe that one can analyse species-being
and then use
that analysis to augment what is to be done
with how to

motivate that.

But one might have supposed that the

question of what constitutes

a

human qua species-being is

one that cannot be asked unless one supposes that there is

already something of the social in existence.

strategies will utilize

a

Demogenic

notion of struggle to communicate,

which will be perceived as the real work of locating selves
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capable of the refusal of
capitalism;
that is, selves who
do not feel the coercion
of abstract class
trajectories.
Hegel no more thought that
everyone in the Prussian
state was concretely free
than Marx thought that one
could
live in a free relation to
one's product in capitalism.
Insofar as both are teleological,
and it runs deep in both

them,

they are teleological to the
same structural

extent.

Marx and Hegel can talk as they
do because the
teleology that is central to them
is based on certain

assumptions about the future.

As such the disclaimer of

this paragraph, namely, that their
systems are not

completely monolithic, does not discredit
the need for novel
ways of describing the free relations
that they call forth.

Marx may not have completely disallowed
them;

like Hegel's

"concrete freedom," the terms of the discourse
do not allow
the expression of free conscious activity
or purely
social

activity as such.

Attempts within the discourse to frame

these notions can only be viewed as hopelessly
utopian

against the necessity of existent politics.
At root both Marx and Hegel must believe that
science

requires the same of everyone.

The communities envisioned

diff er in that Hegel's is one of mind and Marx's is one of
the relations of "men."

Hegel speaks of science as the

space where one sacrifices what distinguishes one from

others in order to achieve consensus.

Hegelian view.

Marx will retain this

The last paragraph of Hegel's Preface can

:
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easily be seen as

possible solution one can give
to a
potential but rational revolutionary
contemplating the
problem of whether to join in
political activity:
a

For the rest, at a time
when the universalitv of
St
th ' a " d the singular
detail
f
“““E
has become correspondingly
g
less imnorf*ntimportant, when, too, that
universal asoect
1 *™* * nd bolds on to
the whole range of the wealth
1
l
h
d ® ve l 0 Ped, the share
in the total work of
ini
?
C
t0 he lndi ’i d “«l can only
ve y sma?l
Because of! this, the individual bf
mus£ aT? iu
the more forget himself,
Science implies and requires. Of as the nature of
make of himself and achieve what course, he must
he can;
but less
must be demanded of him, just as
he in turn can
expect iess of himself, and may demand
less for
himself.
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 72)

ffmt?

'

^

^

Marx associated individual differences
with

anti-democratic ideologies, and in so doing
provided
definition of democracy that leaves no
place for

development of democracy qua democracy

— hence

a

a

the

uncharacteristic language used by Marx when discussing

democracy that we saw at the beginning of this
chapter:
truth",

"standard", the "Old Testament", etc.;

can only be seen as

a

static endpoint.

democracy

Difference seems

threatening because capitalism is shot through with
d

i

e f en ce

difference

"but we only want to negate that kind of
"
.

The Linguistically Determined Valuation of Democracy
I

can now make the argument of this section, namely that

even though Marx is pro-democracy and Hegel anti-democracy,
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the manner in which they
are pro- and anti- makes
perfect

sense following my reading.

m

the Critique of Hegel's

Doctrine of the State, Marx says
that democracy, properly
so-called, finds its constitution
in "real human beings and
the real people;
not merely implicitly and
in essence, but
in existence and in reality"
(Marx
{1975} pp. 87-89).

follows Hegel in identifying
state with the people

He

the constitution of the just

for Hegel,

and for Marx state of affairs.

state as political state
have argued that Marx does

I

not succeed in getting Hegel
right side down.
Here it is
evident that Hegel's theory of
communication and self remain
an integral part of Marx's work.

The constitution is the

product of dialectical activity through
human thought for
both.

Marx, as is well-known, did not view
himself as

sharing views with Hegel in this respect.

When Marx was writing the preface to the
Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy he
was very concerned
with coming to grips with Hegel.
For both Marx and Hegel
,

history is progress of

a

certain kind, namely

a

kind that

does not depend on individual difference but which
consists
of the universal movement of humans.

Political action, as

a

consequence, is rational even if its appearance is
irrational;

science (philosophical science)

know that the appearance is wrong.

is what lets us

In Hegel the appearance

is said to be material and in Marx ideal;

nevertheless, the

strategies which are implied by the theories are not
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objectively distinguishable.

Marx, in "Excerpts from
James

Mill's Elements of Political
Economy" says that under
capitalism "my individuality has
been alienated to the point
where I loath this activity
[labor], it is torture for me"
(Marx (1975) p.

275).

The material reality that makes
the
self’s activity loathsome is
that the activity is "no more
than the appearance of activity
and for that reason it is
only a forced labour imposed
on me not through an inner
necessity but through an external
arbitrary need" (Marx
{1975} p.

278).

Hegel says that science requires
the

individual to be forgotten in order
to be celebrated as a
member of the community. Marx wanting
the same end sees the
need to recapture a sort of individual
identity which
requires noticing that one is not an
individual.
The similarity between these two opposing
minds appears

even more striking

Philosophy of Right

when they discuss freedom.
,

In the

Hegel says what Marx would never say,

viz., that "the state is the actuality of
concrete freedom"
(Hegel {1952} p.

160).

However, his explanation for the

same is similar to discussion of this topic in
Marx's work:

...concrete freedom consists in this, that personal
individuality and its particular interests not only
achieve their complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right... but, for one thing,
they also pass over of their own accord into the
interest of the universal, and, for another thing,
they know and will the universal;
they even
recognize it as their own substantive mind.
(Heqel
{1952} p.

160)

123

~

In Marx's work that
deals explicitly with
the Philosophy

bS9inS hlS di

—

ssion with the

para^

immediately following the
paragraph just cited (Marx
(1975}
PP. 58-59).
it is not unusual
that Marx concern himself
only with the portion of
the work on Ethical
Life.
it is
strange, I think, that he
not deal with the phrase
"the
state is the actuality
of concrete freedom,"
particularly
because he states that the
two succeeding paragraphs
are
those which contain "the
entire mystery of the Philosophy
of
Right and of Hegelian
philosophy in general," and
that those
two paragraphs are deeply
connected to the
former

(1975} p.

9 .)

i

(Marx

think that Marx essentially
agrees with

paragraph 260, sees that its central
ideas imply a
structural and maybe even essential
separation of social and
political he cannot account for and
so fails to deal with it

at this point in time.

have

it is unfortunate that we do
not

commentary from Marx on the paragraph
in question
because Marx, having appropriated the
concept of the
a

state

as the locus of freedom when it
is the right

state— as he

puts it "it goes without saying that
all forms of the state
have democracy for their truth and that
they are untrue to
the extent that they are not democracy"

89)— and believing

(Marx (1975} p.

that "individual freedom" is

a

contradiction in terms, is left, like Hegel, with

a

tension

between spheres which tension is politically
problematic
whether expressed in materialist or idealist terms.

124

My Claim is that this
tension in Marx, the tension
he
himself pinpoints in Hegel,
is there because he
failed to

unmask Hegel's theories of
self and communication with
the
same stark force with which
he later dismantles classical
political economic theories. Thus,
I am claiming that
Marx
would agree with paragraph
260 of Philosophy of Right as
it
stands [9], Marx S aw that there
were implications from this
view for the division of spheres
of human life which

divisions he could not explain;
nevertheless, he knew that
Hegel's explanations were wrong.
During this stage of his

development Marx thought that total
democracy could overcome
the contradictions which arise
because of distinctions
between the social and political spheres
of human existence.
My major claim is that Marx's young
"idealism"
and utopian

tendency are due to his failure to put to
rest Hegel's
notions about language and self [10]
It is fortunate that we have a direct
clash between the

minds on this point which clash helps to
substantiate my

reading of Marx's alliance with paragraph 260.

In the

remark to paragraph 273 Hegel says:
The development of the state to constitutional
monarchy is the achievement of the modern world, a
world in which the substantial Idea has won the
infinite form [of sub jectivi ty .The ancient
division of constitutions into monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy is based upon the notion
of substantial
still undivided, unity, a unity
which has not yet come to its inner
differentiation (to a matured, internal oganization)
and which therefore has not yet attained depth or
concrete rationality.
(Hegel {1952} paragraph 273)
.

,

.
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bit further Hegel makes
quite explicit what and
who the constitution of
a state can be:
tsel£ -e:
'Who
^
Thls
l ues tion seems
clear, but closer inqnppf
u
Sh ° WS at ° nce that ifc
is meaningless
resu
P
PPOses that there is no
constitution h„f
Y
agglomer
at ion of atomic
individuals/ How !! agglomer
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so as exalted above the
sphere of thinqs
that
9
are made.
(Hegel {1952} paragraph 274)
In Marx's Critique of
Hegel's Doctrine of the State he

says

:

Hegel

argument only implies that a state in
which
and 'character and development of
iA
If consciousness' are in conflict
is no true
state.
Of course, it would be petty to
point
out
that a constitution produced by a
past consciousness
30 °PP ressive shackle for a consciousness
which has progressed.
Such views would only lead to
the demand for a constitution that had
the property
and principle of advancing in step with
consciousness;
i.e. advancing in step with real
human be mgs--wh ich is only possible when
'man' has
become the principle of the constitution. Here
Hegel is a sophist
(Marx {1975} p. 75)
s

.

But Marx just represses what must be an endpoint
to his

system by refusing to comment on communism in detail.

it is

not that we cannot imagine the stage after communism
(anymore than we can imagine primitive communism)
that nothing could follow from that stage of social

it is
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development.
°£ What

ifc

I

suggest that anyone who has
even

ml9ht be

a

hazy view

that no development from
it is

possible-or desirable.

The choice, happily, is not
that

between sophistry or silence.

The problem of motivation
in

of an end not our own
has not been resolved;

notable

attempts at solutions have
been put forward.
The attempted solutions
on which I focus result
in the
loss of self even though
they aim at making an internally
consistent Marxism. Making Marx
consistent has often
included ridding the system of
its latent Hegelianism;
it
is interesting that with
or without this idealism,
the self
of consistent Marxism is
absorbed by the system in a manner
that renders communication
extremely problematic,
and in

some cases, notably that concerning
communication of

novelty

,

impossible.

Change becomes

a

happening without an

explanation and political action necessary
but similarly
inexplicable.
The two problem sets discussed below
show
that although the notion of the self
and the notion of

communication in this tradition go beyond those
of the
tradition discussed in Chapter One, they do not
completely
solve problems of political action.
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Contemporary Problems

Discourse Theory:

Multiplying
ng Selves
Sel
From Without

Louis Althusser, the Marxist
whose theories stand as a
paradigmatic antithesis to my
Hegelian reading of Marx in
this chapter, offers an
analysis of the self/subject
which
nonetheless forces the total
closure I have been
criticizing.
For Althusser "individuals"
are interpellated
as subjects within some
already existing ideological context
whenever capitalism completes a
cycle of reproduction. One
becomes a subject in the world by
filling a space into which
one can be inserted.
There is no way to read
the

transformation of individual to subject
that does not have
metaphysical overtones.
in fact, there is no subject which
is not subjected to a Sub ject—
that which calls to the

emerging subject to assume an already
legitimated space.
I
wish to show that a scientific Marx, one
interpreted without
Hegelianism, also seems necessarily to repress
the

possibilities of communication.

Selves in the traditional

sense, do not exist (cannot exist)

in any rigorously

scientific description of the world.
A criticism of relevant portions of Althusserian
theory

exists which has forced the need for

a

reappraisal of that
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theory for man y Marxists
[11],
The criticism is roughly
that Subjects cannot
possibly relate to themselves
as

Subjects.

It is a structural
impossibility to be pure

Subject;

insofar as one is ever an
individual, one must
have been an individual
in the beginning and one
passes
through life as a cipher
in
necessary order. The theory
is
at best a scientific
description of ideology;
it cannot
explain how ideology is to
be overturned save by a
mechanical application of the
formula:
class struggle. As
above, change breaks in as a
revolutionary moment, it cannot
itself be theorized. This is
the analogue to Hegel's notion
of necessity:
it does not allow a mechanism
for change that
can be theorized.

Pecheux's work illustrates an attempt
to reconstruct
Althusser lan theory with a more adequate
conception of
individuality. The problem with the
Althusserian theory as
criticized is that the transition of the
ideological subject
to the position of scientists,
once again as a movement of
thought, remains a mystery.
Pecheux wants to explain
science;

he wants to explain interpellation in
such a way

that the interpellated subject could engage
in scientific

activity

— science

must be possible.

To trace the possibility of science through
discourse
is an important aim of Pecheux's account
of the

interpellation process.

Pecheux acknowledge his debt to

Althusser and then goes beyond Althusser in an innovative
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and exciting manner.

Althusser had noted that
there is no

ctice except by and in an
ideology and that there is
no
Ideology except by the
subject and for the subjects
(P^cheux

P

U982}

p.

102).

of causation.

Pecheux turns the two theses
into a puzzle
How can "the subject of
discourse" be "the

origin of the subject of
discourse" (pScheux {1982}
p. 108)7
Only through the "Munchausen
effect," i.e., only by lifting
oneself into the air by pulling
on one's own hair [12]!
Pecheux's solution includes a
discussion showing that any
solution in a subject form is
precisely an impossible
"solution;" the point of departure
of science, and hence of
emancipatory political activity, that
is the true point of
departure "is exactly the same point
of departure
as the one

that has been our

g uide_

in developing our analysis of the

subject-form ^n which ideology has no
outside " (Pecheux
{1982} p. 129).

To avoid problems which come from
forcing

all real conflict and action outside
of ourselves, the true

point of departure cannot be "man,"
activity,"

cannot be "human

cannot be any of the old categories;

instead

the point of departure must be "the
ideological conditions
the reproduct ion/ transformation of the relations
of

production " Pecheux {1982}

p.

129).

Having made this break with previous theories, Pecheux
shows that if there is no outside to ideology from the

perspective which counts, then it is no longer important
(meaningful?)

to speak of an epistemological break or

:
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discontinuity.

Pecheux assigns two new categories
to
account for paradoxes which
arise from what might have been
an erasing of "break (s)
"
First, there is Erfahrung which
is mere experience of a
situation.
Subjects coming to know
themselves are operating in an
arena of guaranteed
.

continuity (Pecheux {1982}

p.

139).

T he process without a

subject which makes up science
capable of shifts (breaks) is
called E xperiment
The marker of advances here is seen
only
.

retrospectively.

At any given present

one does not know if

one's subject is in Erfahrung or
Experiment

"In speaking

:

of the spontaneous materialism of
scientists, one is simply

describing the effects, in the subject-form
of their being
in the truth'

even if they are unable to 'speak the truth'"

(Pecheux {1982} p. 140).

This background is necessary to understand
the point

Pecheux makes which concerns us most, namely, the
political

prescriptions or descriptions which follow from the new
sense of self and communication he has so brilliantly
put

forward

— or

which has spoken through him [13]

Pecheux

.

says

...proletarian political practice is not the act of
subject (supposedly the proletariat);
this
practice breaks with the spontaneous political
operation of the subject-form, and that is what
makes it Exper iment and not Erfahrung
This is not
to say... that the effect of the subject-form simply
disappears, but that it is transformed and
d isplaced--and it is here... that the point I have
been developing impinges on the question of
proletarian politics: as with every break, the
configuration in which the latter occurs is
a

,

.
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reorganised by it into elements
operating

LSHthe seizure

ofpoMtical

the
communist mode of production-is
the object of this
Pe ° P cact ice. .this 'practice of
a new type'
?noi,^ S
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work
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Whenever what we are engaged in is
science there will be
no sub jec t--no t even the
group/subject/proletariat.
Instead

science just happens through us.
work we should focus on:

There are two forms of

that against the state apparatus

and that against the ideological state
apparatuses.

do as subjects--it is our obligation as subjects.

attempt at repair seems to entail
the Hegelian movement.

a

This we
But the

disconcerting return of

We may make the transition from

working subject to subject by allowing the work to operate
through us.

What we won't know is when, how or even whether

this transformation has occurred.
It is not just the self/subject search that is confusing

here.

Even at the level of the possibly liberating

repetition of ideology and state critique there is the

confusion of what to do because one does not know whether it
is actually science that is talking.

(This worry is
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structurally similar to that
contained in the queries:
«
ls
thrs God or an evil demon?"
or "is this experience a
poem or
a programme?")
Presumably one knows when one is
fighting a
revolution in the complete sense.
I am not wondering
whether we will know this.

If we have to ask.

strategies must be deliberated.
one to fit oneself into

a

.

Available

.

One feels frustrated,

is

state apparatus— to get in there

and let science speak through
one?
We cannot be content with an
answer that asks us to just
have faith in the subjectless
science. We must engage in
two forms of activity:
activity against the state per se
and activity against the ideological
complex which protects
the state [14]
Fighting the dominant ideology seems most
.

pressing for Pecheux and yet this activity can
hardly be
comprehended as taking place through and not by

subjects.

The only way to make this comprehensible is
elitist and the

nature of the elitism shows that not just any human
vessel
will do.

The science of historical materialism could not

just come through any human vessel.

That is, two kinds of

person can perform the function of vessel:

those who can

insinuate themselves into the power complex and those who
are hyper-educated.

To be either kind of self just

described is to be capable of standing outside of,
interpellation.

To be capable of being a vessel for science

is to be a super-superscript Subject.

Pizzorno, offers

a

Pecheux, like

re-interpretation of an old theory that
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leads in the direction
of a decision procedure
one could use
effectively and coherently.
Like Bi ZZ orno the problem
that
remains is that there is
still inadequate fleshing
out of
the self called into
action or purported to act.
Both
thinkers show that it is
here work is required.
Because of where theory breaks
down, would-be
lutionar les are asked to risk
being wrong with no way of
determining even in theory the
epistemological status of
their actions.
The locus of the actions
cannot be found.
To be asked to take risks
when the system guarantees
nothing
until actions become codified
as science is too much to ask
others.
Most importantly the strategy
which is democratic
is ruled out by definition
because there is no meaning to

mediation in this framework.
there in the real conflict,

Everything that matters is out

when we have no selves with

which to communicate and from which
to communicate democracy
does not even make sense.
We have progressed from the

information theorists because here we can
act;
but our
action is based on faith and still cannot
be coextensive
with deliberate demogenic strategies.
Because I do not mean
to imply that the remaining choice is
that between random

violence (terror) and uncertain political action,
which it
is not,

I

offer the analysis of violence below.

Violence is

usually given as one solution to the problems we are

discussing and as such should be addressed.

i
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Violence and Communication
In the course of these studies,
I have
established something so simple that
not believe it had to be emphasized: I di d
men
w o participate in great social
movements
represent their immediate action in the
form
of images of battles assuring
the triumph

of their cause.
A conditional

is

if there

there is

a

[15]

have assumed throughout the dissertation

I

is only surface communication,

that is, if

lack of communication between creative
selves,

then there is no moving past the various
hierarchical

political forms."

I

have held this assumption in

specific

a

manner, namely, if individuals do not view themselves
as

communicating members of some (of any
for

t

ior

)

community then

they cannot view themselves as members of

heterodemot ic community.

materially impossible.

a

a

it is conceptually, and hence,
It is important that such a

conception is not merely

a

conception.

if the conception is

believed then there are two possibilities for its believer.
They can believe it and it can be true or they can believe
it and it can be false.

If it is true then they will look

to alternate forms of engagement;

if it is false then they

will look to alternate forms of engagement.

Because the aim

is now the building of strategies for and with he ter odemot ic

groups and communities,
he ter odemot ic framework.

I

will work explicitly in the

.

135

have shown that it is not
unreasonable to conclude
that there is no hope for
democratic action if one holds the
cluster of beliefs which I have
called information theory or
if one holds the views of
the Hegelian/Marxian tradition
as
they have been described here.
That either cluster may be
I

philosophically untenable is not pertinent;
are held by many rational persons.

both clusters

To not believe in the

possibility of democracy mediating between
interests may
force a person to espouse some form of
violence.
It may

lead the person into complete political
and social apathy
but insofar as this is a mediated form
of the suicidal

impulse
a

,

apathy itself is an impulse towards violence;

person can be considered

a

such

candidate for spontaneous

violence of the sort we witness far too often.

Violence, or

some distant or potential relation to it, may be
seen to be
the best or only alternative form of engagement for
the

person not convinced that democracy and action performed
within its confines might be efficacious.

Of course,

sometimes the possibility that it is the best alternative is
reality
The incidence of and attitude toward violence has been
said to have changed in dramatic ways in "our times," that
is,

in this and the last centuries.

violence. Cotta's Why Violence?

Interpretation

,

notes

French Revolution.

a

A recent study of

A Philosophical

difference in violence after the

Cotta holds that violence, for the first

:
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time in world history, is
valued positively. He asserts
that violence is exalted;
that is, it is no longer
viewed
as a necessary evil [16].
He blames this transformation
on
what he calls the metaphysics
of subjectivity.
This is a
new way of viewing the subject
in that the view devalues the
individual at the same time that
it "exalts” the social
subject

The mass consciousness is the
ultimate
consequence of this reversal of values but necessary
that? by
depriving the personal conscience of
any meaning,
S thS res P° nsible freedom
of the individual
with Jh
witn
the anonymous sovereignty of the
Society thus becomes the new "subject" 'whole.'
that*
measures the world positing itself as
the
rule, and proclaims itself the
foundation
exclusive criterion of judgment of men's and the
concrete
life, scorning individuality as a mere
transitorv
appearance.
(Cotta {1985} p. 121)

What Cotta calls the metaphysics of subjectivity
is
puzzling here as a motivator to action of any
kind.

The

choice Cotta sees for the person in the world who
holds this
"new" doctrine of subjectivity is the following:

We are then faced by an alternative:
either we
a PPly the qualifier of universalization
and thus
everyone has a limited freedom or we apply the
qualifier of absolut iza tion and thus all freedom is
allowed to a limited number of subjects
tertium
non datur .
(Cotta {1985} p. 123)

—

—
:

But of course, we want to say, there are more than these
two possibilities.

The artificiality of the description

can be said to be both symbolic and perpetuating of the

problem at hand.

My discussion of violence is forced by
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thinking about more and less
democratic practice in the
world.
There are many more alternatives about
the

relationship between Me and some Other
than the violence of
universalization or the violence of absolut
izat ion

.

m

each

of these cases, universalization
or absolutization, the

resulting situation can only be seen as
perpetual.

options lead to

a

kind of terror;

as provisional options.

Both

and, they cannot be seen

Tertium non datur.

It is the provisional alternatives that
need exposition.

We need to know how to confine violence, if
and when it

becomes necessary.

To do this we need to examine the root

cause of the problem

— throughout

I

have argued that the root

cause is the manner in which we regard ourselves and the
ways in which we attempt communication.
in important respects similar to mine;

Cotta's analysis is
therefore it is

important to pinpoint why our conclusions diverge so
radically.

The manner in which Cotta continues his argument

is worth nothing:

...the metaphysics of subjectivity is obliged to
choose the second solution:
in fact, if the subject
(individual or collective) is the absolute principle
or the measure of value, its freedom cannot be
anything but absolute. The other individual or
community therefore cannot help but appear to him as
the obstacle to his freedom to his being himself.
(Cotta {1985} p, 123-4)
He has assumed that even the "radical" subject has a

self-interested conception of self.

Altruism is not
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Possible as
solidarity,

a

motivating force here nor
is cooperation nor
when one's group is
one's subject there is
no

way to make comprehensible
these notions.
Any other
subject is necessarily the
enemy and is such forever.
wever, does not notice
this as a problem stemming
from people's holding
false beliefs as is made
obvious by
his solution,
to solve the problem
of violence one must be
charitable to one's enemies.

^
“tn.

00
“p^^'m^rniii^rr-^no^e
^
n

1

this

istic chacit ^ *>«»
n roo ts
:
in
only the°s true tur a^r
ationality
but
so aiso does the vital
need (inseparable from it)
at such a relation be willed
and
confirmed and promoted in actuality therefore
in the
varied experience of life.
(cotta { 1985 } p. 140

r;^‘Ls:;

m^^st^s^
’

)

If the conception of self
is incorrect, and both Cotta

and

i

believe that it is, why is this

a

solution?

The

analysis seems to force the conclusion
that the "enemy" has
been improperly identified.
I am heartened to see that
the
break down of theory occurs at the
same place for one whose
orientation is so different than mine.
His analysis even

includes

a

critique of the liberal conception of self
which

conception leads with equal ease to violence.

The other

side of the dilemma (that which universalizes
freedom) leads
to violence as follows.

Respect is the necessary antecedent

for there not to be violence;

therefore if the respect

breaks there is no reason to forego violence.

In the
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Picture only charity allows us
respect for one another.
How can charity overcome these
two kinds of violence?
isn’t
the problem how we could ever
overcome the despair which
makes us think that charity
might be a prerequisite
for

peaceful co-existence among humans.

Charity, in its

traditional guises, presupposes
inequality of moral worth.
The structure of charitv airrer
s fmm
y differs
trom that of, say sympathy,
in that in the former case
the dispenser of charity gives

something to the recipient of charity
for reasons external
to the charitable relationship.
One has a duty
to be

charitable to those who cannot help themselves,
the least of
these persons, and so on. The structure
of sympathy, by

contrast, stands outside of external obligations.
a

There is

reciprocity involved in sympathy not evident in

traditional discussions of charity.

Charity is precisely

not an answer to violence because it partakes
of the

structure that sustains violence.

Isn't a part of the

problem that in either case selves are fixed by discourse
and so the only mediation is to kill the voice of the

opposition by killing the speaker?
correct.

In some sense Cotta is

Charity is better than violence; nevertheless, it

seems deeply cynical to suggest charity as the solution to

world violence.
The problem is either that there is no alternative to

violence or there is no alternative to violence

understandable to the interested parties now.

Luckily the

analysis, which
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sharp in

8 °“ si
9nificant respects,
aces
not fforce his
conclusions which
cn 1I flnd
fin a to
t
k
be
morally
sentimental at best;
defeatist
eatist and cynical
at worst.
Also
significant is the fact
that rot.
Cotta's solution deals
only
with the conclusion
of his argumentgument -i.e.
i
e
violence is worse
when it is not seen
as a necessary
necessarv evil—
» •;
and not with the
that lead him there.
P
Cotta does not help us
to think
more productive ways
concerning "sub gect ivi
ty »
The re
13 a strong implication
that its analysis
ought to be nonmetaphysical
I agree with
this.
The strength of the
Cotta
text is that he so
eloguently ties the
conceptions we hold
of our selves to
the horror and violence
we have created
I

“

,

m

.

.
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Notes to Chapter Two
A

tuition! I am not offering a new reading
am offering a reading of what
it might feel like
n 3 W ° rld whece «rtain valu
es that helped
k
B »
Wa
p3rsist as PO«er units both in the
texts thaJ
th t h ?lp ° ne f
to be Marx ian but also, a nd
more
km^rr f,
importantly,
the world where one is a Marx is
t

of Mary
to

^

Y

33b

r?V
m

2
There are, of course, humanist and
li beral
M
Marxian
political theory that would locate its readings
discussion
in the context: of Chapter One.
Here I consid er those
tn or "scientific"
al
readings that have been
cenhra^to ftheoretical
h
central
discussions of Marxism for the last
twenty years.
*

~

.

f

wa y of reading Marx is indebted
to Robert Paul
3Ci!
Professot Wolff's seminar on
Marxian Economics has greatly influenced
me.
'

dohnson Points out that many commentators
at (a). Marx'S dialectical interpretation
of
tur e and of humans is far more complicated
than I seem to
allow here and that (b) Marx does allow for
an
dialectic that helps to move history. I agree inner
with both of
these points.
My purpose here, as in the first chapter,
involves the manner in which political agents
interpret
theories as working ideologies.
I believe that many
political actors do not know what to do with the
idealization of capital (or labor for~that matter). I am
trying to describe what it feels like to be a part of
a
conceptual landscape £s actor. My general thrust is that
while Marx's theories tell us what is to be done they do
not
tell us, particularly those of us on the capitalist
side
(geographically-speaking) of late capitalism, how to go
about organizing in a concrete way.
.

,.

4

'

5.

a
d
? I^

See, Marx, Capital, vol. 3., especially "Trinity
(Marx (1967b) pp. 814-831).

Formula,"

6.
Nevertheless, two things are clear. First, that any
sign worth noting will be one that points out commonalities
and not differences.
Second, any sign worth noting will be
necessary and not contingent. That these two are clear is
causally related to the opacity of the theory when applied.
Thus it is interesting to notice the contempt with which
Hegel holds any but an external classification of actual
individualities
:

.
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However, t° take up again in
this way the
distincttve actual individualities,
and to recount
n
m
ha
inCUnatl0n
tot
o
t°h at
?ha t o n
m ° re lntel ligence than
another all ?h?2in9 the

rhL

™d

ssrsiiss/rts.?™

-

SSent allY t0 the eleme "t ° f
contingent
oar?ic„?
i
particularization.
On the other hand, to take
conscious individuality unintelligent
as a
y,

that iS Si " 9le a "d «parSie!
involves
^contradict?
contradiction, since its essential
nature
is the
universal of Spirit.
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 304)
-

7
Ano her wa y of expressing this
is that there is
nowo
^ t
n end
conflict
A class is victorious only when
it rlr«
recognizes that it is never victorious.
There is
WhlC iS ontolo 9 ic ally prior to issues no end
of
class and state.
classed
s?at
£h
The attitude one takes toward
b
® ses the conflict and stands
as
°7 expcethis
s™bo7of7h»7
symbol
of the social—
context is one of hostility.
'

^

*

m

8.
Butler's analysis here, as elsewhere, is
illuminating.
She pinpoints the place that
embraces Hegelianism completely as that whereFoucault
life is
affirmed as struggle, or risk.
"Life, however, is not
affirmed in a simple self-generated act;
it requires
resistance and struggle, and so requires a domain
of Others,
and a form of struggle.
in conceding as much, Foucault
seems to be acknowledging that the very promotion
of life
requires a way of life, and this way of life is a
certain
kind of struggle"
(Butler {1987} p. 230).
Foucault goes on
to choose which kind of struggle.
On my view, Marx and
Hegel differ from him in that each person is fit into
necessary metaphysical space of a pre-existing struggle.
Note that the difference is NOT that Foucault's (sexual)
struggle can be construed as a self-generated act.
It
cannot.
Foucault can see the possibility of many and
diverse struggles. Marx and Hegel, while they may allow
such a possibility hardly conceive it as necessary.
9.

entirety

The reader may want to read the paragraph in its
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom.
But
concrete freedom consists in this, that personal
individuality and its particular interests not only
achieve their complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right (as they do in the
sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one
thing, they also pass over of their own accord into
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thing

they know and will the nniupr^i
6
6n
3 the
° W " subs tan tiv^mind^
they
aCtiv * in
pS» U t.^The^es^t L^that
that 1the "?
uni
versal
does not
prevail nr achieve completion
except along with
particular interests and through
the
e
t 10n ° f particular
knowing
and willingand
in°H?
individuals
likewise do not live as private
persons
or thei r own ends alone,
but in the very
h6Se tl ey WU1 the univer sal in act of
9
the light
of^hp
?
f the universal,
and their activity is consciously
aimed at none but the universal
end! The principle
C
S
eS
pr0digious strength and 6ept h
because ?t
£fcaufe
it an
allows the principle of
progress to its culmination in the subjectivity to
extreme of
self subs isten t personal
particularity, and yet at
11^
bCingS
back to the substantive
nity and so maintains this unity
in the
principle of subjectivity itself.
,

tiruWtV
r

i

.

“

?

1

^

U

un^^V
™ 6is

st claim wil1 not be fully substantiated
i® ree
Perhaps the reason for Marx's neglect
r
J
13 that the beliefs he shares with
a
r
Hegei
forces
him into an acquiescence to the necessity
of
alect ical changes. This is important to
my study because
thlS respect that Kierkegaard's critique
of Hegel will be shown to be equally
forceful with respect
to Marx.
Until Kierkegaard's way out, the paradox
remains.
If the social overcomes the political
then until people have
acquired a social conscience they would have to
continue to
work with the only conscience they have in
the world, viz.,
e political one.
So, there can be no movement.
Political
emancipation can be seen not as a failure in the
sublimation
of social over political;
instead it can be seen as a step
the direction of the creation of a society where
social
emancipation is possible.
The important proposition that Marx and Hegel share is
that "freedom is not a property of individuals but of
human
arrangements." To be concretely free according to Hegel:
individuals do not live as private persons for their own
ends alone. .. their activity is consciously aimed at none but
the universal ends" (my emphasis, Hegel {1952}
paragraph
269).
Here is where Kierkegaard's critique becomes useful
for sorting out this dialectical issue.
un
of

^
ma

*

m

11.
The articulation of this criticism by Torode and
Silverman is succinct and clear:

To grasp an alternative to this ideology is to
produce an alternative speech to the ideological
speech to which the individual is subjected, thereby
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granting to that individual
the words with which to
transform the ideology.
merely reiterating9 and
the wocds of
9
ideology!
Al?h„«
* S e
ly stren 9thens it.
Yet
in th^way in
„
S
he eithibits a manner in
which it
cai be challenged.
can
°a
Overthrowing the present
domination of speech by the ideology
of the
subject reveals the material
linguistic practices
r
that ideolo 9yBut since Althusser
himselff provides
or ov?H
us W1 th an instance of such
speech
fhon hhlS Wn Speech
can be interrogated to discover'
th
n a ,° C S cons
itutive of ide °iogy which it
itse?f pvi
K ^
^
itself
exhibits.
(Silverman and Torode

m

^
V"

'

'

r

P
13.
*?•

•

Se

{1980}

jU)

cheux U982} p. 108.
This is a beautifully
problem of the system in which we
are operatin!
or 5hP
this chapter.
g fo!
One wants emancipation*
emancipation however presupposes being
emancipated which
presupposes the ability to do what cannot
be spoken
and
ana
F
hence cannot be understood.
„r

-

P

?

P

?

^

14.

The notion of truth speaking through a
C
Sel
ha
a 1009 bUt mostly mystical
tradition,
Thuss Plato
pTato doQ
h
fv,
describes
the poet in terms not dissimilar to the
manner in which Althusser and now P^cheux
describe the
scientist. What is relatively recent is the
identification
of oneself by oneself with the vessel
image.
P^cheux does
15.
s ° ldent f y himself but the
reader is forced to make
this identification.
C

}-

16.

Whatever theory is ultimately accepted, some
component of reality must be saved. That it is not in
Derrida and others who follow him is due specifically to the
notion of a completely decentered self.
I completely
disassociate myself from this particular theory of the self.
I will make my reasons for so
distancing myself clear in
Chapter Three.
George Sorrel in Reflections on Violence (Stanlev
{1976}, p. 200).

Cotta says:
"There is then novelty in current
violence ;... the exaltation of violence a very recent
phenomenon, I repeat is the result of very ambitious but
too often frustrating hopes" (Cotta {1985} p. 18).

—

—

CHAPTER III
GRAVE VOICES.

GROUNDWORK FOR COMMUNICATION

Theorizing about political action
without

a

theory of

how to communicate with each
other is cynical, dangerous and
defeatist.
But, as I have shown, the
conception of selves
offered to us by the dominant
ideologies cannot communicate.
The dominant ideologies, perhaps
not surprisingly,
lead to

political apathy.

in this chapter,

examine some voices

I

that have tried to avoid the
constraints of dominant

ideologies.

These voices offer more than one (or
two)

rigidly necessary paths to selfhood (or
freedom, or
emancipation)

,

opening up mostly unnoticed possibilities
of

genuine communications [1],

"Liberated" by voices like

these, many have been trying to find

My task here is to locate

sharing of interests.

a

way to communicate.

a

theoretical basis for their

In section one

I

discuss Johannes

Climacus' critique of Hegel and the individuality free
of

ideological constraint that it seems to promise.
the philosophers and theorists

I

Many of

will discuss (or who would

fit appropriately in this discussion) have either made

deliberate breaks with important political parties or have
been what anyone within the major ideologies would have to
call apolitical.

Thus in section one

an example of how

a

I

will also discuss

philosophy influenced by Kier kegaar dians
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might go wrong politically.

I

use some of the things Jaques

Derrida has said about political
activity here. His link to
Kierkegaard is through Bataille,
a link that seems to
obscure the source [2],
In section two

I

will argue that selves free from

ideological constraint are possible
because they have
existed.
Bataille talks through such selves,
as we shall
see.
The fascination surrounding
Socrates and
his other

self is manifest in the diverse
selves of Kierkegaard and

Nietzsche with whom Bataille feels

a

strong identification.

That these selves are the possible
groundwork for

a

theory

of communication that can ground
an effective theory of

political action is argued in section three.

The aim of

this chapter is ultimately to construct a

Marx-Hegel-Bataille (MHB) dialectic,

a

dialectic which will

allow us to formulate

a

that is adequate to

defensible theory of political action.

a

theory of self and communication

.

147

A Cluster of Voices:
_

Climacus

Radical Cr i tique of Hegel

Critique of Hegelian Necessity

in building the MHB dialectic
we first notice Climacus'

critique of Hegel without which
Bataille's laughter would
remain incomprehensible. The
importance of Climacus'
critique to my project here is great;
Climacus cannot be in
the dialectic for structural reasons.
Nor can Kierkegaard
be assimilated into dialectics—
there is no Kierkegaard to
be found [3]
The MHB dialectic is impossible without
Kierkegaard, but it does not consume his work.
Since the purpose of this chapter is to show
that
Climacus'

radical critique of Hegel leads to

a

communication

theory that is able to adequately represent the
notion of

communication required by

a

theory of political action, it

is worth noting that many have not thought it
possible to

derive

a

social theory from any individualistic philosophy.

That Kierkegaard's theories are radically individualistic
and subjective is well known.

How then can material that

would aid social theory be derived from his work?

The

answer lies in the connection with Hegel.

Because of his contributions to the liberal tradition,
Hegel's mark can be found in nearly all political theory

.
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that comes after him.

One could argue that any reading
of

Hegel is necessarily important
to social theory.
The
centrality of Hegel's work is
glaring.
Derrida says of
Hegel:
"We will never be finished
with the reading or the
rereading of Hegel, and, in a certain
way, I do nothing
other than to attempt to explain
myself on this point"
(Derrida, {1978} p. 77).
He finds that the most important
area of the Hegelian work has to do
with what he calls
spacing
(Derrida {1978}
p. 95).
Spacing is a two-part
concept which includes these components.
First, no identity
can ever be completely closed on "the
inside of its proper

interiority"

(Derrida {1978}

p.

94).

Second, spacing is

not only that which opens a concept to continuous

definition, it is the work of conceptual defining and
redefining.
a

Derrida thus accords spacing both

productive facet.

a

spatial and

This concept of spacing is crucial to

a

reading of Hegel but the place at which we must distance

ourselves from his system.

The concept of "spacing" is

important to this discussion because it is here that

Climacus breaks with Hegel.
Two,

We have discussed, in Chapter

the tradition wherein the self is itself only when

outside of itself.

It is Climacus who turns

Marxian/Hegelian dialectic on its head by giving productive
capacity to the space which is not outside of
"Spacing"

condition

is not denied;

a self.

nor is it accepted as a universal
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This central relationship
to Hegel within Derrida's
work
is precisely the important
area of contact for Climacus
and
later for French philosopher
and novelist George Bataille.
Both are primarily concerned
with how the relations of
concepts to spacing effect the
self and communication. As
such their work is of central
importance to this discussion.
To remain consistent with past
discussions in this
dissertation I will use the term
inwardized exteriority to
refer to spacing with respect to
the self
[4],

Climacus* major reasons for closing
the self against
Hegel's inwardized exteriority have to
do with movement (the
possibility for action) and freedom (the
denial of necessity
with respect to choice in the ethical
realm).
in examining
these reasons we will see precisely why a
philosophy of the

interior has implications for democratic theory
and

political action.

Climacus' closure of the self is an

attempt to bring movement into what he saw as

a

stagnant

system--one which could not account for intensity.

With no

movement there can be no practically significant democratic
theory;

with no intensity no reason for its adoption at the

subjective level.

Climacus believed that Hegel's system was

stagnant because actors had been subsumed by the social.

No

actor could ever do anything in the Hegelian system because

none exist in the system.

When Hegelians recognize the

partitive positions they hold in the system, that is, when
they recognize that they exist merely as

a

piece of

a
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concept, they lose the poss
ibility for intensity with
respect to action or work,
I think that
Climacus correctly
identifies that individuals faced
with this monolithic
system in which they merely
Play out the role assigned to
them by world history, will
feel powerless, frustrated and
defeated
.

Climacus rejects the role Hegel
assigns him, thereby
affirming a role which is a Hegelian
impossibility.
Climacus is not specifically an
anti-Hegelian, he is an

anti-systemic philosopher who happens to
stalk his Hegelian
double because Hegel's system is the
proximate

target of his

activity.

His point of departure from Hegel is
at the point

of inwardized exteriority.

Climacus argues for

self, a completely inwardized interior
ity

consciously false exteriority.

— to

a

closed

the point of

a

Once the inner is sealed

off, however, the self is torn by desire
manifested as

anguish

— the

need to communicate with others.

is anguished due to Climacus'

This desire

recognition that he has, in

a

sense, rendered significant communication transparently

impossible.

What was opaque in Hegel is clear in the

messages of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript

.

One can

infer that it is pointless for Hegelian actors to speak.

Climacus shows why this is so and in so doing shows the
anguish of the Hegelian realization.
Because of this anguished desire

a

community of persons

each referring to other voices, but unable to communicate

.
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With them, is created.

Climacus recognizes himself in
other
writers that cannot be him but
must be him.
By reacting

against Hegel in his "Hegelian"
fashion, Climacus lays the
groundwork for a new reading of
Hegel, namely Bataille's,
which allows for movement,
intensity and meaningful
communication. That Climacus is
to any extent Hegelian is
not universally accepted.
Thus, a good place to begin is
survey of some of the readings
of this relationship to
Hegel
Henry Sussman remarks that "in
order to mount this
multifaceted resistance to Hegel,
Kierkegaard had to be

Hegelian of the first order"

(Sussman {1982} p. 63)

a

a

[5].

it

is interesting then that in
The Relation of Kierkegaard to

Hegel, an exhaustive work which covers
all the major voices
of the Kie r kegaar dian texts, Niels
Thulstrup concludes:
the two thinkers have nothing in common"
p.

372).

(Thulstrup {1980}

Thulstrup maintains that Kierkegaard's only

relation to Hegel is critical or polemical.

He argues that

Kierkegaard rejects every important Hegelian doctrine
and
that the rejection is so thorough in each case that no

assimilation between the original Hegelian doctrine and
Kierkegaard's assessment is possible.

For my purpose the

most important differences mentioned by Thulstrup regard aim
and method:

i
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The result of the subjective
thinker's procedurp i
not, and was not supposed
to be, 'scientific
e '
objective and speculative, but
precisely
in
opposition thereto: an unscientific
Ixistential
contribution, which corresponds
exactly
with man
regarded as existing (on one of
the
in untl:uth ur>til the moment
when
Chri^tiani^"™’
communicates to man existence in truth
and fh
and,
thereby both explains and judges
the lower
stages of existence.
(Thulstrup {1980} p. 372)
<=

.

think that one reason why Thulstrup
sees no similarity
between the two thinkers is that
he takes Hegel and Climacus
I

as correctly labeling the work
in which they are engaged.
If we regard the methods and
aims of the philosophers,

forgetting how Uiey label these aims, the
similarities
become more apparent. Hegel’s theorising
concerning history
is where one finds Climacus’ most
virulent attacks
on him.

Nevertheless his claim in Reason in History that
"consciousness alone is that which is open, that to
which
God and anything else can reveal itself" is
similar
to

claims made by Climacus (Hegel {1953}

p.

74).

The sort of

consciousness which can be open to any kind of truth is that
which is aware of itself.
self.

itself.

To know is to already know one's

Consciousness generates and produces;

it is openness

Likewise Climacus maintains that each person is

open to God only in subjectivity.

For Climacus, each person

begins with an element of subjectivity, the soul;

the

striving towards subjectivity is nonetheless the most

difficult of all human tasks (Climacus {1968}

p.

Likewise, for Hegel, achieving subjectivity is an

116).

.
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accomplishment.

By contrast Climacus minimizes
the need of

culture and knowledge for the
process of finding one's
relation to God, yet the decisive
moment, the decision to
become a Christian, can only occur
after a long struggle for
self knowledge

(Climacus {1968} p. 342).

For both Hegel

and Climacus the self is a self
(the me of everyday life)
which then assumes historical burden.
Hegel's burden always

already consumes him;

articulation at

a

Climacus' is buried beyond

moment of decision.

The individual that

Climacus posits cannot be introduced to
the articulation of
the decisive step through philosophy.
Nor can the
individual be forced or necessitated into
self-consciousness
(Climacus {1968} p. 343). Climacus' and
Hegel's aims are

structurally similar;
absolute certainty.
knowledge;

both thinkers wish to find an
For Hegel this certainty is absolute

for Climacus it is eternal happiness.

Thus,

Climacus' criticisms of Hegel with respect to the
unceasing
need to find yet more knowledge are puzzling

[6]

Climacus says that Hegel loses movement in his system by

disregarding the interiority of the individual.

The

individual is seen as having been subsumed by the

exteriority of world history working itself toward absolute
knowledge.

Marx also notes that movement is lost in the

Hegelian system.

Climacus' significant contribution is that

he explains how it is possible to escape the system and

create movement.

That is, Climacus gives significance to
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the unique thoughts of
each

i

ndividual as the series of

impacts required to force the
system into movement,
It is interesting to
note how Hegel explains change
within his system. He says:
An individual as unity
traverses various staqes and
remains the same individual.
So also a people? up
st e which is the universal
stage of its
^9
SDirit
C ° nS1Sts the inner, the
conceptual
necessitv of its change.
necessity
(Hegel {1953} p. 94
)

And, of course, in Kierkegaard
the movement, which is
interior, produces a new person.
The same person is not

aesthete and then ethicist and then
religious.

The

pseudonyms are not capr icious— they do not
result from whim
or fancy.

Kierkegaard is

a

deadly serious writer for whom

the use of pseudonyms must be seen as
necessary

last chapter we found that we could not
find

a

[7].

in the

satisfactory

explanation for change in the system as presented
in the
Phenomenology because change is described as repetition,
.

a

repetition that is empty until something is inexplicably

described as suddenly grasped!

Climacus wants an

explanation of how movement is possible especially since it
is said to be necessary.

His solution involves completely closing off the

individual at the moment of decision.

In the closure one

becomes someone else and this becoming someone else is

necessary transformation

— as

it is for Hegel.

a

Hegel,

however, does not only notice and exposit this structural

.
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necessity;

he thinks that the kind
of transformation is

also necessary.

Therefore, because of the
reliance on
reason on rationality, Hegel
misses what he might have
seen, namely, that transformations
make new kinds of selves.
For Hegel, the same
consciousness travels from one stage
of
development to the next.
it is not really possible
for
Hegel to do otherwise.
if absolute knowledge is a
,

possibility, it must always already
be present to every
individual, even if individuals may
not have it present to
them (yet) in an articulated form.
The necessity of Hegel's
path requires that one individual be
transformed into

someone who knows, through dialectical
steps, not that
succession of different individuals be
possible.

a

Kierkegaard, who abandons necessity in Hegel's
sense, can
describe a potential succession of quite different
selves as
stages along the life's way of a vessel self.
Kierkegaard
allows what is phenomenologically more palpable:

that each

stage on life's way is the result of

a

not have to be the self that it is.

We can write texts for

our bodies;

new self which did

they do not have to follow old rules.

One way to look at this is through an analogy with

grammar.

For instance, within the limits of certain rules

an infinite array of sentences is possible for us.

There

are strings of words, however, that do not count as

sentences to anyone, and particular strings can be produced
as discourse only by the choice of

a

particular individual
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Hegel'S mistake is in supposing
that the limiting condition
is that of rationality.
For him only a rational path
can
lead to absolute knowledge,
but he describes all paths at
once, so to speak, as if that
could constitute a philosophy,
insofar as the selves we write
take a particular position,
they are already within the
possible structure.
There are
infinite possibilities for ourselves
within this necessity.
Hegel cannot explain the

instantiation of

particular

a

possibility, nor can he recognize
"impossible" choices
In later works often incorrectly
attributed

.

to

Kierkegaard, the issue of subjectivity
is developed in
contrast to Kierkegaard's earlier social
self.
Religiosity
IS a

perspective which can acknowledge the limits
of the
religious in earlier, more worldly modes.
The question of
Socrates' possibilities for religiosity is

manifestation of this style [8].

So,

a

nearly absurd

for instance,

in the

same work in which Climacus tries to open up
Socrates to

Christian subjectivity, he exposits in some detail the

difference between the Pagan and Christian outlooks.

This

is done in such a way that a Pagan clearly could
not achieve
a

God-relation worthy of Climacus' title "Christian"

(Climacus {1968} p. 219).

The necessity of change from one

historical point to another for Hegel occurs when the

society knows itself completely and then "dies" into another
age.

Climacus' epochal changes are just like Hegel's until

the arrival of Christ.

But the arrival of Christ has an
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analogue in Hegelian thought
with respect to its structural
function.
Namely, for Hegel subjectivity
is that which
begins modern history-or
ends history.
For Kierkegaard
history begins with Christ-but
so too does subjectivity
properly so-called.
In The Co ncept of A nxiet
y

Vigilius Haufniensis argues

that “only with the moment does
history begin"
(1980} p.

(Haufniensis

echoing Hegel's notion of prehistory
and world
history.
(See Hegel {1953} pp. 75-78).
The difference we
are looking for, then, when as
many of the intentions as
possible have been cleared away, occurs
at the individual
level.
As previously stated, the structural
possibility
(which is our real concern) is that
selves not be forced
into any state of consciousness.
That this was not Hegel's
concern explains the lack of movement in his
89)

system.

him*

For

there is but vector direction to selfhood,
even if many

particular concrete paths are possible.

This area of

conflict can be exploited to our advantage if we
juxtapose
Climacus' views with Hegel's in the Phenomenology.
In facing another self-consciousness, a self-

consciousness has come out of itself.

For Hegel, the coming

out of itself has two important features.

In the first case

the self has lost itself because its self is in the other.
In addition to the loss of the self the self which is faced
is lost:

"It has superceded the other,

the other as an essential being"

(Hegel

for it does not see

{1977} paragraph
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178).

The self being suspended
between two selves requires
a resolution.
The resolution is two part.
First the self
must supercede the other to gain
certainty for itself.

Second

it must supercede its own
self because its own self

,

is the other.

another.

To have a self, then, requires
recognizing

For the other to be recognized,
the one

recognizing must know that the other
is capable of being
recognized:
"Action by one side only would be
useless
because what is to happen can only be
brought about by both"
(Hegel

{1977} paragraph 182).

At the level of mere

consciousness, "each is indeed certain of
its own self, but
not of the other, and therefore its own
self-certainty still
has no truth" (Hegel {1977} paragraph
186).
To become

self-conscious, the two must act through abstract
negation
and it is this negation which allows the self
to survive, in

some form,

its being sublated.

This survival through negation is what Marx retains
and

what Climacus cannot abide.

I

believe that this is where

Kierkegaard's voices make their most significant
contribution.

The voices collectively demonstrate that

there is no necessary survival through negation.

Kierkegaard has offered himself to the personal

demonstration of consistency on this point by means of
self-sacrifice.

Climacus' response to Hegel's conception of

the doubly reflected self might actually be Hegelian science

speaking through him.

If so, given his vast sensitivity to

.

a

.
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the most minor nuances
of language and his religious
outlook, it would be no wonder
that he thought the

appropriate inner to be God.

That Climacus keeps bumping

into the the wall which is
God, could express the fact
that
vessels for science have to
continuously prepare themselves.

Climacus’ attempts at describing
why he cannot describe what
he has experienced make
Pecheux’s description of the
Munchausen effect, alluded to in
Chapter Two, seem like
understatement

Kierkegaard prepared himself (more
precisely,
Kierkegaard was prepared) to be a prophet

for/of God.

when

reality instead made its presence in
him he could not see it
as anything but what he had been
prepared to accept
god-man with whom to talk.
it is significant

—

that it was

his own preparation which was crucial
to his finding the

response that he did find.

Society made him Protestant.

Society made him Romantic.

Society made him Hegelian.

Hegel wanted to be God

— Climacus

wanted what would be much

more fulfilling and significant but what was also
newer --he wanted to talk with God.
to

fc)e

God.

He was too lonely just

Kierkegaard could not act out to the limit;

nonetheless, Kierkegaard desires beyond his acculturation.
On a personal level this was, of course and obviously,

disastrous
(That

lie

played

experiences would be

part in the preparation of his

a
a

mystery, since Kierkegaard, of all
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people, could not be in advance
of himself, but if he
hadn't, i.e., if he had just had
an idea that would also
raise a mystery.
Do people writing believe it is
they who
write? And yet could anyone else
write exactly as
they

write?

Kierkegaard's corpus requires God, and it
requires
particular individuals who can seal themselves

off from the

world in

a

coherent frame of mind.)

Kierkegaard attempts to bring the whole
process into one
self in an effort to save the primacy of
subjectivity.

Climacus describes the inner process of reflection
this way:
"the reflection of inwardness gives to the
subjective

thinker

a

universal;

double reflection.

in thinking he thinks the

but as existing in this thought and as

assimilating it in his inwardness, he becomes more and more

subjectively isolated" (Climacus {1968}

p.

68).

of becoming subjective never ends for Climacus

begins either.

The process

— but

it never

There is neither unity nor synthesis.

The

subject gets thrown back on itself and becomes increasingly
isolated and subjective.

Yet the increasing isolation that

the subjective thinker experiences does not preclude an

analysis of the relationship of the subjective thinker to
the other.

For Climacus, this relation to the other has

double meaning.

There is ordinary relating via ordinary

communication which is immediate (Climacus {1968}
In addition, however,

p.

68).

there is the impossibility of any

communication from within the subjects' religiosity:

a
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"direct communication presupposes
certainty;
but certainty
is impossibie for anyone
in the process of becoming,
and
the semblance of certainty
constitutes for such an
individual a deception" (Climacus
{1968} p. 68, note).
If Anti-Cl imacus had not
feared God so much, Climacus
might have been allowed to understand
subjectivity and
Kierkegaard himself might have
established non-graphematic
relationships.
in the end the fear of "getting
it wrong,"
made of all the voices closed
entities. The student
Kierkegaard, the Kierkegaard whose Concept
of irony shows
him capable of laughter, and not just
"humor” or "comedy,"
could have done the work of Bataille if
he could have broken
on through to the understanding with
Socrates that his
desice required.
Having failed in this relationship after
being so close God offered the only acceptable
risk of

—

—

final failure.
It

Too bad for Regina!

is certainly worth noting that the author of
Fear and

Trembling was concerned whether God in any form is worth any
kind of sacrifice.

And the answer implies that any

sacrifice is especially self-sacrifice.

To have considered

sacrifice is to have already sacrificed oneself.

Kierkegaard

rejects Regina, sacrifices her for his

spiritual gain.

Henceforth, his self is already sacrificed.

Can Abraham be himself (his old self) after holding the
knife above the body of his son?
by Fear and Trembling

.

This is the question posed

An immediate answer is "no

"

"

.
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Another answer is. "no one
fails to hold the knife over
some
body
.

Because of the impossibility
of direct communication,
agreement among individuals
with respect to issues of
subjectivity is for Climacus
-'the grossest kind of
misunderstanding" (Climacus
{1968} p. 69).
One might argue
some of the alleged disagreements
between Kierkegaard
and Hegel are due to a mi
s-communicat ion
Once Kierkegaard
finds the self missing in
Hegelian thought, he erases
.

exteriority.

This is

a

result forced by the space of

cultural and grammatical conditioning;

nothing in the

structure of the leap forces such an
erasure.
That is,
since Climacus fills the structural
place he has found as
the sacred space wherein one
communes with God, he must

conclude that the significance of anything
outside of that
space is as nothing. No one can fault
him for this erasure
of the outside

[9]

More interestingly each person is freed

from a self-examined life which leads
necessarily to some

variant of already available options.

Kierkegaard's closet
possibility,

a

a

We must seize from

sense of what is possible.

From this

solution to the problem of communication and

perhaps, to that of democratic theory addresses us.
is,

That

we know from Kierkegaard's example that one does not

necessarily survive as the same self from stage to stage;
in fact, one is transformed

(and one transforms one's

.
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selves)

from self to self as one
acts and thinks in the

world

What "privileges" S^ren
Kierkegaard over the authors?
Who is the
such

one transformed

(or

transforming)?

There is

self that might be called the
vessel self, a self
that may carry the same name
even if it is completely
rebuilt on the open seas. We
cannot know this self.
it is
necessary that it exist but we do
not know it as it is
a

unobservable.

it is not the self that might do
science as

the critique of Pecheux showed.

A transcendental argument

based on memory gives us proximate
knowledge that there is
such a self— one remembers that one has
done things that one
could not have done (as the self one now
is).
Kierkegaard's
grasps at this realization in his concept of
repetition;
he

thought an act could be repeated but not
necessarily by the
same person.
Only the certain knowledge that
this is my

self acting now matters politically, because
this knowledge

impels us to communicate and act.

The proximate knowledge

of the vessel self results in self analysis which
will

always end in confusion.

(it is not there to

analyse— its

vestigial trace makes us want such an analysis and the
theories based on this misguided desire reinforce an

insatiable need to know oneself in this sense.

It is

interesting that if one wanted to make others apolitical,
fostering self-absorption in them would probably rank second

)
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only to violence and its
continual threat as means to
achieving that end
.

The vessel selves do not act.
they are not real selves;

constructions.
this point.

They cannot act because

they are ideological

We may take Kierkegaard to have
established

He sees that only particular
selves, at

particular moments, could act.

Hegel's selves are really

vessel selves who can only arrive
at Hegelian selfhood at
the end of an impossible journey.
From the present point of
view, the democratic theories surveyed
in the first two

chapters are theories of vessel selves.
not succeed.

That is why they do

Their selves cannot communicate, and hence

they cannot act.
In spite of the difference between Hegel
and Climacus

with respect to interiority and exteriority, it
is important
to add that Climacus either adopts or re-invents
certain key

concepts and interpretations of history which we can
trace
to Hegel.

These concepts of inwardized spatial locations

are very important to both philosophers' conceptions of

history.

Hegelian.

I

have argued that on many key points Climacus is
He shares Hegel's theory of history and he

appropriates the dialectic when the dialectic is restricted
to the outer world.

Importantly, he also shares the notion

of the individual striving for knowledge or truth and the

notion that communication is doubly reflected.

Thus far the

major difference between the philosophers under discussion.
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is the extent to which the
self is susceptible to
inwardized

exteriority

[10]

.

Mark Taylor’s early work on
Kierkegaard can be seen as
corroborating my analysis of Thulstrup.
Taylor views Hegel
and Kierkegaard as not only
sharing important

"methodological procedures" but also as
sharing the same
aim, viz., "how can spiritlessness
be cured?"

(Taylor {1980}

P.

13).

For Taylor,

the major break between the two is
the

place where Kierkegaard refuses to
allow the dispersion of
the self into abstraction or into
the community:
"it is

apparent that Kierkegaard must reject Hegel's
contention
that authentic selfhood presupposed
membership in spiritual
community.
Instead of being the fulfillment
of selfhood,

life in community with others is

a

concession to the human

weakness of being unable to bear the isolation of
spiritual
individuality"

(Taylor

{1980}

pp. 189-90).

The contrary readings of Thulstrup and Taylor give
one

pause.

Taylor's analysis is so different from Thulstrup's

that one cannot help but think something serious has gone

wrong in at least one of the readings.
this view.

George Connell is of

He calls for a new reading that will examine the

thoroughly dialectical relationship of Kierkegaard to Hegel"
because readers, on his view, should be freed from "both

Thulstrup's overemphasis of Kierkegaard's independence from
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Hegel and Taylor's occasional
exaggeration of the Dane's
debt" (Connell {1985} p. 193).

Henry Sussman's reading may
answer Connell's plea for a
more dialectical one.
For Sussman, Kierkegaard's
attacks on
Hegel serve as a "general
disruption or paralysis of the
Hegelian pretensions to consummation
and continuity"
(Sussman {1982} p. 69).
Sussman argues that several tools
are used to effect this paralysis,
among them
the use of

aphorism and what he calls logical
deadlock.

He notes that

the widespread use of aphorism
makes a mockery of the

Hegelian claims of resolution and progress"
(Sussman {1982}
Sussman's reading is significant in that it
P- 77).
takes

the indirect methods of Kierkegaardian
communication

seriously.

The use of the aphorism as indirect

communication is by itself

a

dialectical criticism of

Hegel's optimistic exposition.
a

metaphor of solitude.

The aphorism can be seen as

By its isolated nature, its compact

potential devoid of the explicit structure of system, it is
almost certain to be understood differently by each reader.

Nietzsche, the greatest writer of the aphorism says in Ecce
Homo,

"Ultimately nobody can get more out of things,

including books than he already knows" (Nietzsche {1967}
261).

This is especially true of the aphorism.

p.

The readers

meet the writer in the space of the aphorism and are forced
to make of it what they will.

system, no help from

a

There is no help from

narrating backdrop.

a

And yet, writers
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Of aphorisms cannot help
but take a position with
respect to

an authorship uniquely their
own, i.e., towards their own
aphorisms.
Kierkegaard works at this in the
revealing of
his authorship;
Nietzsche in Ecce
Homo.

Indirect communication carries
within itself the desire
for a full communication.
Kierkegaard claims not to
understand his work nor to have any
privileged knowledge of
interpretation respecting it. The work
of the pseudonymous
authoro is one of doubly reflected
communication.
As such,

Kierkegaard's interpretation is no more
privileged than
anyone's (Climacus {1968} p. 551). The
possibility of an
aphorism whose interpretation would unfold
with necessity
seems to be forbidden by Hegel's systematizing
and

non-aphor istic philosophy.

Hegel uses aphoristic sentences

only to illustrate discursive positions.

Kierkegaard's use

of aphorisms is a more certain sign of
disagreement with

Hegel than any dialectical

anti-dialectical) protest.

(or

even prosaically

This form of writing denies

system more forcefully and more credibly than do direct
attacks [11]

.

Sussman discusses the logical deadlock, the logic of the
either/or which "suspends dialectical progression in
single cell"

(Sussman {1982} p. 92).

a

According to Sussman's

Kierkegaard, the individual is faced with situations of
"either/or" in which no logic or rationale can force the

individual to choose one possibility over another.

The
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ostensible movement of the Hegelian
system does not allow
the individual any freedom to
determine the course of his
existing possibilities. By stopping
this supposed movement
with an "either/or" choice and
freedom are
able to erase

the necessity of taking one
course on the journey to

selfhood.

The moment of dead lock will be
developed

into a strategy of political action
in Chapter Four.
We have noticed only two of many
techniques that are

possible for indirect communications--the
aphorism and the
logical deadlock.
Both are important.
in each case a self
that exists apart from a system is
affirmed and valued
positively. As such these forms communicate a
sense of

ength--a sense that there is the possibility of
resisting
system.
They also bring back to history the importance
of a
s tr

particularized or concrete subject as
subject, but
rails of

a

a

thoughtfully acting

subject whose thoughts do not follow the

a

stepwise logical development.

"Subject" is no

longer seen as an impersonal catalyst for world historical

events but as
desire.

a

self who has "unique" or extra-systemic

Bataille's work can be manipulated in such

that the subject can derive
to join a new "group."

a

political desire

— the

a

way

desire

Taking the route through Kierkegaard

to Bataille allows the possibility of grouping, but without

returning the self to the submissive position with respect
to world history.

The point, to be developed below, is that

the groups cannot be made jointly subservient to

a
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totalizing system.

The contribution of these serious
voices

is in making it possible
for people, to view themselves
as
actors (and not just reactors).

Sussman claims that because of
the techniques which
Kierkegaard uses against Hegel he
can open up the space
between philosophy and literature
(Sussman {1982} p.
156-58).

Kierkegaard forces his readers to fictionalize
themselves, this taking place in a theater
where they become
as important, consciously as the
authors for whom
,

Kierkegaard served as vessel and the author who
is
Kierkegaard.
fact.

Fiction thus forces philosophy, after its

Kierkegaard's bravery is shown in his assumption of

the risks previously taken only by mythical
caricatures.

His interest in representative characters is
grounded in

this risk-taking, an action avoided by most "real"

people

or, vessel selves.

The mythical figures in his work

outnumber real persons and fictional representatives of

ordinary people significantly. He played symbolic roles
without guarantees of success and with no community backing
his efforts.

He forced a community to exist wherein all

participants are equally creative even though those
participants are the authors whom he simultaneously is and
is not.

Literally.

The main point here is that to read

Kierkegaard's texts is to read

a

utopia whose main

imperfection is that it does not exist.

To note this,

however, is to be an active participant in the dialogue and
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not merely

a

passive recipient of information,
More

importantly, it is to be

a

self who wants to

someone in the paper village.

i

nstantiate

The main point here is that

the reader is no mere reader.
To conclude

,

Climacus is largely Hegelian.

His work

centers around the crucial concept of
inwardized
exteriority.

That is, the major thesis of his work
is that

there are selves that are complete and
in some instants
(moments)

essences.

free.

Selves are not free to create their own

Selves are free to identify with some group,
or

to measure themselves against God.

in a moment of freedom

Climacus identifies with, but never merges with
Christianity;

Kierkegaard finds this in Climacus despite

Kierkegaard's own need to identify with
his real father, the silent mother,

passage where Climacus claims not be

a

different other:

real "lady-love."

a
a

The

Christian is followed

by a passage that covers every topic of this dissertation:

...he who has a real ladylove is prohibited by
fidelity and morality from dangling after an
imaginary one, even if he does it ever so quietly.
But he who has none yea, he is at liberty to do
it
and the author who has no real reader is at
liberty to have a fancied one, he is even at liberty
to admit it, for there is no one whom he offends.
All praise to the well-ordered state!
How can
anybody be so busy wanting to reform the state and
to get the government changed!
Of all forms of
government the monarchical is the best, more than
any other it favors and protects the private
gentleman's quiet conceits and innocent pranks.
Only democracy, the most tyrannical form of
government, obliges everyone to take a positive
part, as the societies and general assemblies of our
time often enough remind one.
Is this tyranny, that

—

—
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one man wants to rule and so
leave the rest of us
free? No but it is tyranny
that all want to rule
and in addition to that would
oblige everybody to
take part in the government, even
the
insistently declines to have a share man who most
in governing.
(Climacus {1968} p. 547-8)
,

We cannot overlook the confusion
of this passage:

paradigmatically anti-systemic.

r

it is

That there is no break

between lover and reader is not puzzling:

if a problem of

interpretation exists it is that there are so
many
solutions.
All of Kierkegaard's books are

for the one

reader who is his imaginary lover, Regina.
no lover who is not

a

reader;

lover, he has no real reader.

Kierkegaard has

and as Kierkegaard has no

When we read Kierkegaard in

the ordinary sense we are less real that the
reader he

envisions in his mind.

This reader is the lover is

universal is nothing ... and in all of this there stands the
state, well-ordered, menacing, keeping us from our loves,
our dreams, our work.

There is only one Monarchy that

Kierkegaard believes can save us for work

— and

this Monarchy

always consists of two persons only.
But to go from here to there!
lover to:

From lover qua reader qua

"All praise to the well-ordered State!"

Is the

well-ordered state, like the imaginary lover and reader
perfect and non-existent or existing and imperfect.
wanted love, recognition, freedom;

We had

and, there was nothing.

If these things existed, we would have no need to create.

But they do not exist so we must create.

Kierkegaard
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attempts to deflect responsibility
by saying:
"You choose
who is Kierkegaard who
Climacus, who the deserter of
Regina.
I will not do it
because I do not know who I am."
In these moments Kierkegaard's
connection to the world
may be pathological.
Political actors should have
connections to the world which are
not pathological:
this
is not always possible.
The most idealist utopia may be
that of proscribing sanity
for the entire
,

polis.

m

the

minimal connection to the world
which is so essential for
Kierkegaard, we find the place where
we must leave
Kierkegaard [12]
Kierkegaard is frozen
.

starts of

cannot see
world.

in the fits and

despairing indirect communication because
he

a
a

way to communicate directly, to be in
the

in this,

he is sensitive to the real consequences
of

the political theories we examined in the
first two

chapters.

One could adopt his relation to text and

Climacus' critique of abstract negation but still not

surmount political paralysis as the following case study
shows.

I

offer the example to show that the first two

critiques and the help from Kierkegaard and his array of
selves must work together in grounding

a

theory of political

action else the results are less than satisfactory.
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Paper Village, Paper Selves

For Derrida, Bataille errs
politically in that he has no
strategy— he is just in a game.
(One would imagine that

Derrida could make the same
criticism of Kierkegaard.)
Because Bataille does not recognize
how binding the rules of
Hegel, Bataille seems to Derrida
to be somewhat more than an
insightful funster.
The joke for Derrida is that Bataille
thinks that poetic ecstatic discourse
can be opposed to
significative discourse. Derrida's point is
that this

discourse'

is linked to the other from before
the

beginning— it cannot be another chain unwound
aside
(Derrida {1978} p. 261).
this criticism;

it"

Derrida is perfectly correct in

however, the criticism may be used against

some of his own political discussion.

The image of

a

single

text can no longer be rent by decisive concrete
actions,

since action cannot be outside the text.

There is only one

discourse and ultimately only one right strategy:

"One

understands nothing about general strategy if one absolutely
renounces any regulation of ascertaining non-pertinence.
one loans it, abandons it, puts it into any hands:

right or the left."

If

the

(Derrida {1978} p. 276).

In concrete terms what this means is that even though we

renounce meaning we cannot free ourselves of textual

ambiguities.

We do not do critique (we do not take
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positions) but we take double
positions which restrict
possibilities by a determination.
"But Beyond"...
Derrida says: apartheid denotes
"a monstrous unique and
unambiguous thing" (Derrida
{1986} p. 159). Facts unlike
words are stubborn (Derrida
{1986} p. 163) and strategy is
unequivocally a call to action.
"Text as I use the word is
not the book. It is precisely
for strategic reasons that I
found it necessary to recast the
concept of text by
generalizing it almost without 1 imi
t
wi thou t any limit
that is" (Derrida {1986} p.
167).

m

.

.

.

For strategic purposes, Derrida
finds it necessary to

recast the concept of text as encompassing
everything.

how are his readers to act?
talked about, the better.
how?

"Apartheid, the more it's

But who will do the talking?

These are the questions.

not enough.

But

And

Because talking about it is

On such a grave subject, one must be serious

and not say just anything"

(Derrida {1986} p. 156).

acting is talking carefully.

Here

"A serious response here would

take hundreds of pages,.."

(Derrida {1986} p. 167).

acting is writing enough.

Derrida may be attacking people

who rely on too crude

a

Here

distinction between text and act,

but his subsumption of action to text seems to rely on the

efficacy of established channels of communication.

This is

why refining Bataillian strategies requires critiques of

existing theories of political action.

.

:
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in this case,

Derrida's strategy-there
can only be the
one-deconstructs itself in the
world.
For instance, in the
de Han case, where writing
is, after all, partly
what is at
issue, the same plea is
made by Derrida as for
understanding
partheid.
After an eloquent and moving
defense of de Man's
career and defense of text in
itself Derrida engages
in

"action"
V
r
r ad mY tSXt
j
1
imagine that for some
it iill sPPm ?I hhave tried, '
when
all is said and done
P1 ttS all the Protests or precautions,
to
Dr ot-pr
SaV
UStlfy What does not d oserve to be
saved
u\i!
saved.
I ask
these readers, if they still have
S m
er n f
jU tice and
to take the time
?
to rer:ad
ad ' a s °?
cl °sely
as possible.
(Derrida {1988}
p. 651
t-

.

\

^

have no criticism of Derrida except
that he does not go
far enough. It is better to reread
than not to reread;
the
I

rereading should come to an end in action,

when we write

about situations requiring action, or talk
about them, the
discourse should match the temporal exigencies
involved.

Political writing has been too careful.

Bataille explodes this problem by giving up the notion
of rational, fully controlled communication

space.

— opening

a

One could say that Bataille’s advance is in knowing

not only that he exists in the world, but that he exists

excessively as many in the world.
hand on Climacus;

there is no such restriction on Bataille.

Bataille may be too careless;
alive

We laid no dialectical

he reminds us that we are
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Bata i lie

1

s

Addition to the Dialectic

That freedom cannot be contained in Hegelian
dialectics
is Cl imacus

important reaction against the Hegelian notion

'

of the self.

I

insist that Climacus' resistance to Hegel is

in having brought the double reflection into
inward

actuality.

What is mere consciousness for Hegel becomes

self-consciousness for Climacus.

In Chapter Two, we

discussed the end and the beginning of the journey of the

Phenomenology as immediate sense-certainty.
critique shows why this must be so.

Climacus'

The Hegelian self can

never be self-conscious because it is never where it could

complete reflection on or with itself.

Having achieved

significance and intensity for the individual in the face of
world history, Climacus realizes that he is asking his

readers to sacrifice

a

great deal.

He has an attitude of

bravery in view of his isolation and sacrifice, but much of
his work can be seen as his attempt to overcome his

isolation.

I

believe that the philosophy of inferiority

forced the beginning of Bataille's theory of communication

because Bataille found that at the deepest level of

inferiority there is still always the human Other, but that
this otherness does not take away inferiority in Hegel's

easy move.

Bataille was very much aware that

a

radical

critique of Hegel occurs at the Kier kegaardian point we have
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been discussing:

a

closure of self from which any
point of

contact from outside of the self
seemed impossible 13 ],
Bataille can understand the message
about the other in
Hegel because he sees the self
in both the Hegelian and the
completely closed senses. Bataille
relates to the closed
notion of self but knows too that
there is something
[

like

the self outside of itself in any
political struggle.

Bataille'

s

remark that "it is from

a

feeling of community

which links me to Nietzsche that the
desire for

communication arises, and not from an isolated
originality"
may seem strange in this context (Bataille
{1954}, p. 128,

note).

Derrida says possibly as

a

gloss of this remark that

Bataille considered himself "closer to Nietzsche
than anyone
else... to the point of identification with him"
{1978} p. 251)

.

(Derrida

Bataille's feeling of community has been

transformed by Derrida into an identity, possibly because
Derrida has lost the notion of self that underpins

Bataille

s

comment.

To grasp what Bataille is driving at,

we must stop restricting ourselves to the either/or of the

major discourses [14).
We have our first instance of a successful communication

that is not the transmission of informat ion--the

communication between Bataille and Nietzsche.
found himself

cis

When Climacus

God's potential interlocutor, he could not

continue the work he had begun.

When Bataille finds

himself as Nietzsche, he realizes that he can be religious
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and then fail to be religious.

Perhaps because he had

a

mystical experience that he could
reject, he believed that
closure did not have to be permanent.
Bataille consciously
pushed forward into communication.
Climacus wrote knowing
that he had never communicated
15
[

]

The connection to political work
is central here.

A

model is needed that transforms
writing into communication.
Bataille leads the way by explicitly
introducing an excess
that is at once non-myst ical non-r
at ional
and amoral.
Kierkegaard is to discourse theory what Bataille
,

,

is to

creative grapheme tizing of the body:

hidden founders.

namely, both are

if revolution occurs because of a reaction

by a great number of people to conditions
under which they

can no longer live, and if the manner that these
people

communicate their need to revolt is immediate but also
indirect (as reflection shows it must be)

,

then a theory is

required to frame the importance (or truth value) of the

possible contents of revolutionary discourse.

Kierkegaard

precludes revolutionary communication because of the

parameters that enclose his traditional notion of discourse.
Either one speaks directly, precluding

a

revolution from

inferiority (the only kind that could have value for him) or
one speaks indirectly, in which case communication is

completely problematic.

Bataille, not afraid of losing the

Christian soul which comes from

a

fragmented "self," or

indeed any closed self, is able to affirm the closure of
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self, because it can be
exploded.

m

the sacrifice of the

soul, and then the unified
self, Bataille erases a limit
Kierkegaard had imposed on himself.
That Bataille can take
himself to communicate with his
major influences (whereas
Kierkegaard could not) is due to
the major difference
between the two, namely, for
Bataille the closed self is
something that one can enter and
then exit (although not
always at will). The exiting of
the completely closed self
first makes its appearance in a
writing of excess.
it is
not an orderly transmission of
information, and it is direct
only in a way that bursts the bounds
of the rational

presentation of information.
Bataille is committed to his writing as

excess

,

a

work of

of the playful outrush of barely credible
new

notions.

in L Experience Interieure
1

to work, which includes being oneself

wanting to be everything"

he says that in order

,

,

one "must cease

(Bataille {1954} p. 34).

Ceasing

to so desire, however, he deems to be "most
strange"

(Bataille {1954} p. 38).

To cease in the desire of being

everything is requisite for work.

The concepts of work,

sovereignty" and desire are related in interesting
ways

— ways

which have led some to wonder how Bataille can be

positioned among the political perspectives.

(Such

positioning is far from idle speculation as some have put
Bataille right of center in fascist camp.)
asks questions in

a

Marguerite Duras

1957 interview which lead Bataille to

.
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discuss these concepts in
their connectedness and to
explain indirectly, why
he refuses to be positioned

e

C

e

vai eur souve ra?ne

att

U

si on

^
T;-ss«s:
n;*'
Ce " herche de

>

si on

htaires celles que l’on trouve dans
le
mnnHo ?
1St
he est incom P rehensibl e. .Si
vous voule Z r a
Ude souveraine est exactement
contrairp
contraire aIVii?
^
celle du
travail.
Dans
agissons pour obtenir un avantage. le travail nou
Un voyageur de
commerce parle afin de vendre si
marchanSiw? Mais
8
at
tude souveraine
iidifflrentS aux consequences: nous nous sommes
indifferents
ne nous
souc ions plus de rien.
Or le militaire, le chef
d arm^e, ^tanten principe
k la rechereihe d'un
avantage politique, est du cote du
voyageur de
commerce.
Hitler ou Louis XIV etaient du cote"
du
voyageur de commerce. Nietzsche s’est
defini au
contraire par le refus de servir des
calculs
d avantages politiques.
Pour lui, quelque chose
dans la vie humaine avait le sens d
une fin
souveraine et ne pouvait etre asservi a rien.
(Duras {1981} pp. 27 and 28)
'

trfT

.

«5

4

'

To be God, Bataille says, is to have
wished the

worst
p.

30)

"Etre Dieu c'est avoir voulu le pire"

(Duras {1981}

He goes on to say that he no longer engages
himself

politically for two reasons.

The first is that he does not

feel responsible for the world;
no hope in this world:

the second is that he has

"Comme je n'ai aucun espoir dans ce

monde et que je vis dans le present je ne peux m'occuper de
ce qui commencera plus tard"

(Duras {1981} p. 32).

could say that Bataille is not

sovereignty

a

One

communist because of

just like those theorists we had critiqued in

the first chapter!

This would make of Bataille

a

fascist
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only if the sovereignty required

a

two-place relation:

either a person sovereign over
person or

a

person sovereign

over body.

These truncated notions of sovereignty
force
Bataille onto the impossible political
terrain
of the

political theories canvassed in the first
two chapters.
But
his is a new sovereignty— one that
accepts the critique of
capitalism, one that accepts class analysis,
one that will

not force or even allow servitude and
hence will not force
or even allow any "lordship."

it is important to note that

the theory of communication that Bataille
presents while

stepping beyond that of Kierkegaard does not
completely
solve our problem.

Bataille notices that sovereign communications will
always be completely honest and as such refusing and making

nonsense of any "rights."

Bataille notes that "in the

instant in which it occurs, communication presupposes the

sovereignty of the individuals communicating with each
other"

(Bataille {1973} p. 171).

communicate this way with God.

Kierkegaard could only

Bataille can only be God

explicitly or make "the worst" into God.

"A propos de

George Bataille," Duras says "Edwarda et Dirty sont Dieu.

Bataille nous le dit"

(Duras {1981} p. 35).

The worst, in

some sense, is Death but if humans are death (in

sovereignty) which lives

man gives death

a

a

human life then the negativity of

sense of being voluntary

— that

is death

would come from risks assumed without necessi ty--wi thout
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biological reason.

And it would follow that if
humans were
death then every thing done by
humans, not just their dying,
would also be free and sovereign.
But people fight
and

work— they make
is freedom,

a

world that was not there before.

there is only freedom in moments.

death there is only death in moments.

if there

if there is

if there is

communication it can only occur in moments
and between those
who are equal in sovereignty—
unequal
(read different)

all else.

in the end Bataille's philosophy
has to include

not just death but class conflict and
work.
two are necessary from time to time;

only once.

in

And the latter

the former necessary

Another way to put this is that there is

a

generative self found in the closure of inferiority
and from
which communication comes but which does not speak
itself in

any form recognizable in received language.

There is

a

necessity to the struggle over the means of production
which
calls various of our selves to take part.

struggle is

a

victory;

"Winning" this

nevertheless winning this struggle

does not solve the problem of overcoming oppression.

To

overcome oppression we must reclaim the human body and the
selves it either covers or elucidates.

Confiscated sovereignty, and bourgeois sovereignty, code
power into political structure.

The sovereignty of

communication implodes and explodes this coding thereby
exhibiting itself as internally and externally subversive.
We must be able to communicate in order to be free

— being

free

win

not show us communication
because being f ree
cannot happen first. The
temporal component tQ spacing „
is
never chronologicai
one cannot be free alone;
one cannot
be free in relationships
tainted by old sovereignties;
one
cannot maintain the same
communication over time and space.
One can, however, separate
one's selves from the system
which binds. The creation
and recreation of selves is
thus
seen to be absolutely necessary
to the process of
,.

.

communication which process cannot
be entirely textual for
reasons which must be apparent
now or forever opaque.

Francis Marmande expresses it:

attitude de Bataille deborde toute
analyse de type
eUtl Ue
PaS de hierarch ie d ailleur s dans^e
dPhorH
?
ebordement:
Mais une posture qui commande de
prendre pour ce qu'ils sont les ^nonc^s,
de 1<.es
r ecevoir a la lettre
et de les faire travaill<.er a
partir d'eux-memes et non 'h partir d'un
renversement qui les juge.
(Marmande {1985} p.
*

'

In short utterances that are totally
honest,

totally blank,

and totally impossible to paraphrase come
about in excess
and can be received and understood only in

hierarchy

a

a

space free of

space that needs to be created and recreated

continuously even in the face of probable failure.
Bataille feels

a

compulsion to write, but like Climacus

refuses to comment on the source of the compulsion save
indirectly.
a

He merely notes:

"I

cannot for an instant make

difference between myself and those others with whom

desire to communicate (Bataille {1954}

p.

55).

I

Bataille

.
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here dissolves the tension
in Climacus between
communication
and its impossibility with
respect to those things which
most.

Going to the extreme is not
possible without
others:
"each entity is incapable,
I believe, of going
alone to the limit of existence.
if he does, he drowns in a
'particular' which has no sense but
for that person"
(Bataille {1954} p. 55). when the
writer wants only to
succeed with the work, to make of
the fiction a mere use
value, the results are revolting
to the writer:
"I had had
the desire, when writing, of being
read, esteemed:
this
memory has the same foul tint of
comedy as does my whole
life
(Bataille {1954} p. 82). One must
transcend one's
authorship to communicate, as Kierkegaard
already knew.

When we look at Kierkegaard's "own" words,
as opposed to
those of the pseudonyms, the relationship
between Bataille
and Kierkegaard becomes closer than we had
previously

determined.

Kierkegaard admits that the self is

encapsulated in the manner of the pseudonymous works.
claims that

a

He

communication from an author must be "rendered

impossible and unendurable if the lines must be the very
words of the the producer,
{1968} p.

552)

this sense.

(Climacus

Bataille explodes the "myth" of producer in
In "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" Bataille says

of art and science

life"

literally understood"

— "the

two essential elements of

that their practitioners find "themselves rigorously

dissociated.

The truth pursued by science is true provided
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that it be without meaning,
and nothing has meaning unless
it be fiction" (Bataille
(1985} p. 225).
Turning either of
the two pursuits to action
is politics.
Many people, says
Bataille, only engage in these
three aspects of life.
Such
a life ceases to be a life,
he continues, because "it is
nothing more than art, science or
politics" (Bataille (1985}
p. 227),.
TO go beyond this, communities
need to keep their
myths alive throuqh
,
rituals
muais. iinji,.,!
y
Ritually
lived myth reveals
nothing less than true being"
(Bataille (1985) p. 232).
,

.

.

Writing requires selves that are not
just our vessel
selves.
Communicating requires loving our
communities
enough to keep them alive through
ritual.
"A community that
does not carry out the ritual possession
of its myths
possesses only a truth in decline" (Bataille
{1985} p.

Bataille

'

s

232).

notion here is important to the work at hand

because it shows that groups constitute but also

reconstitute our selves.

I

differ from Bataille in that

I

do not draw the distinction between myth and
fiction in

terms of the kind or number of "author" but in terms
of the

respective placing in the world of each
event.
this notion of myth--al though

word— to show how

I

I

will use

gladly let go of the

the "rewriting" of bodies through concrete

strategies is the work of communities.

when this rewriting

is performed heteredemotically it is
significant political

wor k

.

.
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would think that work is that
which causes sublatlon
of complete closure.
But instead it is the desire
for
significant communication (in various
forms) with one or
more others that allows work to
have any meaning. This
desire for communication makes us
laugh.
The laugh is the
explosion of boundary indicating that
one no longer cares a
fig for the established
conventional proprieties
of

discourse behavior.

it is the laughter that carries
us

outward and allows the possibility of
work in the
ext r asys temi c manner.

Bataille's work is

a

risk

—a

rush into extremity.

The

eagerness for work, the impossibility of not
working, can
seemingly be expressed in Hegelian categories.
Nonetheless
there is a break with Hegel in the way that
individuals are
said to relate to their work.

Bataille cites two authors

who have gone to the extreme:

Kierkegaard with respect to

Christianity;

Dostoyevsky with respect to shame.

He notes

that Hegel touched the extreme and then turned himself back
into "modern man"

(Bataille {1954} p. 56).

Hegel, in the

end, has a completely different attitude toward his work.

The point at which Hegel, philosophically, loses the deep

self is reached when he refuses

a

radical negativity

[16]

Kierkegaard has the right attitude but the wrong subjects.
Bataille says:

"The entire morality of laughter, of risk,

of the exaltation of virtues and strength is the spirit of

decision"

(Bataille {1954}, p. 38).

He shares Climacus'

187

merriment over Hegel by laughing
with him.
this laughter:
To laugh at philosophy

Derrida remarks
(at Hegelianism)

henceforth calls for an entire
'discipline,' an entire
'method of mediation' that
acknowledges the philosopher's
byways, understands his techniques,
makes use of his
ruses,.. appropriates his texts"
(Derrida (1978) p. 252).

Bataille is to Hegel as Climacus
is to Hegel:
they laugh
as they appropriate.
But, Bataille is also laughing
while
he appropriates from Climacus
(17).
But

to laugh is itself

a

form of self-sacrifice and
other-sacrifice.

Sarah had

already given up on herself and her
possible child, through
laughter.
After giving up and sacrificing
her

possibilities, she is "blessed"
never gives up

with her son.

he is the man of faith

— so

Abraham

his sacrifice has

to be in the world, and he never
comprehends what happens to

him.

Laughter alone cannot move history.

Multiple selves are

found by successively adding to Hegelian inwardized

exteriority

a

full although temporary closure.

Still needed

is a way to produce movement from inside the
closure since
it is inside closure that new selves are found.

alone cannot move world history

dialectic.

— it

Laughter

cannot move even the

It jars history, world history and the dialectic

as an examination of Bataille's addition to dialectics show.

What it achieves is
of system.

a

distance from the serious consequences

.
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Bataille discusses negativity as
the sacrifice of the
self:
"Sacrifice is the negation of the
human through the
negation of objects" (Bataille
(1955) p. 32).
Hegel's
negativity is thus too strong since
it sacrifices the most
sacred thing, communication (Bataille
{1954} p.
96).

Bataille, thus agrees with Kierkegaard
that the negation of
the negation is not a movement
producing category but
instead an overly destructive one which
can only result in
the death of what is significant.
Climacus displaces the
negation of the negation with repetition.
Repetition is the
living of eternity in moments of time.
Hegel had repetition
up to a point but he had no explanation
for how the

repeating of

a

thing could produce "change."

too powerful to permit of repetition.

possibility of repetition.

Aufhebung is

Kierkegaard sees the

Bataille refines it further.

He

brings the notion of paradox or logical deadlock into
the

category of repetition.

It is the moment of liberation when

the "I" is outside of me

(Bataille {1954} p. 83).

The

manner in which we get outside of ourselves is by

dramatizing the many selves we are.

Bataille prescribes

acting out the selves that we are in the real world.

By

contrast, Kierkegaard writes his selves and lives them only

vicariously.

If text includes the world, once again, both

strategies would be incoherent

[18]

Bataille tries to bring us out of the text by forcing
real life dramatization.

Such dramatization is an excess in
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that it does not conform to

a

text that already makes sense.

Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are not excessive;

they

instantiate texts that could be played
out if the world were
different.
The world is not different.
Climacus finds
solace of a kind in repetition which is
for him "at bottom
an expression of immanence, so that
persistence in despair
gives possession of the self" (Climacus
{1968} p.

235).

Likewise for Bataille anguish relates to ourselves.

Anguish

is said to be caused by the non-sens
of human experience

which has no cure.

This anguish, however, is that which

shows us ourselves.

When we pass from knowledge to

non-savoir we come to possess new truths through increasing
intensity.

And the world is to be made different.

To increase the intensity of pure experience, one goes

through the following procedure.

First one glimpses the

extreme of knowledge by mimicking the stance of having

attained absolute knowledge.

At this point one learns that

one knows nothing by knowing that one has deceived oneself

with this desire.

This predicament leads to the anguish

discussed by Bataille (and which had been noted earlier by
Ant i-Cl imacus and Haufniensis)

.

The anguish presupposes the

desire to communicate--that is, one desires to lose the self
for, to and with another.

One wishes to work in the sense

described above, one want to communicate with one's

community or group;

and, one sees that this desire is

greater than the shadow desires of rationality.

Now one may

.
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begin the process finding
again the desire to be
everything.
one can fall prey once
more to Rationality.
Alternatively one may fall
into sickness.
For Bataille
sickness consists in making
of one's experience
a project
(Bataille (1954), pp.
66-69).
The interior experience
becomes the contrary of
action and nothing more.
interior
experience is but thought
(Bataille
(1954), p. 59

,

Nonetheless, despite leaving
the interior experience,
the
principle of interior experience
is "to leave through a
project the domain of the
project"
(Bataille,

{1954), p.

Freedom for the self comes
only when one has left the
free discourse of thought
for thinking

60)

.

action.

Communication is thus possible only
when one leaves oneself
(Bataille,

{1954}, p.

88 ).

And to leave oneself one had

first to know that one could
leave oneself by having
to

leave— by being

a

self that was closed.

a

self

Communication is

not to be found in the projects
by which one leaves closure
but in the explosion out of system
that reinforces what one

has dared to posit:
IS.

that life need not be anything like
it

Experience can be impossible experience.

Bataille

makes of all the ways to "fill" the closure
by exiting the
same equally hypothetical therefore
equally real.
The

desire to communicate, once recognized as

a

human desire can

be put to work in the world as subject.

This particular rupture from system is important
for two
reasons.

First, the encapsulated inwardized exteriority
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Which is self-consciousness
in Hegel is thus seen to
have a
non- theological solution.
Kierkegaard's solution reaches a
stasis not unlike Hegel's.
Bataille's laughter bursts the
bounds of the metaphysical cage
of both the problem and the
solutions
The voices that are outside of
the inward
struggle are no longer seen as necessarily
silent or extra.
The voices which have not been
taken seriously because they
have not been believed in, because
they are fantasy voices,
can now enter real discourse— not
by changing themselves but
by showing that they never were
hypothetical. Bataille does
not merely recognize others;
he hears them.
.

Climacus and Bataille both expose flaws in
Hegel's
search for selfhood.

They show that Hegel allows no space

for individuals due to his negation of the
self's autonomous

existence.

Bataille in turn shows the flaw in Kierkegaard's

search for selfhood by showing the basis of Kierkegaard's
failure to account for the

social nature of the self.

Hegel expands the self to include everything, losing

individuality.

Kierkegaard empties the self of everything

but the self, losing the world.

Bataille gives us an

economy that saves both extremes.
complete world,

a

more

Bataille can say and act on what

Kierkegaard and Hegel can only say;
private journey"

Because his is

(Bataille,

"War is worse than the

{1954}, p.

58).

We can now evaluate various strategies for finding

selves.

Hegel tries to find self through the double
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reflection of self to self.

One only knows oneself by

recognizing oneself in an other.

One is oneself only by

assimilating the self that is outside of
oneself.

However,

the negation of the negation destroys
the inwardness that

Climacus regards as necessary to achieving
selfhood.

For

Climacus, the writer is the indirect expositor
of doubly

reflected thought.

The reader is the possible but

improbable recipient of the doubly reflected communication.

Climacus believes that conflicts can never be transcended
or
negated in any manner than can be shared (see Climacus
{1968} pp.

246-7 and 235).

Thus the self is closed off.

There can be no direct communication between spiritual
beings (Climacus {1968} pp. 218-19).

Bataille finds selves in

a

dialectic of self and other.

A self may close to the exterior, and find an awareness that

this closure allows.

This stage is reminiscent of

Kierkegaard's inwardness.

But the self can transform itself

in its isolation and then reverse its closure, revealing

what it has become.

It must burst forth,

shattering its

closure, and attempting to overwhelm other open selves.
One projects and appropriates the surround with

a

novel

strategy.

Hegel's self is already in tune with its

surround;

it only needs to recognize that.

Bataille's

joyful self desires to overflow, to overwhelm;

transform its surround.

I

it needs to

have interpreted Climacus as

Hegelian who disagrees with Hegel only in that he wants

a
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autonomy for the self.

I

have interpreted Bataille as a

Hegel ian/Kier kegaardi an who endorses Climacus'
disagreement

with Hegel, but is not content to accept interiorized

inwardness as

a

final, stable state.

Bataille is desirous

of bringing back a space for communication between
selves

and

a

possibility for action in the outer world.

these writers as having engaged in

toward

a

world view which allows

experience.

in fact,

a

a

Thus

I

see

dialectical discourse

total range of human

they have made possible

a

groundwork

for novel communication by giving us
subjects who are
capable of finding possible voices from
the interior.

The MHB Dialectic

My aim has been to find

conforms to

a

a

conception of self which

possible human experience and which is

consistent with real communication within many discourses.
I

have suggested that once found, the communicating self
can

be the groundwork for

actual practice.

Such

democratic theory that implies an

a
a

practice will involve both

a

strategy and an identification process which are jointly

necessary yet separate strands of coherent political
practice.

Before turning to Chapter Four where the new self

will be made more concrete as

a

ground for political theory
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and action,

systematic account of our conception
of self
at this point seems appropriate.
a

began by accepting the philosophical
tension that the
self is derived from others.
This self is not necessarily
defined exclusively in terms of the obvious
others of our
I

civilization.

That is, the self is not defined in
terms of

the others who make up the
conventional network of the
state, and is not defined exclusively
in terms of such

struggles as that between Bourgeoisie and
Proletariat. The
vessel self will be related to many different
groups (in
typical cases)
self.

,

and each of these relations may involve

a

Theory should not suppose that all of these

relationships are consistent, or that there is ultimately
only one self (say

individual in

a

a

Bourgeois self) which constitutes the

fixed social network.

The consequence of

this approach is that self-interest is group-interest

although one's groups' interests need not necessarily reduce
to class interest.

Group interest may on occasion be class

interest. Group interest is primary for analysis but not

necessarily more important in terms of political strategy or
social identification.
seems to expose

a

That self-interest is group interest

deeper level of analysis:

through others remains

a

the self formed

self only insofar as it

continues to be experienced through others.

The variety

of these experiences can in principle cause new

selves to form.

The vessel selves represents the
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Physical location of self in
possible transformation but the
vessel self has no significant
content.
From time to time,

the formation of a new self
may involve the sacrifice of
an
self, its deliberate, although
sometimes unavoidable,

destruction.

That the vessel self always
remains is

a

reminder of its vacuity.
It is in the interest of the
bureaucrats of the state

for

the self to be unable to recognize
itself as matter

waiting to be reformed as

a

part of another group.

State

interest is best served by ready-made,
stable, controllable
and predictable selves that fit
neatly into groups or
classes.
Theories that posit one self, or no self
at all,
play into the ideological hands of
authoritarian structures.
Kierkegaard had no interest in the state; and
no interest
in community after the one thwarted
desire.
One
finds

Descartes earlier in time trying to concentrate,
shivering

m

an oven gone cold.

Isolated extra-systemic selves seem

to offer revolutionary and revolutionizing
possibilities.

Descartes tries to reassimilate self to system, but needs
his Demon to do so;

isolation by parading
e x t r a— sy s t emi c

and, Kierkegaard lives through his
a

closetful of selves.

self and its array of selves has peculiar

psychology and peculiar development
this paragraph.

An

— this

is the content of

The isolated selves of philosophical

history have held out

a

revolutionary potential that their

commentators have usually ruthlessly pruned away.

Descartes

.

196
is a convenient reminder
that Kierkegaard does not
stand

alone in this respect.
The self as information is
no self.
p eserve the revolutionary moment,

The task is to

the moment that flashes

through isolation.

Descartes' collection of ideas must
keep
reassuring itself that it is there.
Kierkegaard redeemed the
self as oneself, but once having
found it lost it again;
the self could not exit as itself.
One could leap into a
different self in one's interior but
once the inner is

established one is trapped.

Bataille allows us to exit the

interior because he has no teleology
toward the "best" kind
of self and because he is not
constrained by a prudential
conception of communication. Bataille finds
the inner self

explicitly only in moments of madness or in
death.

My

arguments in Chapter Four show that madness and
death are
not the only possible departure points from the
interior and
that Bataille's release can be completed in

notion of political action
The "self"

henceforth when

I

coherent

[19]

will use, and to which

I

a

I

will be referring

write "self," has two moments.

The first

is that the self is defined in terms of others not merely
in

the Hegelian sense of recognizing ourselves in others, but
in the sense that genuine others communicate with us,

helping some one of our selves to self consciousness.

The

second is that the self formed in terms of others is not the

entire self.

The self can close in self-development and

;
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decision— the decision equivalent with
freedom and madness.
The self is Hegelian/Marxian in
that it is necessarily
social;
it is Kierkegaardian in that
moments of individual
closure are not overlooked; and, it
is Bataillian in that
it allows madness and death
as valid forms of human

express ion— no t as something extra-human.

it is the self of

the MHB dialectic in that it is the
most comprehensive

conception of self possible.

Nothing in the account thus

far excludes laughter, madness, death,
desire;

and this

conception is possible because it is contained
in an
intelligible MHB dialectic. The definition of self

here

makes it impossible for anyone to ask of it "What is
its

identity through time?"
If we are to have a self capable of communication
we

must reject the dominant ideologies;

the self cannot be

seen as sovereign with respect to itself, nor can it be seen

only as its information.

For communication to be possible

the selves must be selves that are constructed towards

action and communication in concrete situations.

There are

many types of self, some of which will be seen to be
se lf~9 ener ating

.

Vessel selves are not self-gener at ing

they are the site of the generation of communicating selves
through the dialectic of closure and dialectic release.
Ant i-Cl imacus and Bataille saw that there was pain
(anguish)

at the moment of decision

— Bataille

anguish as sacrificial and always mad.

describes the

The structural

.
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reason for the pain, the madness
and the sacrificial nature
of this moment is that in
decision one has given up

membership in some group before allowing
oneself to be
formed by another group. The moment
of decision is
solitary, and this is the basis for its
literal insanity.
The reformation process can be solitary,
but it suggests the

possibility of communication with others.

Climacus and

Bataille failed to see this logical extension
of their
views.
We do not find in their work the full
explanation
for movement

[20]

Bataille threatens

reversion to essentialism in the

a

explanation of action by vacuously tying movement to
the
desire to be with others.

This desire, for Bataille, is the

thing which makes us human.

The desire, however, should be

correctly identified as only

a

structural marker

— each

desiring as distinct and possibly as "unknowable" as each
unconscious.

The structural marker, that which enables us

to find the two complete strands of

a

dialectic that

includes inner and outer, is the desire to communicate which

comes to us from attempts at descriptions of self.

desire to coalesce as

a

The

group is so strong that it carries

over into indirect discourses and major communications as

sovereignty but its translation as sovereignty is false.
The isolation of decision cannot be spoken anymore than the

unconscious can be spoken.

It can be sovereign no more than

the unconscious can be sovereign.

What Bataille calls

.

199

"sovereign"

I

would call simply extra-systemic.

To mount a
critique of the moment of decision
as a sovereign moment, we
must first outline the theory of
sovereignty as

communication
We have seen Bataille criticizing
Hegel's supposition

that negation "move" every operation
in the system.

This

requirement seems to guarantee that there will
always be
another negation.
Breaking the chain of negation is

accomplished by the sovereign autonomous refusal
of the next
step.

if the refusal is autonomous,

out of the desire to be

with others and not out of the desire to be
alone in

interiority, the result will be

a

major communication.

exit had not been seen by Hegel or Kierkegaard.

This

Bataille's

laughter at Hegel is sovereign (anti-systemic) precisely

because it bursts the bounds of the master/slave dialectic.
Laughing at Hegel is complicated.

Genuine laughter

presupposes that one has taken Hegel seriously and that one
knows what one is laughing at.

Hegelian discourse is

dislocated by laughter because impossibility enters into
mediation.

So laughter mediates the necessity of

impossibility, and forces the second laughter, which laughs
at itself.

Laughter is not

a

Hegelian negation because the

preservation involved in sublation is absent:
an exit from the chain of negations.

would laugh at in these passages:

laughter is

We find what Bataille

.
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And it is only through staking one's
life that
freedom is won; only thus is it
proved
that for
elf consciousness, its essential
being is not
(Dus
being;.. The individual who has not
risked his
wel 1 be recognized as a person but
he has
the truth of this recognition as an
ndependent self-consciousness. .This trial
by death
lth thS truth w hich was supposed to
aY
issue
from ?f
it... Khaving a mind of one's own is a
freedom
which is still enmeshed in servitude.
(Hegel (1977}
paragraphs 187, 188, 196)
)

.

Communication" here requires beings who have
put their
being at stake

sacrifice,"
communicate.

a

have placed it at death.

slavish dependency on structure

a

in this new sense,

is preserved

[21].

joyless

a

failure to

Death is not the negation of negation

nothing— and so nothing

dreamwork.

Here is

— it

is

Communication,

is to talking what dreaming is to the

Every communication will be

a

projection to one

or more others of the sacrifice of one self to the selves
of

expression.

One can communicate politics to others in

moments in the world but one can only say as part of

a

rational narrative something like "then we decided to adopt
the second plan."

One almost wants to say that if

political strategy can be explicated in
is because it has failed.

a

a

clear fashion, it

It is tempting to agree with

Bataille that "the chances for

a

working class revolution,

liberating subversion of society, disappear to the extent
that revolutionary possibilities are affirmed"

[22]

could be explained by the psychoanalytic theory that

This

a

.
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negation is affirmation when the
subject in analysis speaks.
Even in analysis the third term
is the trouble-giving
one.
Negation in the subject's discourse signals
a
repression by the subject to the analyst.
The negated
content is what is really being expressed.
However,
defeating the negation by showing the
subject that the

content of the repression can be accepted,
does not result
in ridding the subject of the
repression.
In "Negation"
Freud says "we succeed in defeating the
negation too and in

establishing

a

complete intellectual acceptance of what is

repressed— but the repression itself
(Freud

{

1925} p.

182)

is still not removed"

[23]

When we are free from the chain of negations of world

history but not simultaneously thrown into senselessness,

communication is possible.

When actualized this

communication is potentially "scientific" because it can be
outside the realm of stable discourses and predictable
oppressions.

Nothing is guaranteed at this point

intrusion of psychoanalytic theory above shows.

— as

the

The

communication which will result from an exiting of this
interior is made possible by the conceptions of selves we
found in unraveling the MHB dialectic.

This possible

communication will be one of selves grouping together
outside the major either/or of already existing imperial
discourse.

Only these selves and this communication

facilitate democracy.

Notes to Chapter Three
1*
Th at Kierkegaard may be the first
discourse theorist
was suggested to me by Bob Ackermann.

farther (structural) link is that like
Kierkegaard
aill
Grrida is obsessed with the third term
!f
?
l egGllai
^
dlalectlc
At one point Aufhebung is called
„^
?.
Discourse
itself
(Derrida {1978} p. 259) .“"Aufhebung means
sublimation and suppression, it is the process
whereby
something is simultaneously destroyed and preserved.
Negation is the movement producing category within
Aufhebung
Hegelian negation is used in every operation of
every dialeetical progression. The operation which
obsesses
our philosophers is the abstract negation of
the negation
which is death and which, according to some, makes
thought
itself possible.
To think involves separation and death and
to live is to think.
A confusion of thought and action is a
permanent consequence.

.JVt

*

r.,-

.

,

—

3.
One cannot find Kierkegaard's voice
in this sense
he "out-Nietzsches Nietzsche."
Climacus' is but one
relationship between texts: the written text and the texts
®f Climacian Christianity.
There is a Climacian voice and
it is one that cannot be taken up into dialectics precisely
because it is its own dialectic.
"Kierkegaard" orchestrates
but it is an orchestration so mechanical and passive it
cannot be recaptured by the reader except to note that
Kierkegaard as vessel allowed his Climacian self to take
over the old self.
Arguments exist in the literature (nicely exposited by
Jon Els te r recently (see Elster {1987} pp. 1-34) that
sentences like the last one I've written prove that there is
but one self why else would I refer to the Kierkegaard who
orchestrates Climacus (supposed to be a new self) or the
Kierkegaard who allows old selves to die. My response is
that these arguments take place within the two discourses I
have critiqued in previous pages and cannot take into
account the material force of the Kierkegaardian experiment
due to the limitations those discourses impose.
The
Kierkegaard we hold in existence to point to as unity in the
world is the most insignificant portion of his existence:
the conceptual shell that allows us to talk of him.
His
works, their autonomy, attest to this.
A work (or action)
that comes from a new self will not be subject to dialectics
from outside of itself which again does not mean that it has
no creator (or agent).

—

k Taylor has a sked why I focus
so much on space
when Derrida s concept clearly encompasses
space and
time- indeed, the historical aspect
of "spacing" is erased
i

T
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if the component of temporality
is ovprlnnko^

•

concept of spacing involves both
a temporal fnd a
“?
ltS name
The name
undoubtedly
appropriate because spacing, as noticed
appropriated*
by Kierkeqaard
is
primarily spatial, and in this sense
Derrida’s
be
qarded as the completion of a concept.
Derrida"s
315 on temporality is related to
his
(historir.n^h
observations about the inaccessibility
of
1
oriafnQ
igins
my view, Kierkegaard saw these
problems
but
could not articulate them, because
he was obsessed by the
1
f dlreCt comraunicati on—
Y
tha t communication
cannot occir m° k 30 lnaccessible
origin.
Kierkegaard is
here caotSrPdd h
bY a conventional notion of communication
as
thp transmission of information.
the
Derrida, who has no
problem with a notion of communication,
and writes in his
own name
signing and copyrighting his texts,
can express
temporaiiby
and articulate a more complex notion of
5.
spacing.
5
s
and Bataille's) difficulties with temporality
"^
J
an./comm
and
communication are also coded in "repetition" and
the
moment."
Spacin 9 is always in the text for Derrida (see
„. 11
"Paper
UlLage, Paper Selves"
Spacing is a spatial blockage in
the text for Kierkegaard and Bataille, a
blockage that
requires either an irrational leap or an explosion
for its
temporal resolution. My democratic project is dependent
on
the apparently "arrested" notion of Kierkegaard.

^

:

enfh

^

m

-

)

.

It is unclear whether Climacus or Kierkegaard is
he
who must be anti-Hegelian if the choice must be made.
To
make sense of many commentators one has to make numerous
equations which from the outset are false: Climacus equals
Kierkegaard; Anti-Cl imacus equals Climacus; Kierkegaard
equals Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard makes the Hegelian
observation that Kierkegaard never really equals
Kierkegaard. Would it not be much better for us if we had
one name for the Hegel who wrote the Phenomenology and
another one for the Hegel who wrote the Philosophy of Right?
Don't we say in any case "According to that Hegel.. '?

—

1’5

6.
Bataille reformulates the proper criticism of Hegel.
Hegel is wrong to want to ]ae everything;
he is not wrong in
wanting to know everything. See the analysis of Bataille
which follows.
7.
Some might call the need to create personae while
maintaining a "shut-up" secret and "real" self, a symptom of
insanity.
R. D. Laing informs his readers that he solicited
diagnoses of schizophrenic from his psychoanalyzing
colleagues with respect to Hegel and Kierkegaard. Of
Kierkegaard it was said that he was:
"A very good example
of early nineteenth-century schizoid psychopathology;" and,
an analyst said that he "certainly would" diagnose "Hegel as

'
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schizophrenic" (Lainq flQRR) r-,^
Laing concurs somewhat in the^p’rii

i

sSriia^
thls

o
2

j
a °d

,

_

13

*

Inter es t ingly

1

sLsr-s iiH
draws on

ct he
his own psychotic
•?„
oossihiT^rf; without
possibilities
forgoing his sanity" (Laing (I960!
d
6 SUCh P^stici ty-4y r
eadlng'
j\ier
Kierkegaard^”
xegaard
"Schi-oh^"
Schizophrenia cannot be
understanding despair. See especially understood withoutKierkegaard £he
Unt^ D^th (1954); Binswange?. 'The
Illness
Tase of^fllen
8.
i8)
Farber
"The therapeutic despair'
nlloA ,r
(L
9 {I960} p. 39).
The category of
?
qhn f —

/

'

.

7

'

.

.

Kier kegaar dian and is one that leads
Laing
to his notion It
that schizophrenics should be treated
OUS
Lain 9 {19 54} p. 76).
That Laing
j
schizophrenia in some forms is well known. values
being able to take on" plasticity without The notion of
foregoingy sanity
Y
is very important to what follows.

Tntf

^l

^

<

See Climacus {1968} p. 329.
Here it must be
Kierkegaard who admits the possibility that
Socrates'
experiment in subjectivity be Christian and thereby
indicative of a real subject. There is no
question
that Kierkegaard's cultural chauvinism is repulsive but
I
think it would be wrong to let this provincial
aspect of his
work keep us from appreciating Climacus' attempt
to overcome
what is unacceptable in the external.
9. Two pictures of Kierkegaard help us understand
the
completeness with which he turns himself away from the outer
world.
One is that of Soren as a young boy with his father.
They are pacing (again) up and down on a living room rug
as
1^
they were strolling outside.
They comment on the
weather and the goods displayed in shop windows.
And the
loneliness of his life after the break with Regina, an
intensified loneliness which is a repetition of the earlier.

10.
It is significant to note the relationship between
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx here.
I argued in the previous
chapter that Marx shared key concepts with Hegel and that
his dialectics does not turn material at the level of
self/communication. Kierkegaard goes beyond a Marxian
critique because he goes the "other way" with the self and
communication. So what we have as positive is a Hegelianism
turned right side up with respect to State and history in
Marx and a self actually internalized in Kierkegaard.
11.
See the kangaroo aphorism in Either/Or vol. I,
ed., Victor Eremita, trans.
Swenson and Swenson (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1959), p. 37.
,

,

.
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om what Merold

pathological
provoking
aposes the
ecadent is not immediately
a Way
way that th
the
o esumed lto be
u
Y P
ther.)
superior to the
Westphal says:

1
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1
superior to a barbaric s lneV i tablY think ifc self
en j° ys an
orderliness that contrasK^^i f ° r
PP y with the latter's
tumultuous anarchv
olence
Ever the
Socratic gadfly Kitrtal'
ard challenges the
self-evidence of
After all, he
insists the barbaMr superiority.
has
at
leas t retained
a partial relation
to th^v^
wh
le
the decadent
society, beneath its
!
\°
f cl vilization,
has
lost contact with' tL *

"
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*

,

but

Khomeini.
13.

(Westphal {1987} p. 48)

See Bataille {1954
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n 7 s awareness
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can be coupled with the flVt Ill*, u
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14.
is that

An example of work that stands
outside of either/or
°e eU2e *" d Guattari.
considering the
selves at'
C
lettec - wr iting of Kafka who is
said to attHhnt°
t ° the
b
P ° St " the va mpirish
Dhanf-nm" h
phantom
because it reintroduces "the ghostly revenge of the
Y element
between people" (Deleuze and Guattari
{1986}
p. 30)
Deleuze and Guattari ask:

m

•

But how do the letters function?
Without a doubt,
because of their genre, they maintain
the duality of
the two subjects:
for the moment, let us
distinguish a subject of enunciation as
the form of
expression that writes the letter, and a
subject of the statement that is the form of
content that the letter is speaking about
(even if i speak about me).
it is this duality that
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Kafka wants to put to a perverse
or diabolical usp
instead ° f the subject of
enunciation using
tter to recount his own
situation, it is the
subject of the statement that
will take on a whni
S
me fi ° tive ° r n ° more thSn
superficial. .. [m
superficial"
r?
"The Verdict"], which resolves
entirely around the theme of letters,
portrays the
u ject of enunciation
who remains in the paternal
store and the Russian friend who is
not only an
d dre sse ® but a potential
subject
of
the statement
u
n
and
who does not exist perhaps outside
the letters.
(Deleuze and Guattari {1986}

^°

,

pp.

30,

31)

15.
Like the objects of Kafka's letters,
Climacus the
communicator takes a literary form. He
becomes
ypo etical.
Consequently it became easy to think that the
iencpHffor the domain ^any-that is, that it was
an experience
an°exper
of fictional and/or dead
r C er/geniU eS
Grave voices.
The avant-garde as false
che C u 5
u
PS
e W ° rkingS out of Jesus/Lenin
nnW° of course, is that it is imperative complexes.
The Point,
that there be
an objective and a subjective difference
between being a
conceptual artist and a revolutionary which
difference is
not only ontological but also epistemologically
verifiable.
In order to have a theory which will serve
as a
springboard for political action we will have to be
able to
distinguish real real from fictive real.

"W
*

r

16.

Derrida expresses the point of contact as follows:

The blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be
organized the representation of meaning, is the
P° int at which destruction, suppression, death and
sacrifice constitute so irreversible an expenditure,
so radical a negativity
here we would have to say
17. an expenditure and a negativity without
reser ve --that they can no longer be determined as
negativity in a process or system... Now Bataille
does not take the negative ser iously
In
his discourse he must mark the point of no return of
destruction, the instance of an expenditure without
reserve which no longer leaves us the resources with
which to think of this expenditure as negativity.
(Derrida {1978} p. 259)

—

.

.

.

My reading shows Bataille and Kierkegaard to take the
expenditure very seriously. The laughter is no less riotous
for being grave.

Bataille offers an explanation for accepting the
laughable.
He cites Nietzsche:
"Regard as false whatever
has never been laughed at!" (Bataille {1954} p. 96).

,

,
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1
1S important to note here that the
^
Bataille/Kier
kegaar d point is not structurally simil
ar to
Nietzsche s notion of discipline and making
oneself i n a
revaluation of values. Nietzsche seems to desire
un ity of
some kind particularly in The Will to
Power.
This d esire is
gone in Bataille/Kierkegaard. Bataille thought
Nietzsche had already given up on unity of this that
What
counts here is that selves, whether by Bataille, kind
Nie tzsche
Kierkegaard or some combination of the three's work,
are
freed from the confining aim of coincidence with
the life of
a vessel human.
_

/

,

.

16 relationsh ip between our
ability to communicate
politically and our ability to know are intricately related.
Foucault tries to enter politics via epistemology.
in some
sense this entrance is more Kie r kegaar dian than what I
am
doing. Which ever way we go:
discourse or knowledge, the
self is primary:
"Perhaps ours is an era of a politics of
documentation, secrecy, and individuality which has made
subjectivity our basic problem--our modern problem as
political intellectuals" (Rajchman {1985} p. 12).
"

5

..T

20.
See an attempt in "Popular Front in the Street,"
(Bataille {1985} pp. 161-168).
Here several points are
made;
the most important for us being that political action
must be fluid in every aspect but its anti-fascist one.

21*

Is whispering nothing?
Is leaning cheek to cheek? is meeting noses?

Kissing with inside lip? stopping the career
Of laughter with a sigh?
a note infallible
Of breaking honesty horsing foot on foot?
Skulking in corners? wishing clocks more swift?
Hours, minutes? noon, midnight? and all eyes
Blind with pain and web but theirs, theirs only,
That would unseen be wicked? Is this nothing?
Why, then the world and all that's in't is nothing;
The covering sky is nothing;
Bohemia nothing;
My wife is nothing;
nor nothing have these

—

—

nothings
If this be nothing.
I, ii, 285-97)

(The Winter's Tale,

22.
"The Psychological Structure of Fascism," in
Bataille {1985} p. 159.

23. An interesting use of negation on Freud's part
occurs at the end of the essay where he says: There is no
stronger evidence that we have been successful in uncovering
the unconscious than when the patient reacts with the words
'I didn't think that' or 'I never thought of that'" (Freud
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{1925} p. 185)
"The same process " he says in a
note, "is
at the root of the familiar supers
tition that boasting is
dangerous.
'How lovely that I've not had one of
my
headaches for such a long time!'
But this is in fact the
first announcement of a new attack of
whose approach the
patient is already aware , though h e is as
yet unwilling to
believe it"
(Freud {1925} p. 182)
.

f

,

CHAPTER IV

MAKING HETERODEMOTIC GROUPS THROUGH
CONCRETE DEMOGENIC STRATEGIES

I

have attempted to articulate

a

self which is not the

self of the traditional democratic
theories, and

projected

I

have

potential for communication which is not
the
mere power-brokering of pre-fixed
selves.
My aim has been
to develop an account of communication
which helps explain
democratic strategies and which might serve
as groundwork
a

for a new theory of socio-political strategy.

Our

discussion in Chapter Three shows that to act
demogenically
is to be external to existing theoretical
discussion.

To

notice and understand something not constrained by
the

channels of existing conversational or theoretical

communication is to break away from one's vessel self.
Because democracy and communication are so inextricably
linked in theorizing through the notion of the self that is

presupposed, many theorists have focused on political models
that are language oriented.

other times for
writing.

a

Some theorists refer back to

more pure or innocent form of speech or

Others attempt theoretical restriction of

potential communication:

to graphematic structures,

to

laughter, to "female" or to "male" voices, and others.

The

critiques which force the various theoretical reactions
claim to be liberating and anti-reductionist, and yet, the
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proposed "solutions" find monolithic:
groups, reducing
critique once again to the implicit
authoritarianism

of

established democratic theories.
Solutions

to problems should be more
metaphysically

adequate to the problems that gave
rise to them.
Broadly
speaking, the problem for potential
demogenic actors is to
exit from existing systems or
monolithic groups.
Every
strategy in exiting a system is a
political strategy and a
form of communication.
Persons who are trapped in vessel
selves or firmly established strategies
will not notice the
communications of these groups.
it is not a case of many
being called but few chosen— it is a case
wherein only some
can hear certain calls.
a

Not every exit from system will be

political strategy that demogenic actors would want to

affirm either politically or theoretically, but the

demogenic actor is attempting to listen with
emerging demogenic discourse.

a

third ear for

Although the strategies

suggested by our new theory of self are diverse, they are
also open in that they are not reducible to fixed types that
can be specified in advance.

The demogenic actor renounces

the notion that theory can encompass beforehand the possible

range of social changes and strategic responses.

The strategy of communication is

a

prescription to lose

faith in most existing categories and classifications of

selves, and to attempt the creation of new groups to handle

emergent new problems in the political environment.

One

.
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cannot change categories at will.

One can foster

environments wherein it becomes
possible to articulate new
selves.
New categories will replace

those that one refuses:

there will be some measure of
creativity in these

communications
That not all groups are authoritarian
is

reason for exploring new possibilities.
make up new

g r oups--gr oups

a

concrete

The selves that

that are not authoritarian— are

not freely chosen in any ordinary sense
of "freely chosen."
To begin with, they do not exist as the
agents of choice.

Material, social and political conditions all
come into play
calling forth demogenic activity. Selves are
called

m

forth as new selves from

a

necessity that is triggered by

random movements in the political environment.

This

necessity, however, is not analogous to the Kier kegaardian
leap although the structure of that leap helps our

explanation.

communication

The new selves come into being by incipient

— and

not from any already

existing need for

power or for realizing self-interest [1].

Another way to

put this is in the moment that the old self understands its

limitations with respect to what needs to be done in some
context,

it begins to change into the new self.

understanding can only come through

a

This

communication with

similarly changing selves whose activities at that moment
involve more than transferring information.

There is no

paradox here because none of these selves need to be the
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originating center.

Responding to an environmental change,

the changes in each individual would
be at first too minute
to measure.
It is the collective interchange
that can raise
all the members of a group into awareness
of new selves, and

new possibilities of action.

Nor is this

a

miniature case

of achieving "class" consciousness
because there is no

authority sending out necessary catalysts to the
understanding.

it is the rejection of the old self through

an implicit and shared understanding that the
old self must
be let go.

The vessel self camouflages this event by

asserting the ideological discourse that formed it, and
trying to deceive the new self that it (the new self) does
not really exist.

The vessel self can succeed in this on

occasion because the vessel self has no content, freeing it
to play endlessly with permutations in the already existent

discourse of power.

The appeal of the vessel self is simply

to allow the old language of communication to retain its

authority, covering

a

revolutionary break by attempting to

assimilate it within the old grammar.
With

a

general understanding of communication and the

formation of new selves at our disposal, we can turn to some
general comments about kinds of strategies provoked by this
theory of the self and communication.

strategic options

I

The three general

discuss in this chapter do not seem

reducible to one another, nor do they seem not to yield an
exhaustive list of possible strategic options.

The

.

.
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incompleteness itself is

a

sign of possible theoretical

adequacy
The first two strategies, overcoming
self-deception and

overcoming self-interests, seem to be
involved in all
movements leading to the formation of new
selves and new
groups.

There are many groups that follow these
first two
strategies, most of them small and all of them
concerned

with new modes of expression.

it is difficult to give

examples of these groups because many of them do not

endure--in fact, in the normal sense of the word "group"
they are not really groups. Evidence of them is found
in the

explosion of group mass art in recent decades.

That the

body has been rejected as the locus of individuation can be

deduced from observing new modes of dance, music, poster art
and even some performance art.

Many of the new genres

require group interpretation to be genres

— even

locus of the art work is not in the activity of

works.
a

The

single

working artist or in the properties of the work of art but
in the dialectical response of the group present.

artwork and the artist lose their "bodies;"
made completely material.

The

the process is

The third strategy, overcoming

self-representation, does not seem to be necessary to group
f orma

tion--in this it differs from the first two.

Because

this last movement involves histories of vessel selves, it

can be continuous for some, unconscious or sporadic for

others
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The discussion of

self strategies" concerns politics

and not just tangentially.

There are different kinds of

activities such that in some halls determining
who is
performing is impossible while in
others people watch other
people do exactly the same thing that they
did for
other

people in other halls the night before.

Presses roll off

page after page of the same magazine and the
same news
stories.

Some activities such as these speak only to
the

vessel self.

Others allow selves to emerge as actors.

Vessel selves will not change systems because they
cannot;
they facilitate the language into which they
were originally

inserted.

Vessel selves are created by the systemic

thinking embodied in the language of an originating
(unconscious)

indoctrination.

Groups of people constantly

break with the presuppositions of their vessel selves,

acting politically and spontaneously outside the constraints
of the language of power.

This is an observable datum [2],

General Pr inciples Governing Group Formation

Two general principles govern the formation of

heterodemotic groups, but these principles aim at
non-r educ t ionistic array of practices, or, as

referred to them, at new groups.

I

a

have

The general principles
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that govern demogenic actors
in the formation of
heterodemo tic groups and the carrying
out of strategies are
these.
First, no group can be formed
that is based or

dependent on any form of hierarchy.

The second principle is

that no strategy be chosen that is
not an available

strategy.

All strategies will depend on our
ability to lose

reliance on existing categories and
classifications as
exhausting the possibilities for political
action.
This
latter is not a principle because it is,

so to speak, the

foundation of the non-universalizing principles

I

suggest.

That is, only in exercising the ability to
lose reliance on
the old categories, can one set up a self-other
relation

that seeks neither to dominate nor to be dominated.

Put

this way one sees that one needs to develop one's

communications but that in so doing one needs neither to
invent them nor to

impossible.

r

ediscover them--" tasks" that are

Rather, one needs to free oneself of the

contexts that recycle existing modes of authoritarian
behavior

.

As noted above,

system-exiting strategies will always

be political strategies.

One is trained, as the first three

chapters of this dissertation argue, to assimilate oneself
to given roles in precise and society-specific ways;

one is

not trained to be external either to oneself or to one's

arrangements.

To act demogenically in heterodemotic groups,

then,

(initially)

is to be

fearful because the choice

.
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entails rejecting the given rails of
social and ideological
self-definition. Dialectically, coherent
political action
depends on escaping the rails of existing
social
action.

Societies free from rails of social definition
do not exist,
nor will they ever exist.
The strategies I will discuss in
sections two through four below involve overcoming
and not
acceptance; the overcoming, however, is

a

continuous one.

Revolutionary theorists who hold the view that the
working class will revolt when it is aware of certain

contradictions forget that their own political choices have
a

privileged status within that theory.

That is, the

theorists' choices are not bound by necessity, since the

theorists' choices precede the time during which such

choice would be

a

necessary one.

a

The working class or

"underclass" population in this picture is not accorded
similar autonomy.

Underclass choices are relegated to the

old Hegelian category of necessity.
a

I

am not advocating that

false sense of autonomy be communicated to the

revolutionary class.

I

am arguing that communications be

offered within the framework of each individual's actual

autonomy
An explanation for our capacity in this respect is found
in psychoanalytical description of our rejection of some

aspect of the ideology formed by our primary grouping.
a

That

rejection of portions of the dominant ideology of one's

primary grouping is

a

basis for future psychological
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development is crucial in the
psycho-politics

I

am putting

forward.

The psychological possibilities
for political
action begin to open or close in
one's initial social

grouping— often

in a family.

The phenomenological marker

that shows us that we are capable
of demogenics is the
reality that problems in groups are
often solved

immediately— without long deliberations.

This is not to say

that the immediacy does not come after
some kind of work or
process.
The immediacy, however, ought not be
analysed as

stemming only from the work of the group,
anymore than

psychoanalytic theory should remain within the
domestic
walls.

Psychoanalytic theory fails to become

theory when it is fixated on the family.

a

political

Cooperation in

catastrophe is possible because of work which precedes
the
immediate solution.

Many theories analyse but the

groundwork and not that moment of immediacy in which new
selves are formed, solutions understood and groups either

dissolved or more strongly united.

Not all political groups

are immediate in this sense but the foundation that makes

political grouping possible is the learned ability to

regroup as new selves.
Proof that we change from one self to another can be
found in the startling realization that the self we find

ourselves to be in while attending, for example, family
reunions may not be compatible with our current selves,

undercutting the presumed solidity and compass of the vessel

.
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self

Instead, we may slip into an
old self as the old
constraints call to the self we
no longer are. We even have

different bodies in these
"returning" contexts— craving food
we no longer eat, feeling
shorter or younger because in the
old context, that is what we
were.
Our voices may surprise
us by sounding out words we
have neither heard nor thought
for years.

We can imagine the old self and its
body as

imprisonment.

a

form of

This image will have more or less
force

depending on the initial strategy of
the relevant
individual.

By "initial strategy"

up or sacrifice of an old self.

I

mean the first giving

A first fear of

politicizing inner experience might be that of
being alone.
It

is the old self however that mimics
solitary confinement.

The old self is always "alone with its intricate
image."

To

overcome the fear accompanying the strict encasing in
the
body of but

a

single self, one must explode the myth of the

same. Like other myths, once it is seen as a myth, the

evidence against it is abundant.

(From psychology we have

the evidence that for example, the hysterical body does not

operate at all like the non-hyster ical body nor in some
cases does it even resemble the other.
the evidence that the matter of

completely in cycles over time.

a

From science we have

human body changes
From folklore we hear the

impossible feats performed by various bodies under stress.
From our personal histories we have the impossibly small

.
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school yard, the disbelief
that we were babies, the
sensation that we are not
"all there
mere, " or
nr "u
too much there."
And, to complete thi=;
partial list, how strange
it can be to
read our old notes, or
letters
etters, found
fnnr,rq after
an interval of
time, and written by an
alien hand.)
.

i

•

r.

To maintain a liberating
component to system-exiting one
most find one of the many
selves that one is, although
perhaps one that has not yet
existed.
One must reject the

notion that we have

a

single ego that takes on new

characteristics over time.
meta-psychology.

One must develop

a

subtler

if „ e have but one self,
we must

constantly fear choosing the wrong
strategy.
There is no
question that one of our selves
is a systemic one.
Ideology
tells us that there is just one
self, insuring that we

"protect" that one self [3].

Choosing the wrong strategy as

a

unitary and solitary

entity is to risk making one's self
project into an
irreversible horror. A demogenic strategy
allows one to
abandon a failed strategy, and even the

self that chose it.

One must learn to not only assess and
weigh the preferences
and intentions of others but also to
perceive and care for
their bodies.
if mistakes are made, they can be
abandoned
(not corrected)

The way we have learned to talk and think about
bodies
and the preferences of individuals has led to
an alienation
that is not necessary to any economic stage of
development.
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Political strategies that
code only preferences
and
utilities favor calculation,
and produce an authoritarian
disregard of individual
differences and the kinds of
feeling
that accompany those
differences.
But demogenic strategies
turn to the formation of
heterodemotic groups that the
initial demogenic strategy
serves as practice for. Our
many
selves are reflections
towards our many groups.
And
we are

alienated by the society that
recognises only our most
trivial self, the vessel.
Before turning to the three
proposals whose structural
markers indicate whether any possible
concrete strategy is
in fact a demogenic one, I offer
the two general principles
that govern group formation.
One can test any political

strategy to determine if it is

a

strategy which will help

foster heterodemotic groups by testing it against
these two

principles.

Everything in my theorizing so far suggests

that the notion of general principles is anathema to
both

demogenic strategy and heterodemotic grouping.

These

principles are offered as guidelines to guard against the
worst abuses of power and are not considered to be necessary

universal laws.

give an example of an exception to the

(I

first principle below.)

The first principle of concrete

demogenic strategy is that any strategy for concrete

demogenics must be

a

strategy against existing hierarchy and

authority that controls and "writes" the vessel self.

The

second principle of concrete demogenic strategy which is

.
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coincidental to the first is that

a

strategy is demogenic

only if it is available as an
option right now.

Demogenic strategies are not planned in
advance
according to general principles. They
generate and act out
specific principles in specific circumstances.
One does not
plan to reject the values embodied by
the practices
of the

primary domicile.

I

hope to elucidate these principles in

this chapter by testing three concrete
strategies against
them

The context for the three strategies discussed
in this

chapter comes from reactions to the categories
which now
form our selves.

Bourgeois senses of the self are

conceptually untenable, as we established in the first two
chapters.
There is no rational justification for our
believing that we are merely self-interested selves who
share information nor that we are Bourgeois selves nor

Proletarian selves nor Vanguard selves who fill certain
roles at some level of abstraction.

People cannot truly

believe that they are merely one of these things.

We must

"lose faith" in these selves and in all long-term

ideological selves.

The three strategies

are, as previously noted,

(1)

overcoming self-interest and
self-representation.
For example,

I

will discuss

overcoming self-deception,
(3)

(2)

overcoming

These are not independent strategies.

the first strategy is merely the negation of

older categories. Ironically it is the abstract negation of

older categories.

it is impossible to make

this strategy
result in concrete action without
the involvement o£ other
strategies.
The first strategy prepares us
for leaving our
old self by a distancing mechanism.
I would violate the
second principle (strategies must be
available now) if i did
not arrange my material in this way.
That concrete
strategies must be immediate brings them
outside of a
discourse of purely universal principles.
Because the

strategies are, in part, the working out of
the content of
psychoanalytic work on our bodies, they cannot
be done
without the recognition which comes in
simultaneously

overcoming traditional philosophical analyses of
self.

But

none of the strategies are demogenic until they
become tied
to a concrete situational plan of action.

in other words,

the principles tell us only that the first two strategies

are preconditions for the formation of new groups, but
are
by themselves too abstract to entail concrete action.

Overcoming self-interest, the second strategy to be

discussed below, is

a

away from recovery of

location of

a

novel form of self-analysis, leading
a

past functionality, and towards

new self.

The third strategy (overcoming

self-representation) shows that demogenics is something that
happens again and again.

Overcoming is not to be construed

in any absolute or irreversible sense.

No overcoming in the

strategies about to discussed is permanent

— nor

could it be.

There are always new selves waiting to be called forth by

.
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new situations.

limitations;

provide
s

i

a

Demogenic strategies recognize their

they do not master the environment,
they

way of finding coherent responses to
new

tuat ions

Overcoming Self-deception

The logical deadlock represented by the suspension

between the either/or's of ideological indoctrination
becomes the impetus for concrete demogenic strategies.

We

have examined the problems theorists have encountered

concerning what constitutes the social and what constitutes
the political.

The problems which surround this issue are

extremely important for our strategies because ideology
presses an obligation to leave what is private and
established, private.

In fact,

the violation of this

prescription often produces an outcry indicating that some
action by the State, or some powerful group is felt by its

members to be seriously wrong.

But the problem is not

merely moral outrage in terms of the ideological background.
There is an epistemological problem that is covered up by
moral outrage.

The old "selves" are already supposed to

know what is social, political and private.

They cannot

know these things in advance for all social settings.

When

.
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uncertainty arises, it threatens
the sense of
epistemological control, which, being
ideological, cannot be
realized
Our attempt is to be outside
of the either/or's which
exist in the non-heterodemot ic
space, in such a way that we
are demogenic actors and can

become increasingly concrete

demogenic actors.

One way to put this is that less

hierarchical cultures would be ones where
people felt (with
justification) that their subcultures were
not

underground

that is, where subcultures and undergrounds

were neither "sub" nor "under."

The images we have

discussed have been vertical and horizontal.

Information

theorists, particularly Lyotard, showed the most
fluid and
horizon-less images of those we have encountered.
These
theorists, nonetheless, ended up turning to talk of
size and

relative value within an imagery that especially in its

utopian moment does not force such talk. Why has it seemed

necessary that picturing of ourselves be ranked?

guestion
asked from

either mainstream or underground?" is
a

position of power.

There is

a

The
a

question

possibility of

refusing that discourse.
I

case.

am not callously suggesting that this is always the

Counterexamples abound of situations that do not

allow the strategy of being ext r asystemic even if one would
so choose.

Principle one--that no group be formed or

strategy chosen that necessitates

h ier ar chy--can be

given up

.
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when principle two--that strategies must be
available

now— overrides

it.

Thus it would be bizarre to suggest,

within this theory that women reject the individualism
that
forces hierarchy with respect to issues concerning
their

sovereignty over their own bodies.

in that struggle there

is no currently available option that
does not produce power

hierarchies right now.

Specifically, the notion of

sovereignty over self is politically more enlightened than
any other available to the situations.

Nevertheless it is

not an image that should be reproduced in cultural contexts.

There will be no freedom from the interest in domination
until the body as the locus of individuation is also given
up,

but many groups will have to force many social changes

before the ideology of control of one's self can be

eradicated
In previous chapters,

about the self.

I

pointed out various deceptions

Understanding these self-deceptions

systematically is important to seeing the necessity of the
tri-part strategy suggested above.

There are two kinds of

self-deception that are supportive of an ideology of
control.

Perhaps through

to lose their force.

a

classification

they may begin

These deceptions are fostered by

States, corporations, media and other entities who need to

maintain power in order to maintain themselves.
deceptions are, first, that there is

a

These

self, contained by

one body, which prefers, aspires, believes, etc.

The
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overriding feature of this self
is theoretical unity:
its
preferences and beliefs are all
commensurable with one
another.
The second deception is that
this self cannot be
deceived with respect to its
preferences.
The existing
critiques often argue that this
sketch of ideological
self

is a distortion of a "true"
or

"natural" self, but these

critiques retain the root ideological
principle of
individuation: one self per body.
have argued that it is philosophically
untenable to
suppose that there is such a thing as
one self that is
I

attached to

a

single body and that it desires, prefers,

aspires, believes qua self and that this
self is conceivable
as an identity over time.
Every successful deception has an
element of truth and the one body/one self
lie is underlined
by a truth, namely, that there is a desire
for unity, and
that at any given time, a consistent voice
seems the vehicle
of rationality.

The desires of moments need not all be the

desires of the same self;

what is needed is

a

clear

recognition of the formal vacuity of the vessel self.

The

result of the strategy of overcoming self-deception is not

merely the overcoming of the one body/one self thesis.

This

is not a political or social strategy but a philosophical

analysis.

Once developed, however, this analysis spurs

strategies that refuse either/or's developed outside of the

heterodemotic group and that are not relevant distinctions
for

it.

Many support groups begin as sub-groups of larger

organizations, (formed to help deal
with injustices within
the larger organization.
Often such "sub-groups" realize
together that the problem is not
that of assimilating to the
larger group but in leaving it.
The sub-group serves a
valuable function of helping individuals
leave churches,
civic groups, political groups and
so on
that offer them

"choices" that destroy their radical
difference. The new
groups eventually may either dissolve
or become new

organizations on larger scales.

it is my contention that

this small grouping and breaking away
is constitutive of
societal change.
if Hegelian ideas become realized
in
history they do not exist prior to their
realization.
,

The work of the first strategy is to
overcome the desire
for extended unity in time.

risky in many ways

And of course the work can be

psychological, physical, etc..

if one

has been swayed to any extent by Bataille's
work the

response

to this request is to extend the shaking of

concepts to the entire discourse of ideology, thereby
remaining strategically consistent.

When this is done,

however, the risk for concrete strategists is in the

suggestion that any strategy must be as good as any other
provided that the notion of the unified self is denied.
The resulting virtue would be tolerance and this virtue does
not leave "liberal" space behind.

We can view other groups

merely as not assimilated, and the modern project of

.
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resolving differences in full
communication still seems
viable
The desire for unity can be used
much too easily. No
concrete heterodemotic strategy should
exploit this need.
Instead, the concrete "1 = 1" of political
life should be that
part of ourselves that satisfies
concrete desires in group

affirmations that do not wish to define
and destroy what lies outside.

lead to

a

a

group boundary,

The desire for unity can

new group assimilation that cancels the
repugnance

felt by the former self in its abjection.

Kant suggests

that when one knows that one cannot do the
right thing

socially, one has an obligation to exit the social.

What is

difficult for theorists to accept is the permanent

heterogeneity of the social.

This state of affairs forces

a

theory of political action that promises no homogeneous

endpoin t--eve n as

conceptual measure of progress that

a

theorists recognize will never be met.
There is

a

self-deception to be overcome and the

overcoming embraces and rejects unity of self.

Striving for

full unity of self leads automatically to an authoritarian

personality.

Structurally this is so because the vessel

self is deceived into pretending that it exhausts all the

possibilities of being one's self.

There is

a

concrete

marker of the self to be overcome in this sense: of the
selves to be overcome the vessel self is the only self for

which solipsism is

a

real conceptual possibility.

While the

.

.

:
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solipsism which IS the logical
result of believing
one self breeds a gross parody
of self-sufficiency
atheist forms, the strategy under
discussion leads
practice of caring and material
universalizability
cancels the possibility of solipsism.

in only
in its

to a felt

that

The old self-sufficiency can be
overcome in two ways.
First one can point out that unity
is just one of the things
we may seem to

describe us.

be— one

of the descriptions that correctly

That prolonged unity in

a

human implies

solipsism should show how great is the
self-deception
involved in taking one unity as an ideal
state.
Students in
an introductory Philosophy course are
often surprised
at the

suggestion that the so-called solution by analogy
to the
problem of other minds is plausible. One such

student, Lisa

Nelson, pointed out in

a

classroom discussion that one can

be certain that other minds exist not because others
are so

similar to oneself but because they are so different from

each other

[

4

]

Overcoming Self-interest

The n otion of

a

self who has no self-interest

i

s

incoher en t according to the democratic theories we have

examined

Questions from these perspectives might be

II

Who
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is the self who could perform
this strategy?"

"what self

would want to overcome self-interest?"
and "why suppose,
within an anti-authoritarian theory,
that people "want" what
they cannot consciously articulate
as what they want?"
i
will answer these questions from the
new perspective. The
answer to the first question is that
the self who sacrifices
the old self is the self who makes
strategies without

self-interest.
of Climacus.

This answer comes from rearranging the
work
The central portion of the rearrangement
is to

secularize the notion of sacrifice thereby
making it
specific [5]. The answer to the second
question is the self
who struggles against the power source
is the self who wants
to overcome self-interest.
Finally the answer to the last

question is that there is work to be done
in finding out
motivations to action; however, while there
might be
general rules to help determine those
motivations, there is
no elite, or vanguard, or avant-garde
who can determine
those rules for anyone or for any other group.

makes of everyone

a

My theory

member of the vanguard class.

in that class is not to belong to the group.

Not to be

The remainder

of this section contains the elaboration of
these answers.

The Sacrifice of the Old Self

The psychological basis of the political actor working
out new self-interests is linked to

a

theory of
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communication that credits
everyone with
potentially at least one other
self.

a

vessel self and

It is not of g reat

significance how many selves
we are.
it seems that
political actors are always
at least two-the vessel
and the
other selves.
At times we are clearly
three-, vessel self,
another self and an emergent
self.
The vessel self
communicates trivially with other
vessel selves along the
pre-laid rails of ideological
discourse.
Demogenic selves
communicate with other demogenic
selves and as they
do,

groups are formed that allow
changes to take place.

I

have

to two specific cases--group
actions against State

and social passivity before
AIDS, and the initial strategy
in the primary domicile.
In neither of these cases is

already existing self-interest an issue;
since the self that
could plan strategically is in the
process of formation.

Conditions require that certain kinds of
selves and bodies
exist.
The communication of a political and
social

compulsion is an issue that Kierkegaard addresses
by telling
an old story in novel fashion.

Kierkegaard retells the story of his desire for and

subsequent sacrifice of Regina as if it were the Abraham
story.

All the roles but one are played by Kierkegaard.

While Kierkegaard focuses on the inscrutability of Abraham's
exterior, this is

a

minor part of the canonized version.
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There

the story is an essentially
social and political one.
Combining the two stories,
Kierkegaard's and the other one,
shows how the MHB dialectic
helps us see that self,
,

communication and the demogenic
strategies under discussion
open possibilities for new
selves.
The MHB dialectic saves
concreteness from abstraction by being
a thoroughly material
dialectic. The demogenic strategies
of this chapter become

concrete as the old self is emptied out,
the new creation
appears in the world, and the process
begins anew.
The

articulation of them appears abstractly
because each
demogenic strategy must be based in an individual
overcoming:

they take on their concreteness in unique
forms

sharing only an abstract but not

a

defining structure.

In Kierkegaard's story Abraham is tired.

He has done

his best and although his son has been restored,
he has

misplaced something in

a

remembering what it was.

space so distant he despairs of
in the instant during which one

realizes that one is capable of sacrifice one loses

something the nature of which is also undefinable.
the issue.

broken.

It is,

Issac is

after all, his body that could have been

His eyes are those that saw the father raise an

arm.

Issac is he who had lived his life with the burden of

being

a

miracle--whose mother's first thought of him was

laughter.

Kierkegaard sees what the original version

contains only very obliquely:
much as it is Issac.

the sacrifice is Abraham as

Since Issac is "saved," the only

sacrifice is the sacrificer.
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Abraham symbolizes power in
the world.
the lines of the oppressed
realizing

issac is given

that his difference is

not miraculous but

a

marker of oppression.

miracle, he is singled out;

nothing to do with him.
fire, and the wood:

offering?

Because he is

a

his importance is negative and

He asks:

My father, behold the

but where is the lamb for a burnt

The victim deserves what he
gets:

given the

chance he would be over something
less than himself, an
oppressor.
Issac would have helped a different
sacrifice.
To sacrifice is to risk being
sacrificed.
To then blame this victim for what
he would have done,
however, is to overlook the structure of
the struggle.

Oppression is

tri-part relation:

a

source of power.

abstract:

oppressor, oppressed,

The source of power is strongest when

one is powerful because of one's relationship

with God, with

a

class, with

a

race, with a gender.

(Inner

strength is almost always attributed to an external power
source.)

Abstraction is strongest because it cannot be

located for concrete attack, but it is also most easily

dissipated once it is located and the rails of habit are
torn up.

I

am not suggesting that class, race, gender are

mere abstractions;

but that in their use as sources of

power they are appropriately used as abstractions.
the oppressed in this story;

power source is God.

Abraham the oppressor;

Issac is
the

That there is no real agency involved

.
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is seen by Issac's

implicit willingness to perform
the

sacrifice of the lamb.

(In that case the power source
would

be Abraham.)

This story cannot be read in any
reasonable
manner such that no trace of
authoritarianism remain.
it is
completely authoritarian. It is almost
an archetype
of

power struggle:

brutal, pointless, forever.

Kierkegaard,

however, manages to personalize these
forces, to subjectify
the subject of Abraham and in doing
so shows
that

individuation to be worthy of the power source
must for some
period of time or in some space be independent
from the
power source. What is of importance to us is
that

Kierkegaard envisioned human consciousness untied
from any
power source and hence from the impetus to be either

dominated or to dominate.
Ideologies come to an end in time.

To use power is to

gain the ability to sacrifice an other at the expense of

something else.

I

suggest that what is lost is the ability

to recoil from show of force. The lost ability occurs in

both oppressed and oppressor.

The focus of show of force is

traditionally on that used by oppressor because it causes
most harm right now.

If the ability is lost in oppressed,

however, the structure and systems which maintain hierarchy
will never wither away.

They will merely take new forms of

oppression
Thus,

in the articulation of concrete demogenic

strategies one must confront the concrete problem:

how does
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one confront power without losing
the ability to recoil from
show of force? Specifically,
we must focus on the question

concerning the nature of

a

new paradigm for human

arrangement such that society might
function justly without
the instantiation of the power
categories which have
previously moved history.

The Self Who Struggles Against the
Power Source

The aim for

a

more just arrangement of society will

require an overcoming of hierarchical structures;
turn requires people who can behave in

ways.

this in

non-hierarchical

Our language makes it impossible to name

a

form of

state government that does not partake of the tri-part

arrangement of oppressed, oppressor and source of power.

I

do not discuss concepts such as the withering of the
state

because what is required is an analysis of transitions.
one knows other than transitions.)

(No

The question which

concerns me is "What would people have to be like for the
state to cease to have power?"

The solution offered by

a

society in which many groups struggle for power is not in
view.

The triangle oppressor/oppressed/source of power will

not dissolve hierarchy in the appropriate sense if there is

merely

a

complexity,

a

diversity, of hierarchies.

The

strategy in asking this question is to overcome

self-interest radically.

We must replace what we lose

.
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through "sacrifi Ce '" viz
Show of force

,

*'

the ability to recoil from
the

by refusing the struggle
toward

heterodemotics as

a

struggle toward any kind of rule.

Two recent books that appear
to offer concrete political
strategies make use of the concept
of the zero-sum game
which requires the notion of
self-interest. These books
seem initially to explain phenomena
in new, insightful
manners.
The findings of the authors can be
made more
helpful if we reanalyze their data
from the new perspective.
Both books contain directions a
politics of difference might
take.
These theorists mention the zero-sum game
in order to
suggest that political struggle is not to be
patterned on
that model.

But they fail to escape the essential self
on

which the zero— sum game is predicated.
In Chapter One, we saw Lyotard suggest that
a new

politics is needed:

one that "would respect both the desire

for justice and the desire for the unknown"
p.

67)

.

(Lyotard {1984}

The first step in this theory is to build

language game wherein all information is shared.

a

"But they

[language games] would also be non-zero-sum games, and by

virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in
a

position of minimax equilibrium because it has exhausted

its stakes"

(Lyotard {1984} p. 67)

A zero-sum game is a

game in which there are two players whose preferences are

strictly competitive, which is to say that players A and

B

are such that everything that A prefers, B does not prefer
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and everything that

B

prefers A does not prefer.

Zero-sum
games are models whose efficacy
as heuristic device
diminishes to nothing if one takes
into account the
possibility of compromise, cooperation,
coalition building
etc.
Lyotard's passage can be interpreted
as referring to
non-zero sum games here because he
wishes to indicate that
(1) there are no political battles
that have only two sides
and (2) political battles are never
finished because
of

His call for

a

(1)

politics that addresses the complexities of

struggles beyond that of

a

model of two self-interested

groups or classes is answered by Mouffe and
Laclau:
These conditions arise originally in the field of
what we have termed the 'democratic revolution',
but
they are only maximized in all their deconstruc
t ive
effects in the project for a radical democracy, or,
other words, in a form of politics which is
founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any
essence of the social'
but, on the contrary, on
affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of
every antagonism. Affirmation of a 'ground' which
lives only by negating its fundamental character;
of an 'order' which exists only as a partial
limiting of disorder;
of a 'meaning' which is
constructed only as excess and paradox in the face
of meaninglessness
in other words, the field of the
political as the space for a game which is never
'zero-sum', because the rules and the players are
never fully explicit.
This game, which eludes the
concept, does at least have a name: hegemony.
(Laclau and Mouffe {1985} p. 193)
,

—

I

insert these passages because what they stand for

seems to be

a

critique of late capitalism similar to my own

in moving toward a heterogeneous democracy of communication.
I

find both rejections of the "zero-sum" model

.
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unsatisfactory in that the self
remains trapped nonetheless
in the expression of its own
interests.
One rejects a
clear-cut struggle and then there
are no explicit rules or
players.
But there are types remaining
without the benefit
of a typical game plan.
From there one can quickly see
tactical problems for those players
still explicitly
bounded.
To affirm contingencies and
ambiguities of every
antagonism is a game-plan for a strategy.
However its
ground is what Laclau and Mouffe indicate
that it is:

nothing
There is

a

root level need for affirming the zero-sum

game which is the ideologically defined mirror
struggle

between the oppressed and the oppressor.

system-exit from this either/or
default,

in chance,

nor do

I

By advocating a

neither believe, by

deny the existence of System.

I

To deny a system is to say that it is not there.
to exit from something.

To exit is

Thus, the vessel self finds that it

is constantly being called back into existence by theorists

who almost recognized the emptiness and inability to act of
the vessel self.

There is

a

clear-cut struggle that can be

fought head-on by always using the two principles of

demogenics.

If no struggle is entered,

the vessel self

patiently waiting to be filled by content becomes sacrificed
to an oppressor instead of being overridden by an acting

self.

More importantly in this context, if the strategy

embarked on is

a

strategy against existing hierarchy and
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authority that controis the vessel
self, the strategy win
have an effect on that power
source which is as difficult to
theorize as the moment of change
in political action.
The
rich and diverse cultures that
surround non-ass imilable
forms of music are an example here.
No future strategies are
promised;
the manner of the culture's existence
and its

recuperative powers necessitate making
temporary

oppositional selves.

These small cultures chip away at the

power source, most successful when they
are unnoticed

because they are mistaken for variants of
the power source.
The music that sings to vessel selves
likes

to think that it

encompasses all variations.
The game-theoretic models depend on conflating
the

individual with the relevant vessel self.

Vessel selves may

be locked into a struggle with the state that can
be called

unrest.

The state

(or

any power system) may assign

a

slot

into which one should fit, any deviation from the slot being
a

precisely corresponding "loss" for the state.

"gain" for the vessel self is problematic.

But the

Game- theoretic

models have to be written from the point of view of power,
since that is where the assignments come from, and where the

"irrational" desire to "deviate" may be seen as

a

gain for

the vessel self because it is a loss from the perspective of

power.

This zero-sum game is trivial;

and so is any

reiterative form with respect to political action.

In

changing selves, the game-theoretic theoretical embrace is

.
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broken.

Rather than looking for an adequate
game-theor e t ic

image, we simply set all images
(the would-be archetypes)
aside.
We are not playing games in social
and political

action

The Paradox of Self-interest

That the theory emerging is against the notion
of

a

vanguard or an avant-garde elite is becoming very
clear.
However, the seemingly ubiquitous problem of

a

theorist

deciding what others really want or really are seems just

beneath the surface in this section.
be making the assumption that

I

It appears that

I

must

have some privileged

knowledge about what people want and that although it

appears that what they want is to maintain themselves in
their interests what they really want is to explode the myth
of self-interest.

first,
is a

Relevant questions at this point are:

"how does one know (or determine)

that self-interest

deception for any group of persons or for any given

person?" and second, "isn't the preponderance of historical

evidence on the side of the old theorists of self--those who

maintain that there is at least some self-interested motive
in any political action?"

question:

take these to be the same

I

one its theoretical formulation and the second

its practical formulation.

I

will answer them together.
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Demogenic political action, for
the most part, occurs
outside of the decisions that
interest Culture. One reason
for believing this is that
there is no explanatory value in

saying otherwise.

The old theories cannot explain
why

people act in resistance politics.
be seen as

irrational:

Such behavior can only

it is irrational to support the

"underdog," irrational to vote for

a

third-party candidate,

irrational to engage in revolutionary
activity, and,
irrational to fail to do any of these
things.
My theory
shows that at the very most what the old
theory can explain
is the self at the edge of
metamorphosis, and this is always
the self just on the verge of the sacrifice
of the old
self

which results in new groups, new strategies and
new selves.
The old theory can explain part of the groundwork,
but not
the groundswell.

huge rate.

The old selves are being overcome at

a

The selves who do not participate in the action

that can be tallied up by democratic theories are holding

society together by going on, oblivious to the interests
they are supposed to have.
for them.

There is no avant-garde cadre

They are the avant-garde.

Everyone has at least

one world historical moment and many wish to repeat the

moment again and again.
When one realizes that one's culture is not one of

a

few

but one of more than one will ever know about, one can

recognize that there is an incredible potential for
resistance.

There are more revolutions than we can see, or
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that we can act in.

Host of them are not our revolutions.

Several serious and legitimate
objections can be made
about theories which end in sentiments
like that just

expressed.

Most serious is that it is morally
objectionable

on both consequentialist and
deontological grounds to

suppose that there are just causes that
are not the concern
of every individual.
Put affirmatively:
it is obligatory
to concern oneself with the
prevention of human injustice to
humans even if the particular injustice is
not directly an
injustice to oneself or one's immediate group.
That

prescription assumes the perspective of grand theory.

Not

every act of resistance is or ought to be
universalizable.
I

am not suggesting that people should act only on
issues

which directly concern them.

emerging selves do so in

everyone can experience.
over theory, is local.

a

My theory requires that

social environment that not
Action, which takes precedence

Theory could point to the resistance

which goes unnoticed because it does not stand up and point
to itself as such.

I

do not suggest that what is required

is a massive theoretical cataloging of this visible, vocal

and active resistance.

That would only serve to point to

what is already over, and could only aid established power,
not emerging groups.
It is the small emerging groups that need protection

most and least.

They need it most because they are

vulnerable due to their relative lack of the accoutrements

243

of traditional power.

They need it least because in
the

final analysis they have

a

great deal of control in terms of

the reproduction of values, goods
and services.

To fully

make sense of the final strategy
we must take account of a
huge hoax of power:
that control of society is always
from
the top down.
Consideration of the matter will show that
small groups actually run society from
the bottom up.
An

example might help in clarifying this
point.

Most of us

have experienced the strange realization
that some small

bureaucracy with which we contend is not run by
its

administrators but by those who require its services,
and
those who interact with those obtaining the
services.

Thus

one hears
r

a

helpful client suggesting an efficient manner of

etr ievi ng information to the head of some computer

department.

This phenomenon is not due to incompetence of

the workers in bureaucracies but to bureaucracies having
no

workable structure.

The glue which holds bureaucracies

together is the people who use them [6].
And, the example above ought not to be construed as

trivial because its concerns non-political transactions.

might as easily have used

a

big example.

I

Many believe,

myself included, that the persistent actions of small groups
(on the Left and on the Right)

have had more to do with the

formulation of U.S. policy in Central America than any other
factor.

The interest in the non-political example above is

entirely phenomenological:

the actors of small groups (not

n

244

leaders, not bureaucracies, and
not huge blocks of people
with the same interest) not only
do the work of the world
as they do, but they also are
responsible for the change
that occurs in it.

Overcoming Self-represe n t a t i o

The three strategies of this chapter must
be performed

simultaneously and continuously for communication in
my
political sense to take place.

This strategy, like the

others, is something one can do in the present--it does
not

describe

a

possibility for which one need wait.

This

strategy, like the others, is inherently anti-hierarchical.
It is anti-hierarchical in a different sense from the first

strategy, overcoming self-deception, because it involves

overcoming deceptions not of the self itself but those

deceptions concerning all manner of repressed content,
particularly the manner in which one represents one's selves
to others.

Repressing one's selves is different from being

deceived about one's "self" in that the latter is

a

mistaken

belief about structure and the the material we are to

discuss concerns mistaken beliefs about specific matter with
respect to one's selves.
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As we saw at the end of the
last section society is held
together at the bottom and its
functioning
is

underdetermined by commands from the top.

Governments,

bureaucracies, institutions are superstruc
tur al in more than
the sense that they arise out of
economic necessity. They
are

s

uper s true tur al in the sense that they
perch

precariously on structures that might notice
they have no
need of them.

Once

a

fiction is seen to be

perched on its tree are forced to take wing

fiction, those

a

— and

to die of

exhaustion or to alight anew, transformed by
their flight.
Individuals, too, hold themselves together from the

bottom up.

This is why our beliefs are often coherent on

local level, but inconsistent as

a

totality,

philosophers have (mistakenly) taken as

a

a

a

fact that

proof of

irrationality in their writing on conformity to ideology.
The beliefs one has about specific matters that relate to
the development of one's many selves get arrested by the

thought police of ideology [7].

One such endpoint is that

the self that sees itself as a "divided subject," is in deep

trouble.

This unhappy consciousness is not

dialectical state

—a

state in movement,

resolution, but evidence of

self-representation.
selves;

a

a

a

final

state needing

step towards overcoming an odd

We do not always have to be vessel

we do not always have to be "divided subjects."

,

In "The Dreamwork
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Freud explains that:

Healthy persons often contain

a

much simpler

more

am dlSt
are frequently troubled
°^ tl0n therefrom
enHd obscured
h
and are therefore more difficult
rricult to
translate.
(Freud {1938},
'

,

p.

383)

The health of "healthy persons"
is, for Freud, relative to
the possibilities offered a
civilization that does not offer
"healthy" ones.
All members of civilization are,
to a

greater or lesser extent, neurotic and
every communication
requires some translation of the symbols
arising
from

repression.

To facilitate the translation of
one's

communications, one needs to open up at least
some repressed
content.
It is difficult to apply psychoanalytic
theories
to the strategy of overcoming
self-representation without

bending meanings because the definition of

a

demogenic actor

in the world does not to my knowledge conflate
with

traditional psychoanalytic theorizing.

Lacan's notion of

the fading of the subject in linguistic positioning
is

similar to what

I

have in mind, but the political intimation

is that the fading is the beginning of the realization
that

now the positioned self has an awareness of specific

strategic content directed toward an end that in some sense
temporarily truncates possibilities of action and focuses
them on a specific target.

linguistic insertion as

a

Whereas Lacan describes
single event in development,

I

would suggest it must happen again and again in political

.
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action

and that the faded subject does
not choose the
individual's persona on any occasion.
Lacan comes close to
describing the emergence of the vessel
self in explicating
Freud but attention to what is
repressed at that moment
covers over the explosive political
potential of a Lacanian
theory that would recognize the
repeated creation of selves
by sacrificial insertion into temporary
political
,

,

discour ses
Work has been done showing the Lacanian notion
of

repression to be important to ethical life.
for example,

John Rajchman,

in "Lacan and the Ethics of Modernity,"
traces

the development of the conscience to repressed
desire.

He

argues that the law and the conscience result from parental

internalization.

By showing that that internalization sets

up the first power struggle in the child,

hierarchy.

I

a

private

am attempting to show that groups who have

effect in political and social networks are possible in part

because they are able to suspend the "need" originating in

repression for power.

Rajchman says:

Thus the moral law speaks to us from within,
acknowledges our propensity, to transgress it, and
yet enjoins us to act without regard for our
self-love or self-knowledge.
Lacan reads these
elements of Kant's transcendental moral psychology
in terms of his theory of the subject.
The
fundamental thesis is that "the law is repressed
desire" ... Fundamentally we do not suppress our
desire because we have an inner conscience; we
have an inner voice of conscience because we are
constituted as subject though a primal repression of
our desire;
our conscience derives from that
repression. (Rajchman {1986}, p. 51)
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In his constancy of purpose, the
historical Socrates

heard only one voice of conscience.

As political actors in

complex world, we need to cast off repressions
in order to
hear other consciences.
in this way, "the moral law" will
a

give way to workable tables of values for
concrete

situations, but without relativism, since not all
values
will be appropriate to one arbitrarily chosen
social
situation.
The

f

uture-directedness of the Lacanian subject sheds

additional light on political action.

Peter Dews represents

Lacan with respect to some issues of temporality as follows:
At the moment in which the subject grasps its
intended meaning, however, there takes place a
process which Lacan describes as the 'fading' of the
subject, a realization that whatever it represents
itself as being will fail to capture its
non-being '... [B] efore it begins to speak, the
subject is simply a lack, a nothingness, which finds
itself confronted with 'the given of the signifiers
which cover it in an Other which is their
transcendental place.'
(Dews {1987} p. 100)
'

For Lacan the subject sees itself in the future until it

turns into

a

signifier.

The subject empties itself in

language and having spoken takes on
again.

a

forward movement

Two things need to be examined in connection with

the future directedness of the subject.

The first is that

Lacan states of analysts that:
It is a fact that we do not disclaim our competence
to promise happiness in a period in which the
question of its extent has become so complicated:
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principally because happiness as St. Just
said, has
become a political factor.
(Lacan {1977} p.
,

252)

Many analysts have written about their
power

(see e.g.,

Laing {1985} p. 10), but this small
paragraph, which stands
alone
the essay "Direction of treatment and
principles of

m

its power," recognizes this potential
political power in

stark manner.

a

it is not so much that the analyst deals

with people who happen to be political animals.

It is that

the manner in which analysts direct individuals
toward

happiness" is interwoven with too many social and political
strands.

The second statement that

wish to discuss with

I

respect to temporality comes from the same essay:

"The

analyst is the man to whom one speaks and to whom one speaks
freely.

That is what he is there for.

(Lacan {1977} p. 253).

What does that mean?

To me, it means that unstructured

conversation requires leaving system to one side.

But in

typical practice, analysts cannot be seen as other than part
of the most visible of one's systems,

state/political system.
analyst constitutes

a

self can be recovered.

i.e,

the

Waiting to be "cured" by the

fraudulent expectation that an old
The analyst is precisely the person

to whom one could not speak freely, after one has

represented oneself as free from the deception of
self-interest.

Part of the political agenda which could

come from psychoanalysis would be the dismantling of

raditional psychoanalytic practice.

More importantly, it
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would recognize the deep roots of the
need for power that
have been overlaid with the shallow ones
of self-interest
(happiness) and liberation through focus on
the speaking
self (talking therapy).
In considering the strategy of overcoming
self-

representation, one apparently learns from psychoanalysis,
and from experience, the depressing idea that
such an

overcoming is not totally possible. None of these strategies
are ever completed
But there is
(vessel)

a

— they

are continuous and simultaneous.

crucial ambiguity involved.

If there is one

self, overcoming does involve blatant paradox, and

the pessimism is warranted.

This pessimism is grounded in

a

notion of vessel self that mistaknly seems to exhaust the

conceptual field.

There are always new situations which

will call to the selves waiting to come forward.

Since

Nietzsche, when theorists discuss new selves, they often

mention new kinds or forms of subject that are already
existent, and these discussions are not formally unrelated
to the discussion here.

Deleuze agrees with Foucault (who

agreed with Nietzsche) when he says:
As Foucault would say, the superman is much less
than the disappearance of living men, and much more
than a change of concept;
it is the advent of a new
form that is neither God nor man and which, it is
hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous
forms.
(Deleuze {1988} p. 132)

The new self has to be called from

a

concrete situation.

Rhetoric must be related to politcal praxis.

.
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The aim is to celebrate differences without falling into
the implicit hierarchy imminent in game-theoretic or

linguistic models.

Overcoming self-representation is not

a

prerequisite to the formation of every new self or new
group;

however, if selves could always use this strategy

concurrently with the formation of specific groups it is
certain that some of the problems of group formation be
solved.

I

will discuss two problems that arise in

conjunction with group formation and show that if the actors
are using this third strategy, the problems can be addressed
in a satisfactory manner.

The first problem

I

will discuss

is how to choose between two or more groups both or all of

which have come into existence because of the same

situation.

The second problem concerns guarantees against

fascism

Decision Procedure

As selves represent themselves to each other

,

as they

repress specific content in order to offer the self

appropriate to

(or

believed to be appropriate to)

a

given

situation and an other, they are still under the influence
of orders from previous indoctrinations or repressions.

Certain situations force non-compliance with ideological

demands so strong that the old conforming selves may have
been unaware that their conformity was built into the

representations of who they were.

Such situations are
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liberating in the respect of overcoming the old
order;
ironically, the liberating component may come from
finally

understanding that
oppression.

a

situation is one of confinement and

So for instance,

represent matters in such
to many policies.

a

theory and ideology can

way that citizens be oblivious

Citizens who suddenly confront the

consequences of policies, first hand, may have opened to
them many options they had not previously considered.

But

more than this, options may arise that even if theoretically

considered beforehand would have had no impact on political
action before viewing the situation.
Once representations have been rearranged sufficiently
that selves see new options, they may see so many that

a

new

acquiescence begi ns--ther e seem too many groups to satisfy,
and no manner of determining which arising from

a

given

situations are the "right" ones. If the demogenic actor

manages

a

new representation that is consonant with the two

principles we have discussed, then this question of choosing
the "right" group fades away.

The groups and selves that

emerge may compete for time, but if they fall within the

space we have drawn, any acceptance

wrong choice.

cannot constitute

Only failing to choose is

because this "option" collapses into

a

a

a

wrong choice here

conservative

repetition of the old order that is clearly wrong.
Given

a

situation where two groups compete for

a

self's

time one of which, group A, has hierarchical structure and
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long-term goals for itself as

a

group, the other of which

group B, overtly rejects hierarchical
structure and is
planning a short-term action in relation
to a specific
circumstance, group B will typically be the
best choice.
(If both groups are hierarchical,

the self should form Group

Group A will have problems with control within
itself

C.)

and its actions will concern not only the
social or

political issue at hand, but the legitimation of
the group
itself.
Legitimation questions are a hierarchical deferral
of group formation.

Group

B

will not appeal to selves who

do not undergo the three strategies;

but it has no vested

interest in maintaining itself so it can accomodate selves
who need hierarchical structure by ignoring the need for the

duration of the action.

Very small groups can discuss these

needs in between actions if that seems appropriate or

necessary.

Group

B

has no needs as

its desire to address

a

group:

concrete situation.

a

it works out

Between two

groups who adhere to principles one and two and who are

addressing the same situation in the same area, the choice
can be made by tossing

a

coin.

Or if the actions are

sufficiently similar, the two groups can merge with the
understanding that the merge is provisional.
I

have avoided using the term "consensus" to describe

the method that might be used by either group.

Groups like

group B ought not to use this method because it often ends

.
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up violating principle two.

Consensus assumes commonality

with respect to more than the issue at hand
and if the

commonality is resisted by some of members of groups
using
consensus, such groups may end up violating principle
one.

Consensus, in short, is agreement among already existing
selves and our demogenic strategies are instantiated, in

a

sense, before consensus in this sense can be obtained.

Often some variation of principle one is the justification
for adopting consensus.

Usually persons confronting various

groups end up contributing to them, what they feel good
about contributing
this theory.

rely on

a

nothing more.

This is acceptable within

There is no argument against it that does not

utilization of the notion of

a

vessel self.

Such

use, as we have seen, can often lead to political

quiescence

Excluding Fascism

The material in the last sections may seem to call for

politics so diffuse and unstructured that nothing
"important" could ever get done.

I

have argued that the

notion of top-down organization is ideology, and that it is
the small changes that are important, the ones that power

cannot notice in time.

In fact, most affairs take place

because groups come together through necessity to perform
the needed action, and then dissipate.

In the absence of

a
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political principles,

a

theory could seem to end up

sanctioning many actions some of
which would be seen to be
morally wrong in retrospect.
Accordingly, fascist group
action may not seem to be ruled
out in
this theory.

Principle one serves as the bulwark
against this
possibility.
i wish to show that
it is not just by
definition that this result accrues; but
that principle one
is concretely incompatible with
fascist strategies.
I

have mentioned an exception to the first
principle,

namely the justified use of the image of
sovereignty over
self with respect to women's right to their own
bodies [8].

Sovereignty is

a

form of hierarchy;

the image violates principle one.
is correctly violated in this case.

using sovereignty in
I

said that the principle
I

make this exception

because there has been no other public way of communicating
and forming new groups, that helps to maintain this right in
the immediate present. One of the principles had to be

overridden and in this case it was principle one.
In many circumstances any strategy for concrete

demogenics can be

a

strategy against existing hierarchy and

authority that controls and "writes" the vessel self.

In

the present situation two hierarchies are used against

women:

the writing of their bodies as subservient to

society as

a

whole and the writing of their bodies as

properly under the control of mental activity of some kind.
The latter kind of control is so much to be preferred over

I

.

.

256

the former that in the context of
the present situation it
appears as an absolute good. But in other
circumstances it
is shown in its undesirable
consequences:

anorexia and

agoraphobia
The present situation involves the immediate
physical
and mental abuse of women as an undiffer
lent iated class from

everything outside that class.

The image of

self-sovereignty has been used with the result of lessening
that immediate abuse by exposing the systematic brutality

which resulted from the other image
a

— that

whole have sovereignty over women.

men and society as

No situation calls or

could call that could justify this latter image.

It is

ruled out by definition according to my two principles and

there is no more encompassing hierarchy over it remaining to
be toppled. To accept it

f

one needs to forego all the

strategies discussed in this chapter;

one needs to

represent oneself so completely as the persistent
self

— persisting

in hierarchical repressions

— of

ideology

that any political movements are anathema to oneself.
Indeed,

I

may be arguing too forcefully.

hierarchy are in

a

conceptual interlock, as shown by their

link at the position of

a

leader

seems to call rhetorically for

a

an existing and corrupt society.

seem ant i— 1 iber al

action

,

Fascism and

(Fuhrer, Duce)

"new" self,

.

Fascism

for a change in

That is why it may also

and to have limits to calls to demogenic

But fascist socialism would create

a

totality that
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could be manupulated by the crude
two-step hierarchy of
leader and followers.
In addition, the fascist "new"
self
is typically a return to an
"older” less sophisticated self.

By now, it should be obvious that
these aspects of fascism
are incompatible with what I have
developed as concrete

demogenic strategies.

Conclusions

People become conscious of who they are in complex
webs
of discourse and power struggles.

I

have tried to show

phenomenologically that those discourses and that power are
not the result of necessary patterns or species-specific

behaviors.

I

have argued that political action in

particular escapes its own categories.

When something

happens politically, it happens outside of the discourse

delegated by power to represent it.

Strength, but not

power, can come upon the realization that many successful

victories against the power source occur and do so
constantly.

The ideological blending of strength and power,

over time, blinded selves to the dangers of the hierarchical

formations that lead to power.

The reliance on power as the

motivation for all political action resulted in the myth
that the task required of political actors is

a

proliferation of efficient organizations to take the place
of already existing efficient organizations.

The discussion

.
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of the two principles in conjunct
ion with the three

strategies we have examined shows that what
we need to know
about organization already exists
The task
.

choose

a

is not to

form of organization, bu t to overthrow the

misperceived need to pre-select

an

optimal group st r uctur e

Notes to Chapter Four
1.
New selves have been formed through
such groups as
Act UP and People With AIDS i n reaction
to State and
societal refusal to deal with this health
Needless to say, the possibil ity of AIDS care reality,
could not have been
laid out in advance at a cone rete
level that would have
implied a definite social str ategy. The
appearance of AIDS
is a good example of a random change
in the social
environment that calls forth new selves, and new
social
strategies.
Here the more tr aditional analyses are seen to
be painfully inadequate.
See OCTOBER 43, Winter 1987 for
discussions and analysis.
,

2
•

i.

‘u

he

R ® centl y the leader of the False Prophets
exploded
news " for his costume and actions in the Summer

tSoo m
1988
Tompkins Square riot. See Village Voice, XXXIII. No. of
34, Aug. 23, 1988, numerous articles.
,

3.
A rejection of ideology that denies that we have
one
self, claiming not that there is no self at all like the
ideological self, remains ideological and misses the
possibilities explored here.

—

4.
It seems significant that she did not say that there
are many who are different from "me."
H. H. Price gives a
non-naive version of the argument that is of considerable
interest to those who are interested in the topics of this
dissertation. See "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other
Minds" (Price {1938})
Part of Price's argument involves
noticing the different ways humans use the non-information
dispersal functions of language.
.

5.
Sacrifice, as I use it, can take on many meanings.
There is no limit on how it can be interpreted as long as it
applies only to the old self and that it is carried out in
ways consistent with the two principles of demogenics.
(The
sacrifice of anyone against their will is obviously not a
strategy in concrete demogenics.)
The meanings I have in
mind when I use the term are (1) the surrender or loss of
profit (2) the destruction, surrender, or giving up of some
prized or desirable thing in behalf of a higher object, or
to a claim considered more pressing, and (3) the making
sacred of some thing--in this case a self (the old self).
("Sacred" I use in the political/secularized sense, viz.,
"not amenable to punishment or enjoying immunity," as in
"the King's person is sacred."
These meanings are loosely
quoted from the 1902 edition of the Century Dictionary.
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6.

I

am grateful to Bob Ackermann for this and
many
y

other points.

7.
The connection between psychological development and
political action gets overlooked in some respects because
the ideologies that bind them together (in inaction
at
times) come and go.
The arresting conponents linger on
after the institutions that made them possible have long
since dissappeared
.

8.
Cynthia Kaufman provided this example and I have
profited both from the example and discussion with her about

it.

.

.

,

.

'
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